13. At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops coming gradually to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long practice. And this is the natural and usual result. The citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to their battles than the subjects of a tyrant; but in the same proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a condition of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory: for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties; while a tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it are more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the loyalty and power of mercenaries.
13. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνδρώδης ἦν ἡ σύμπτωσις· κατὰ βραχὺ δὲ προσγινομένων τοῖς πιεζομένοις τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ συνέβη τὸ παρʼ ἑκατέρων ξενικὸν ἀναμὶξ γενέσθαι, πάντῃ δὲ τούτων συμπλοκῆς ἁθρόως καὶ κατʼ ἄνδρα γινομένης ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον πάρισος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος οὕτως ὥστε τὰς λοιπὰς δυνάμεις, καραδοκούσας καθʼ ὁποτέρων ὁ κονιορτὸς τραπήσεται, μὴ δύνασθαι συμβαλεῖν διὰ τὸ μένειν ἀμφοτέρους ἐπὶ πολὺ διακατέχοντας ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόπον. χρόνου δὲ γινομένου κατίσχυον καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις διὰ τὴν ἕξιν οἱ παρὰ τοῦ τυράννου μισθοφόροι. τοῦτο δʼ εἰκότως καὶ τὸ παράπαν εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. ὅσῳ γὰρ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ὄχλους προθυμοτέρους ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγῶσι τῶν τοῖς τυράννοις πολιτικῶν ὑποταττομένων, τοσούτῳ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις ξενικὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μισθοφορούντων εἰκὸς ὑπεράγειν καὶ διαφέρειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐκείνων οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας ἐστίν, οἷς δʼ ὑπὲρ δουλείας ὁ κίνδυνος, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ ὁμολογουμένης ἐπανορθώσεως, οἷς δʼ ὑπὲρ προδήλου βλάβης γίνεται φιλοτιμία. δημοκρατία μὲν γάρ, ἐπανελομένη τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύσαντας, οὐκέτι μισθοφόροις τηρεῖ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐλευθερίαν· τυραννὶς δʼ ὅσῳ μειζόνων ἐφίεται, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων προσδεῖται μισθοφόρων. πλείονας γὰρ ἀδικοῦσα πλείονας ἔχει καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας. ἡ δὲ τῶν μονάρχων ἀσφάλεια τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῇ τῶν ξένων εὐνοίᾳ κεῖται καὶ δυνάμει.
14. Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant. And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders. The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from their ground, and their leftwing having been thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their front with others, and did neither; but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who had once given way up to the town gates.
14. διὸ δὴ καὶ τότε συνέβαινε τὸ παρὰ τῷ Μαχανίδᾳ ξενικὸν οὕτως ἐκθύμως ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ βιαίως ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς ἐφεδρεύοντας τοῖς ξένοις Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας δύνασθαι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ὑπομεῖναι, πάντας δʼ ἐκπιεσθέντας φεύγειν προτροπάδην ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Μαντινείας, ἀπεχούσης τῆς πόλεως ἑπτὰ σταδίους. ἐν ᾧ δὴ καιρῷ τὸ παρʼ ἐνίοις ἀπορούμενον τότε παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογούμενον ἐγένετο καὶ συμφανές, ὅτι πλεῖστα τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον συντελουμένων παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀπειρίαν ἐπιτελεῖται. μέγα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τὸ προτερήματος ἀρχὴν λαβόντα προσθεῖναι τἀκόλουθον, πολὺ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ σφαλέντα ταῖς πρώταις ἐπιβολαῖς μεῖναι παρʼ αὑτὸν καὶ συνιδεῖν τὴν τῶν εὐτυχούντων ἀκρισίαν καὶ συνεπιθέσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἁμαρτήμασιν. ἰδεῖν γοῦν ἔστι πολλάκις τοὺς μὲν ἤδη δοκοῦντας πεπροτερηκέναι μετʼ ὀλίγον τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφαλμένους, τοὺς δʼ ἐν ἀρχαῖς δόξαντας ἐπταικέναι πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀγχίνοιαν τὰ ὅλα παραδόξως κατωρθωκότας. ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε προφανῶς ἐδόκει περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρους γεγονέναι. τοῦ γὰρ ξενικοῦ παντὸς ἐγκεκλικότος τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ παραλελυμένου τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ὁ μὲν Μαχανίδας ἀφέμενος τοῦ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατὰ κέρας ὑπεραίρειν τοῖς δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀπαντᾶν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ὅλων, τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἔπραξεν, ἀκρατῶς δὲ καὶ μειρακιωδῶς συνεκχυθεὶς τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μισθοφόροις ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὸν φόβον ἱκανὸν ὄντα τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντας ἄχρι τῶν πυλῶν συνδιώκειν.
15. Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urging them to stand; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy’s right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a general advance; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis to collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a look-out against the return of the pursuers. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke, being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance through it without stopping to think.
15. ὁ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἕως μὲν τοῦ δυνατοῦ διακατεῖχε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐπʼ ὀνόματος καλῶν καὶ παροξύνων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἑώρα τούτους ἐκβιαζομένους, οὐ πτοηθεὶς ἔφευγεν οὐδʼ ἀθυμήσας ἀπέστη, ἀλλʼ ὑποστείλας αὑτὸν ὑπὸ τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος κέρας, ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν τοὺς διώκοντας καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔρημον, καθʼ ὃν ὁ κίνδυνος ἦν, εὐθέως τοῖς πρώτοις τέλεσι τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν ἐπʼ ἀσπίδα κλίνων, προῆγε μετὰ δρόμου, τηρῶν τὰς τάξεις. καταλαβόμενος δὲ τὸν ἐκλειφθέντα τόπον ὀξέως, ἅμα μὲν ἀπετέτμητο τοὺς διώκοντας, ἅμα δʼ ὑπερδέξιος ἐγεγόνει τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων κέρατος. καὶ τοὺς μὲν φαλαγγίτας αὐτοῦ παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν καὶ μένειν, ἕως ἂν παραγγείλῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν ἀναμίξ· Πολυαίνῳ δʼ ἐπέταξε τῷ Μεγαλοπολίτῃ τοὺς περιλειπομένους καὶ τοὺς διακεκλικότας τὴν φυγὴν Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας καὶ μισθοφόρους συναθροίσαντι μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐφεδρεύειν τῷ κέρατι τῆς φάλαγγος καὶ τηρεῖν τὴν ἐπάνοδον τῶν ἐκ διώγματος ἀναχωρούντων. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρὶς παραγγέλματος, ἐπαρθέντες ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν εὐζώνων προτερήματι, καταβαλόντες τὰς σαρίσας ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν προάγοντες ἧκον ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς τάφρου χεῖλος, τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι διδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ μεταμέλειαν ὥστʼ ἐν χερσὶν ὄντας τῶν πολεμίων ἀναστρέφειν, τὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς τάφρου καταφρονήσαντες διὰ τὸ τὴν κατάβασιν ἔχειν ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ μήθʼ ὕδωρ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἐν αὐτῇ μήτε τινʼ ἀγρίαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν, ὥρμησαν ἀνεπιστάτως διὰ ταύτης.
16. The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as I have described their actually doing; or that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order and a long straggling column, the victory would be his, without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary’s. For this has happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.
16. ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν κατὰ τῶν ὑπεναντίων τὸν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ἑωραμένον ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καιρόν, τότε πᾶσιν ἐπάγειν τοῖς φαλαγγίταις καταβαλοῦσι τὰς σαρίσας παρήγγειλε. τῶν δʼ Ἀχαιῶν ὁμοθυμαδὸν καὶ μετὰ καταπληκτικῆς κραυγῆς ποιησαμένων τὴν ἔφοδον, οἱ μὲν προδιαλελυκότες τὰς τάξεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῇ τῆς τάφρου καταβάσει πάλιν ἀναβαίνοντες πρὸς ὑπερδεξίους τοὺς πολεμίους ἀποδειλιάσαντες ἐτρέποντο· τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τάφρῳ διεφθείρετο, τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων. συνέβαινε δὲ τὸ προειρημένον οὐκ αὐτομάτως οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν τοῦ προεστῶτος, ὃς εὐθέως προεβάλετο τὴν τάφρον. ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην οὐ φυγομαχῶν, ὥς τινες ὑπελάμβανον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀκριβῶς καὶ στρατηγικῶς ἕκαστα συλλογισάμενος, ὅτι παραγενόμενος ὁ Μαχανίδας, εἰ μὲν προσάξει τὴν δύναμιν οὐ προϊδόμενος τὴν τάφρον, οὕτω συμβήσεται παθεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα τὸ προειρημένον νῦν, γινόμενον δὲ τότʼ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· εἰ δὲ συλλογισάμενος τὴν δυσχρηστίαν τῆς τάφρου, κἄπειτα μεταμεληθεὶς καὶ δόξας ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἐκ παρατεταγμένων ἀπολύσει καὶ μακρὰν αὑτὸν ἐν πορείᾳ διδόναι μέλλει, διότι χωρὶς ὁλοσχεροῦς ἀγῶνος αὐτῷ μὲν τὸ νικᾶν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τἀναντία περιέσται. πολλοῖς γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν, οἵτινες παραταξάμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως δὲ νομίσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τινὲς μὲν διὰ τόπους, οἱ δὲ διὰ πλῆθος, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἄλλας αἰτίας, μακρὰν ἑαυτοὺς δόντες ἐν πορείᾳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν οὐραγούντων ἤλπισαν οἱ μὲν προτερήσειν, οἱ δʼ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπολυθήσεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων. ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ μέγιστα συμβαίνει τοὺς ἡγουμένους πλὴν ὅ γε Φιλοποίμην οὐ διεψεύσθη τῇ προνοίᾳ τοῦ συντελεσθησομένου·
17. However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, in the course of the pursuit, he was caught between the dyke and the town with his mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a return. But when Machanidas saw that his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory: he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit. Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him at first; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the dyke, they lost heart; and the whole company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke, trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross.
17. τροπὴν γὰρ ἰσχυρὰν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. συνορῶν δὲ τὴν φάλαγγα νικῶσαν καὶ τὰ ὅλα καλῶς αὑτῷ προχωροῦντα καὶ λαμπρῶς, ἐπὶ τὸ καταλειπόμενον ὥρμησε τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς· τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ μὴ διαφυγεῖν τὸν Μαχανίδαν. εἰδὼς οὖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διώγματος παράπτωσιν ἀποτετμημένον ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν μέρεσι τῆς τάφρου μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων μισθοφόρων, ἐκαραδόκει τὴν τούτου παρουσίαν. ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας, συνθεωρήσας κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διώγματος φεύγουσαν τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, καὶ συλλογισάμενος διότι προπέπτωκε καὶ διέψευσται τῆς ὅλης ἐλπίδος, εὐθέως ἐπειρᾶτο συστραφεὶς μεθʼ ὧν εἶχε περὶ αὑτὸν ξένων, ἅθρους διαπεσεῖν διὰ τῶν ἐσκεδασμένων καὶ διωκόντων. εἰς ἃ καὶ συνορῶντες ἔνιοι συνέμενον αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρχάς, ταύτην ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας. ὡς δὲ παραγενόμενοι συνεῖδον τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τηροῦντας τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τάφρου γέφυραν, τότε δὴ πάντες ἐξαθυμήσαντες ἀπέρρεον ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ καθʼ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος ἐπορίζετο τὴν σωτηρίαν. καθʼ ὃν δὴ καιρὸν ὁ τύραννος ἀπογνοὺς τὴν διὰ τῆς γεφύρας ὁδὸν παρήλαυνε παρὰ τὴν τάφρον, ἐνεργῶς διάβασιν ζητῶν.
18. Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple cloak and the trappings of his horse. He at once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to any of the mercenaries; because they were the men on whom the despots of Sparta always depended for supporting their power. Then taking Polyaenus of Cyprus and Simias, who were attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing their fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, and with their armour carried off also the tyrant’s head, and then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy’s commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up to Tegea. And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carrying Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any great number of their own men in the battle; while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and arms.
18. ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην, ἐπιγνοὺς τὸν Μαχανίδαν ἀπό τε τῆς πορφυρίδος καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἵππον κόσμου, τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀναξίδαμον ἀπολείπει, παρακαλέσας τηρεῖν ἐπιμελῶς τὴν δίοδον καὶ μηδενὸς φείδεσθαι τῶν μισθοφόρων διὰ τὸ τούτους εἶναι τοὺς συναύξοντας αἰεὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ τυραννίδας· αὐτὸς δὲ παραλαβὼν Πολύαινον τὸν Κυπαρισσέα καὶ Σιμίαν, οἷς ἐχρῆτο τότε παρασπισταῖς, ἐκ τοῦ πέραν τῆς τάφρου τὴν ἀντιπαραγωγὴν ἐποιεῖτο τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ τοῖς μετʼ αὐτοῦ· δύο γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ τότε τῷ Μαχανίδᾳ συμμίξαντες, Ἀρηξίδαμος καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων εἷς. ἅμα δὲ τῷ τὸν Μαχανίδαν κατά τινα τόπον εὔβατον τῆς τάφρου, προσθέντα τοὺς μύωπας, βίᾳ τὸν ἵππον ἐπάγειν καὶ διαπερᾶν, συναγαγὼν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὁ Φιλοποίμην αὐτῷ καὶ πατάξας τῷ δόρατι καιρίως, καὶ προσενεγκὼν τῷ σαυρωτῆρι πληγὴν ἄλλην ἐκ διαλήψεως, ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διέφθειρε τὸν τύραννον. τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον ἐγίνετο καὶ περὶ τὸν Ἀρηξίδαμον ὑπὸ τῶν παρίππων. ὁ δὲ τρίτος ἀπογνοὺς τὴν διάβασιν διέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον κατὰ τὸν τῶν προειρημένων φόνον. πεσόντων δʼ ἀμφοτέρων, εὐθέως οἱ περὶ τὸν Σιμίαν, σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ συναφελόντες ἅμα τοῖς ὅπλοις τὴν τοῦ τυράννου κεφαλήν, ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τοὺς διώκοντας, σπεύδοντες ἐπιδεῖξαι τοῖς ὄχλοις τὴν ἀπώλειαν τοῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνος χάριν τοῦ πιστεύσαντας ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀνυπόπτως καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ποιήσασθαι τὸν ἐπιδιωγμὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἕως τῆς Τεγεατῶν πόλεως. ὃ καὶ μεγάλα συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν ὄχλων· οὐ γὰρ ἥκιστα διὰ τούτων τῆς μὲν Τεγέας ἐξ ἐφόδου κύριοι κατέστησαν, ταῖς δʼ ἐχομέναις παρὰ τὸν Εὐρώταν ἐστρατοπέδευον, κρατοῦντες ἤδη τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀναμφισβητήτως. καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων οὐ δυνάμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἀπώσασθαι, τότε πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθουν αὐτοὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν, τῶν μὲν ἰδίων οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπολωλεκότες ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπεκτακότες μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τετρακισχιλίων, ζωγρίᾳ δʼ εἰληφότες ἔτι πλείους τούτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς κεκυριευκότες ἁπάσης καὶ τῶν ὅπλων. ὅτι φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος, τί γὰρ ὄφελός ἐστι τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι διεξιέναι πολέμους καὶ μάχας καὶ πόλεων ἐξανδραποδισμοὺς καὶ πολιορκίας, εἰ μὴ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπιγνώσονται, παρʼ ἃς ἐν ἑκάστοις οἱ μὲν κατώρθωσαν, οἱ δʼ ἐσφάλησαν; τὰ γὰρ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ψυγαγωγεῖ μόνον τοὺς ἀκούοντας, αἱ δὲ πρόσθεν διαλήψεις τῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐξεταζόμεναι δεόντως ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας. μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ὁ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμὸς ἑκάστων ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἐπανορθοῖ τοὺς συνεφιστάνοντας. — τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις τἀνδρός, βλέψας εἰς τὸ μῆκος τούτου τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ συνεπιστήσας αὑτὸν ἐπί τε τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μάχας καὶ πολιορκίας καὶ πόλεων μεταβολὰς καὶ περιστάσεις καιρῶν, ἐπί τε τὴν περιοχὴν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πράξεως, ἐν ᾗ συνεχῶς Ἀννίβας ἑκκαίδεκα πολεμήσας ἔτη Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οὐδέποτε διέλυσε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ἀλλὰ συνέχων ὑφʼ αὑτόν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς κυβερνήτης, ἀστασίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις.
19. What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which conduce to success and failure? The results of such operations merely touch the fancy: it is the tracing of the designs of the actors in such scenes that is really instructive; and above all it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the ideas of the student. Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of this great man’s strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one looks to the length of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realises to one’s self the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war with Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were not by any means unvarying: for though the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal’s display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and ended his career with them.... Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various towns in which they had wintered, advanced to within a short distance of Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and battle. His infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to visit Colichas and take over from him the forces that had been prepared by him. These amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse. The other allies he received personally in the course of his march up the country to his destination. When he approached Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a position of great perplexity. For without their allies the Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle; yet to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions. With this purpose in his mind he got his whole army on the march, forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and when he had come within the view of the Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.
19. εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας, Ἴβηρας, Λιγυστίνους, Κελτούς, Φοίνικας, Ἰταλούς, Ἕλληνας, οἷς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἡ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγχίνοια τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ἑνὸς ἐποίει προστάγματος ἀκούειν καὶ μιᾷ πείθεσθαι γνώμῃ, καίπερ οὐχ ἁπλῆς οὔσης τῆς περιστάσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποικίλης, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν αὐτοῖς λαμπρᾶς ἐπιπνεούσης τῆς τύχης, ποτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἐξ ὧν εἰκότως ἄν τις θαυμάσειε τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος δύναμιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, καὶ θαρρῶν εἴπειεν ὡς εἴπερ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπʼ ἄλλα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπὶ τελευταίους ἦλθε Ῥωμαίους, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν προτεθέντων αὐτὸν διέφυγε. νῦν δʼ, ἐφʼ οὓς ἔδει τελευταίους ἐλθεῖν, ἀπὸ τούτων ἀρξάμενος, ἐν τούτοις ἐποιήσατο καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ τέλος. οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, ἁθροίσαντες τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐν αἷς ἐποιοῦντο τὴν παραχειμασίαν, προῆλθον, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως τῆς προσαγορευομένης Ἰλίπας, βαλόμενοι τὸν χάρακα πρὸς ταῖς ὑπωρείαις, καὶ προθέμενοι πεδία πρὸς ἀγῶνα καὶ μάχην εὐφυῆ. πλῆθος δὲ πεζῶν μὲν εἶχον εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας, ἱππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχιλίους, θηρία δὲ δυσὶ πλείω τῶν τριάκοντα. Πόπλιος δὲ Μάρκον μὲν Ἰούνιον ἐξαπέστειλε πρὸς Κολίχαντα, παραληψόμενον τὰς ἑτοιμασθείσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τούτου δυνάμεις· αὗται δʼ ἦσαν πεζοὶ μὲν τρισχίλιοι, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακόσιοι· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς συμμάχους αὐτὸς παρελάμβανε, προάγων καὶ ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον. ἐγγίσας δὲ τῷ Κασταλῶνι καὶ τοῖς περὶ Βαίκυλα τόποις, καὶ συμμίξας ἐνθάδε τῷ Μάρκῳ καὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ Κολίχαντος δυνάμεσιν, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνέπιπτε περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἀξιόχρεοι παρῆσαν αἱ Ῥωμαϊκαὶ δυνάμεις αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν· τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἔχοντας τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων κινδυνεύειν ἐπισφαλὲς ἐδόκει καὶ λίαν εἶναι παράβολον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διαπορήσας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων συγκλειόμενος, ἐπὶ τὸ συγχρῆσθαι κατηνέχθη τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν οὕτως ὥστε φαντασίαν μὲν παρασκευάζειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, τὸν δʼ ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν ἰδίων στρατοπέδων. ταῦτα δὲ προθέμενος ἀνέζευξε μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς τετρακισμυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ τρισχιλίους. ἐγγίσας δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ γενόμενος σύνοπτος ἐστρατοπέδευσε περί τινας γεωλόφους καταντικρὺ τῶν πολεμίων.
21. Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment to attack the Romans while actually engaged in making their camp; he therefore rode up to the entrenchment with the greater part of his own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had however all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge, many of the enemy’s horsemen at once took to flight at the startling appearance, and began to make off; while the rest closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry. But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat was at first conducted in good order: but as the Romans pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the next few days they both drew out on the intervening plain; skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops; and, after thus trying each other’s mettle, were resolved to bring the matter to the test of a general engagement.
21. Μάγων δὲ νομίσας εὐφυῆ καιρὸν ἐπιθέσθαι καταστρατοπεδεύουσι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀναλαβὼν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων καὶ Μασαννάσαν μετὰ τῶν Νομάδων, ἤλαυνε πρὸς τὴν παρεμβολήν, πεπεισμένος ἀφυλακτοῦντα λήψεσθαι τὸν Πόπλιον. ὁ δὲ πάλαι προορώμενος τὸ μέλλον, ὑπό τινα βουνὸν ὑπεστάλκει τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἴσους τοῖς τῶν Καρχηδονίων· ὧν ἀνυπονοήτως ἐμπεσόντων πολλοὶ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀναστρέφοντες διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιφανείας τῆς ἄφνω τῶν ἱππέων ἀπέπεσον, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ συμβάλλοντες τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμάχοντο γενναίως. τῇ δὲ παρὰ τῶν καταβαινόντων ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εὐχειρίᾳ δυσχρηστούμενοι καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπολλύντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, βραχὺ προσαντισχόντες ἐνέκλιναν. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τάξει τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἐποιοῦντο, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐγκειμένων αὐτοῖς λύσαντες τὰς ἴλας κατέφυγον ὑπὸ τὴν αὑτῶν παρεμβολήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι τούτου γενομένου θαρραλεώτερον διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τοὐναντίον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἑξῆς ἐπί τινας ἡμέρας τάς τε δυνάμεις ἐκτάξαντες ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ πεδίῳ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων ἀκροβολισμοὺς ποιησάμενοι καὶ καταπειράσαντες ἀλλήλων, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα.
22. On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing; while his own practice had been to make his counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the day on which he resolved upon a general engagement, by reversing this arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own men, and succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage. For directly it was light he sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and men to arm, as soon as they had got their breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The order was obeyed with alacrity because the men suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close to the enemy’s camp, and skirmish boldly up to it; while he himself marched out with the infantry, just as the sun was appearing above the horizon; and on reaching the middle of the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the Roman legionaries on the two wings. The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatch his cavalry and light-armed troops at once against the enemy’s cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet; but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement between the light-armed troops still continued undecided, because such of them as were forced from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, and then distributed them equally between the two wings on rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. He then advanced, at first in line direct; but when he was about a stade from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.
22. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον δυσὶ δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι στρατηγήμασιν ὁ Πόπλιος. θεωρῶν γὰρ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ὀψὲ ποιούμενον τὰς ἐξαγωγάς, καὶ μέσους Λίβυας, τὰ δὲ θηρία προτιθέμενον ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων, αὐτὸς εἰωθὼς τῇ μὲν ὥρᾳ προσανατείνειν, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους μέσους ἀντιτάττειν τοῖς Λίβυσι, τοὺς δʼ Ἴβηρας ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων παρεμβάλλειν, ᾗ προέθετο κρίνειν ἡμέρᾳ, τἀναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις ποιήσας μεγάλα συνήργησε ταῖς σφετέραις δυνάμεσι πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, οὐκ ὀλίγα δʼ ἠλάττωσε τοὺς πολεμίους. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ φωτὶ διαπεμψάμενος τοὺς ὑπηρέτας παρήγγειλε πᾶσι τοῖς χιλιάρχοις καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀριστοποιησαμένους καὶ καθοπλισαμένους ἐξάγειν πρὸ τοῦ χάρακος. γενομένου δὲ τούτου καὶ προθύμως πειθαρχησάντων διὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν τοῦ μέλλοντος, τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους προαπέστειλε, συντάξας ἐγγίζειν τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν ὑπεναντίων καὶ προσακροβολίζεσθαι θρασέως, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἔχων ἄρτι τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολῆς ἐπιφαινομένης προῆγε, καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς μέσον τὸ πεδίον παρενέβαλε, τάττων ἐναντίως ἢ πρόσθεν· μέσους μὲν γὰρ ἐτίθει τοὺς Ἴβηρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κεράτων τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων. τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις, ἄφνω συνεγγιζόντων πρὸς τὸν χάρακα τῶν ἱππέων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἐκταττομένης ἐν ὄψει, μόλις ἐδόθη καιρὸς εἰς τὸ καθοπλίσασθαι. διόπερ ἠναγκάσθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ἔτι νήστεις ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπαρασκεύως ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους ἐπαφιέναι τοῖς ἱππεῦσι τῶν ὑπεναντίων εἰς τὰ πεδία, τὰς δὲ πεζικὰς δυνάμεις παρατάττειν, οὐ πολὺ τῆς παρωρείας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔκταξιν, καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος αὐτοῖς. ἕως μὲν οὖν τινος ἔμενον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοντες· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἡμέρας προύβαινε, τῶν δʼ εὐζώνων ἄκριτος ἦν καὶ πάρισος ἡ συμπλοκὴ διὰ τὸ τοὺς πιεζομένους καταφεύγοντας ὑπὸ τὰς ἰδίας φάλαγγας ἐκ μεταβολῆς κινδυνεύειν, τὸ τηνικαῦτα δὲ διαδεξάμενος ὁ Πόπλιος διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐν ταῖς σημαίαις εἴσω τοὺς ἀκροβολιζομένους, καὶ μερίσας ἐφʼ ἑκάτερον κέρας ὀπίσω τῶν παρατεταγμένων, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς γροσφομάχους, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπιβάλλει τοὺς ἱππεῖς, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς μετωπηδὸν ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον· ἀποσχὼν δὲ περὶ τετραστάδιον τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τοὺς μὲν Ἴβηρας τηροῦντας τὰς τάξεις τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν παρήγγειλε, τῷ μὲν δεξιῷ τὰς σημαίας καὶ τὰς ἴλας ἐπι στρέφειν ἐπὶ δόρυ, τῷ δʼ εὐωνύμῳ τἀναντία.
23. Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct being still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in column, according to Scipio’s original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, were exactly the converse of each other—taking the right and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing came into line on the right and tried to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left; but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little for this, but was intent on something more important, namely, the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.
23. καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ, Λεύκιος δὲ Μάρκιος καὶ Μάρκος Ἰούνιος ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων τρεῖς ἴλας ἱππέων τὰς ἡγουμένας, καὶ πρὸ τούτων γροσφομάχους τοὺς εἰθισμένους καὶ τρεῖς σπείρας — τοῦτο δὲ καλεῖται τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν πεζῶν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις κοόρτις — πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐπʼ ἀσπίδα περικλάσαντες τούτους, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ δόρυ, προῆγον ὀρθίους ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐνεργῆ ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον, ἀεὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπιβαλλόντων καὶ κατὰ περίκλασιν ἑπομένων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτους μὲν οὐ πολὺ συνέβαινε τῶν πολεμίων ἀπέχειν, τοὺς δʼ Ἴβηρας ἐν τῇ κατὰ πρόσωπον πλευρᾷ τόπον ἱκανὸν ἔτι διεστάναι τῷ βάδην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγήν, προσέβαλλον τοῖς κέρασιν ἀμφοτέροις ἅμα τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὀρθίαις ταῖς Ῥωμαϊκαῖς δυνάμεσι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. αἱ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα κινήσεις, διʼ ὧν συνέβαινε τοὺς ἑπομένους, ἐπιπαρεμβάλλοντας ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, συγκαθίστασθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς τὴν μάχην, τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχον διάθεσιν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ καθόλου τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῷ λαιῷ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οἱ πεζοὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἱππεῖς μετὰ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐκ δόρατος ἐπιπαρεμβάλλοντες, ὑπερκερᾶν ἐπειρῶντο τοὺς πολεμίους, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ τοὐναντίον ἐξ ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλλον· τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς σπείραις ἐκ δόρατος, οἱ δʼ ἱππεῖς μετὰ τῶν γροσφομάχων ἐξ ἡνίας. ἐγεγόνει μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν εὐζώνων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν κεράτων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως τὸ δεξιὸν εὐώνυμον. οὗ μικρὸν λόγον θέμενος ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ μείζονος ἐποιήσατο πρόνοιαν, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερκέρασιν, ὀρθῶς λογιζόμενος· εἰδέναι μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὸ γινόμενον, χρῆσθαι δὲ ταῖς πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἁρμοζούσαις κινήσεσιν.
24. When these troops were at close quarters the elephants were severely handled, being wounded and harassed on every side by the velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,— the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the proper food; while the Romans had the advantage in physical vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy. Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal’s centre began to retreat; at first step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they began a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have been driven from their camp too; but a sudden storm gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty effected a return to their own camp.... Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in trying to get the silver and gold which had been melted and fused.... When every one complimented Scipio after he had driven the Carthaginians from Iberia, and advised him straightway to take some rest and ease, as having put a period to the war, he answered that he “congratulated them on their sanguine hopes; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his mind how to begin the war with Carthage. Up to that time the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans; but that now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war upon them....” In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently endowed by nature in this respect, conducted himself with so much kindness and tact, that Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that “Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview than in the field....”
24. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν θηρία διὰ τῶν γροσφομάχων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἀκοντιζόμενα καὶ διαταραττόμενα πανταχόθεν ἔπασχε μὲν κακῶς, ἔβλαπτε δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον τοὺς φίλους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους· φερόμενα γὰρ εἰκῇ τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αἰεὶ διέφθειρε. τῆς δὲ πεζικῆς δυνάμεως τὰ μὲν κέρατα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐθραύετο, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Λίβυας, ὅπερ ἦν χρησιμώτατον, εἰς τέλος ἄπρακτον ἦν· οὔτε γὰρ παραβοηθεῖν ἠδύναντο τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων, λιπόντες τὸν ἴδιον τόπον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰβήρων ἔφοδον, οὔτε μένοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐνεργεῖν τι τῶν δεόντων οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν διὰ τὸ μὴ συνιέναι τοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον πολεμίους αὐτοῖς εἰς τὰς χεῖρας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ χρόνον μέν τινα διηγωνίζοντο τὰ κέρατα γενναίως διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἑκατέροις συνεστάναι τὸν κίνδυνον. ἤδη δὲ τοῦ καύματος ἐφεστῶτος κατὰ τὴν ἀκμήν, οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι παρελύοντο διὰ τὸ μὴ πεποιῆσθαι τὴν ἔξοδον κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν, κεκωλῦσθαι δὲ τῆς ἁρμοζούσης παρασκευῆς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ ταῖς εὐψυχίαις καθυπερεῖχον, καὶ μάλιστα τῷ τοῖς χρησιμωτάτοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους τῶν πολεμίων συμβεβληκέναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόνοιαν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν κατὰ πόδα πιεζούμενοι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἐποιοῦντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κλίναντες ἁθρόοι πρὸς τὴν παρώρειαν ἀπεχώρουν· ἐγκειμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βιαιότερον ἔφευγον εἰς τὸν χάρακα προτροπάδην. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ θεὸς αὐτοῖς τις συνεπελάβετο τῆς σωτηρίας, παραχρῆμʼ ἂν ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα συστροφῆς ἐξαισίου, καὶ καταρραγέντος ὄμβρου λάβρου καὶ συνεχοῦς, μόλις εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν στρατοπεδείαν ἀνεκομίσθησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. — Ἰλούργεια, πόλις Ἰβηρίας, Πολύβιος ἑνδεκάτῃ. τὸ δὲ τετηκὸς καὶ συνερρυηκὸς ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον ἀναζητοῦντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς πλεῖστοι Ῥωμαίων διεφθάρησαν. — ὅτι πάντων εὐδαιμονιζόντων τὸν Πόπλιον μετὰ τὸ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐξελάσαι τῆς Ἰβηρίας, καὶ παρακαλούντων ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἐπεὶ πέρας ἐπιτέθεικε τῷ πολέμῳ, μακαρίζειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη διότι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐλπίδας, αὐτὸς δὲ νῦν καὶ μάλιστα βουλεύεσθαι τίνα τρόπον ἄρξηται τοῦ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πολέμου· τὸν μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τούτου χρόνον Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις πεπολεμηκέναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὴν τύχην παραδεδωκέναι καιρὸν εἰς τὸ Ῥωμαίους Καρχηδονίοις ἐξενεγκεῖν πόλεμον. — ὅτι ὁ Πόπλιος διαλεχθεὶς τῷ Σόφακι, ἅτε δὴ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυὴς ὑπάρχων, οὕτω φιλανθρώπως ὡμίλησε καὶ ἐπιδεξίως ὥστε τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν εἰπεῖν ταῖς ὕστερον ἡμέραις πρὸς τὸν Σόφακα διότι φοβερώτερος αὐτῷ Πόπλιος πέφηνε κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν ἤπερ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. — ὅτι στάσεως γενομένης τινῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῷ Ῥωμαϊκῷ, ὁ Πόπλιος, καίπερ ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐφʼ ἱκανόν, ὅμως οὐδέποτε μᾶλλον εἰς ἀπορίαν ἧκε καὶ δυσχρηστίαν.