1.1. IN the second book the subject of inquiry was the nature and the end of rhetoric, and I proved to the best of my ability that it was an art, that it was useful, that it was a virtue and that its material was all and every subject that might come up for treatment. I shall now discuss its origin, its component parts, and the method to be adopted in handling and forming our conception of each. For most authors of text-books have stopped short of this, indeed Apollodorus confines himself solely to forensic oratory.
1.1. quoniam in libro secundo quaesitum est, quid esset rhetorice et quis finis eius, artem quoque esse eam et utilem et virtutem, ut vires nostrae tulerunt, ostendimus, materiamque ei res omnes, de quibus dicere oporteret, subiecimus: iam hinc, unde coeperit, quibus constet, quo quaeque in ea modo invenienda atque tractanda sint, exsequar; intra quem modum plerique scriptores artium constiterunt, adeo ut Apollodorus contentus solis iudicialibus fuerit.
1.2. I know that those who asked me to write this work were specially interested in that portion on which I am now entering, and which, owing to the necessity of examining a great diversity of opinions, at once forms by far the most difficult section of this work, and also, I fear, may be the least attractive to my readers, since it necessitates a dry exposition of rules.
1.2. sum ignarus, hoc a me praecipue, quod hic liber inchoat, opus studiosos eius desiderasse, ut inquisitione opinionum, quae diversissimae fuerunt, longe difficillimum, ita nescio an minimae legentibus futurum voluptati, quippe quod prope nudam praeceptorum traditionem desideret.
1.3. In other portions of this work I have attempted to introduce a certain amount of ornateness, not, I may say, to advertise my style (if I had wished to do that, I could have chosen a more fertile theme), but in order that I might thus do something to lure our young men to make themselves acquainted with those principles which I regarded as necessary to the study of rhetoric: for I hoped that by giving them something which was not unpleasant to read I might induce a greater readiness to learn those rules which I feared might, by the dryness and aridity which must necessarily characterise their exposition, revolt their minds and offend their ears which are nowadays grown somewhat over-sensitive.
1.3. ceteris enim admiscere temptauimus aliquid nitoris, non iactandi ingenii gratia (namque in id eligi materia poterat uberior), sed ut hoc ipso adliceremus magis iuventutem ad cognitionem eorum, quae necessaria studiis arbitrabamur, si ducti iucunditate aliqua lectionis libentius discerent ea, quorum ne ieiuna atque arida traditio averteret animos et aures praesertim tam delicatas raderet uerebamur.
1.4. Lucretilus has the same object in mind when he states that he has set forth his philosophical system in verse; for you will remember the well known simile which he uses:—And as physicians when they seek to giveA draught of bitter wormwood to a child,First smear along the edge that rims the cupThe liquid sweets of honey, golden-hued,and the rest.
1.4. ratione se Lucretius dicit praecepta philosophiae carmine esse complexum; namque hac, ut est notum, similitudine utitur:veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentesdare conantur, prius oras pocula circummellis dulci flauoque liquore,et quae sequuntur.
1.5. But I fear that this book will have too little honey and too much wormwood, and that though the student may find it a healthy draught, it will be far from agreeable. I am also haunted by the further fear that it will be all the less attractive from the fact that most of the precepts which it contains are not original, but derived from others, and because it is likely to rouse the opposition of certain persons who do not share my views. For there are a large number of writers, who though they are all moving toward the same goal, have constructed different roads to it and each drawn their followers into their own.
1.5. nos ueremur, ne parum hic liber mellis et absinthi multum habere videatur, sitque salubrior studiis quam dulcior. etiam hoc timeo, ne ex eo minorem gratiam ineat, quod pleraque non inventa per me sed ab aliis tradita continebit, habeat etiam quosdam, qui contra sentiant et adversentur, propterea quod plurimi auctores, quamvis eodem tenderent, diversas tamen vias muniverunt atque in suam quisque induxit sequentes.
1.6. The latter, however, approve of the path on which they have been launched whatever its nature, and it is difficult to change the convictions implantted in boyhood, for the excellent reason that everybody prefers to have learned rather than to be in process of learning.
1.6. autem probant qualecunque ingressi sunt iter, nec facile inculcatas pueris persuasiones mutaveris, quia nemo non didicisse mavult quam discere.
1.7. But, as will appear in the course of this book, there is an infinite diversity of opinions among writers on [his subject, since some have added their own discoveries to those portions of the art which were still shapeless and unformed, and subsequently have altered even what was perfectly sound in order to establish a claim to originality.
1.7. autem, ut procedente libro patebit, infinita dissensio auctorum, primo ad ea, quae rudia atque inperfecta adhuc erant, adiicientibus quod inuenissent scriptoribus, mox, ut aliquid sui viderentur adferre, etiam recta mutantibus.
1.8. The first writer after those recorded by the poets who is said to have taken any steps in the direction of rhetoric is Empedocles. But the earliest writers of text-books are the Sicilians, Corax and Tisias, who were followed by another from the same island, namely Gorgias of Leontini, whom tradition asserts to have been the pupil of Empedocles.
1.8. primus post eos, quos poetae tradiderunt, movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur. autem scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi, quos insecutus est vir eiusdem insulae Gorgias Leontinus, Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus.
1.9. He, thanks to his length of days, for he lived to a hundred and nine, flourished as the contemporary of many rhetoricians, was consequently the rival of those whom I have just mentioned, and lived on to survive Socrates.
1.9. beneficio longissimae aetatis (nam centum et novem vixit annos) cum multis simul floruit, ideoque et illorum, de quibus supra dixi, fuit aemulus et ultra Socraten usque duravit.
1.10. In the same period flourished Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Prodicus of Ceos, Protagoras of Abdera, for whose instructions, which he afterwards published in a text-book, Euathlus is said to have paid 10,000 denarii, Hippias of Elis and Alcidamas of Elaea whom Plato calls Palamedes.
1.10. Thrasymachus Chalcedonius cum hoc et Prodicus Cius et Abderites Protagoras, a quo decem milibus denariorum didicisse artem, quam edidit, Euathlus dicitur, et Hippias Elius et, quem Palameden Plato appellat, Alcidamas Elaïtes.
1.11. There was Antiphon also, who was the first to write speeches and who also wrote a text-book and is said to have spoken most eloquently in his own defence; Polycrates, who, as have already said, wrote a speech against Socrates, and Theodorus of Byzantium, who was one of those called “word-artificers” by Plato.
1.11. Antiphon quoque et orationem primus omnium scripsit et nihilo minus et artem ipse composuit et pro se dixisse optime est creditus, etiam Polycrates, a quo scriptam in Socraten diximus orationem, et Theodorus Byzantius ex iis et ipse, quos Plato appellat λογοδαιδάλους primi communes locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias, adfectus Prodicus et Hippias et idem Protagoras et Thrasymachus.
1.12. Of these Protagoras and Gorgias are said to have been the first to treat commonplaces, Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras and Thrasymachus the first to handle emotional themes. Cicero in the Brutus states that nothing in the ornate rhetorical style was ever committed to writing before Pericles, and that certain of his speeches are still extant. For my part I have been unable to discover anything in the least worthy of his great reputation for eloquence, and am consequently the less surprised that there should be some who hold that he never committed anything to writing, and that the writings circulating under his name are the works of others.
1.12. Cicero in Bruto negat ante Periclea scriptum quidquam, quod ornatum oratorium habeat; eius aliqua ferri. non reperio quidquam tanta eloquentiae fama dignum; ideoque minus miror esse, qui nihil ab eo scriptum patent, haec autem, quae feruntur, ab alis esse composite.
1.13. These rhetoricias had many successors, but the most famous of (Gorgias' pupils was Isocrates, although our authorities are not agreed as to who was his teacher: I however accept the statement of Aristotle on the subject.
1.13. successere multi, sed clarissimus Gorgiae auditorum Isocrates, quanquam de praeceptore eius inter auctores non convenit; nos autem Aristoteli credimus. velut diversae secari coeperunt viae.
1.14. From this point the roads begin to part. The pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study, and when he was already advanced in years (and he lived to the age of ninety-eight), Aristotle began to teach the art of rhetoric in his afternoon lectures, in which he frequently quoted the wel-known line from the Philoctetes in the formIsocrates still speaks. 'Twere shame should I Sit silent.Both Aristotle and Isocrates left text-books on rhetoric, but that by Aristotle is the larger and contains more books. Theodectes, whose work I mentioned above, also lived about the same period: while Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle, produced some careful work on rhetoric.
1.14. et Isocratis praestantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni studiorum genere, eoque iam seniore (octavum enim et nonagesimum implevit annum) postmeridianis scholis Aristoteles praecipere artem oratoriam coepit, noto quidem illo (ut traditur) versu ex Philocteta frequenter usus: esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere. ars est utriusque, sed pluribus eam libris Aristoteles complexus est. tempore Theodectes fuit, de cuius opere supra dictum est.
1.15. After him we may note that the philosophers, more especially the leaders of the Stoic and Peripatetic schools, surpassed even the rhetoricians in the zeal which they devoted to the subject.
1.15. Theophrastus quoque Aristotelis discipulus de rhetorice diligenter scripsit, atque hinc vel studiosius philosophi quam rhetores praecipueque Stoicorum ac Peripateticorum principes.
1.16. Hermagoras next carved out a path of his own, which numbers have followed: of his rivals Athenaeus seems to have approached him most nearly. Later still much work was done by Apollonius Molon, Areus, Caecilius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
1.16. deinde velut propriam Hermagoras viam, quam plurimi sunt secuti; cui maxime par atque aemulus videtur Athenaeus fuisse. post Apollonius Molon, multa Areus, multa Caecilius et Halicarnasseus Dionysius.
1.17. But the rhetoricians who attracted the most enthusiastic following were Apollodorus of Pergamus, who was the instructor of Augustus Caesar at Apollonia, and Theodorus of Gadara, who preferred to be called Theodorus of Rhodes: it is said that Tiberius Caesar during his retirement in that island was a constant attendant at his lectures.
1.17. tamen in se converterunt studia Apollodorus Pergamenus, qui praeceptor Apolloniae Caesaris Augusti fuit, et Theodorus Gadareus, qui se dici maluit Rhodium, quem studiose audisse, cum in eam insulam secessisset, dicitur Tiberius Caesar.
1.18. These rhetoricians taught different systems, and two schools have arisen known as the Apollodoreans and the Theodoreans, these names being modelled on the fashion of nomenclature in vogue with certain schools of philosophy. The doctrines of Apollodorus are best learned from his pupils, among whom Cains Valgius was the best interpreter of his master's views in Latin, Atticus in Greek. The only text-book by Apollodorus himself seems to be that addressed to Matius, as his letter to Domitius does not acknowledge the other works attributed to him. The writings of Theodorus were more numerous, and there are some still living who have seen his pupil Herinagoras.
1.18. diversas opiniones tradiderunt, appellatique inde Apollodorei ac Theodorei ad morem certas in philosophia sectas sequendi. Apollodori praecepta magis ex discipulis cognoscas, quorum diligentissimus in tradendo fuit Latine Gaius Valgius, Graece Atticus. ipsius sola videtur Ars edita ad Matium, quia ceteras missa ad Domitium epistula non agnoscit. scripsit Theodorus, cuius auditorem Hermagoran sunt qui viderint.
1.19. The first Roman to handle the subject was, to the best of my belief, Marcus Cato, the famous censor, while after him Marcus Antonius began a treatise on rhetoric: I say “began,” because only this one work of his survives, and that is incomplete. he was followed by others of less note, whose names I will not omit to mention, should occasion demand.
1.19. Romanorum primus (quantum ego quidem sciam) condidit aliqua in hanc materiam M. Cato ille censorius, post M. Antonius inchoavit; nam hoc solum opus eius atque id ipsum imperfectum manet. minus celebres; quorum memoriam, si quo loco res poscet, non omittam.
1.20. But it was Cicero who shed the greatest light not only on the practice but on the theory of oratory; for he stands alone among Romans as combining the gift of actual eloquence with that of teaching the art. With him for predecessor it would be more modest to be silent, but for the fact that he himself describes his Rhetorica as a youthful indiscreition, while in his later works on oratory he deliberately omitted the discussion of certain minor points, on which instruction is generally desired.
1.20. vero lumen sicut eloquentiae ita praeceptis quoque eius dedit, unicum apud nos specimen orandi docendique oratorias artes, M. Tullius; post quem tacere modestissimum foret, nisi et rhetoricos suos ipse adulescenti sibi elapsos diceret, et in oratoriis haec minora, quae plerumque desiderantur, sciens omisisset.
1.21. Cornificius wrote a good deal, Stertinius something, and the elder Gallio a little on the same subject. But Gallio's predecessors, Celsus and Laenas, and in our own day Verginius, Pliny and Tutilius, have treated rhetoric with greater accuracy. Even to-day we have some distinguished writers on oratory who, if they had dealt with the subject more comprehensively, would have saved me the trouble of writing this book. But I will spare the names of the living. The time will come when they will reap their meed of praise; for their merits will endure to after generations, while the calunmies of envy will perish utterly.
1.21. de eadem materia non pauca Cornificius, aliqua Stertinius, nonnihil paler (Gallio; accuratius vero priores Gallione Celsus et Laenas et aetatis nostrae Verginius, Plinius, Tutilius. et hodie clari eiusdem operis auctores, qui si omnia complexi forent, consuluissent labori meo; sed parco nominibus viventium; ueniet eorum laudi suum tempus, ad posteros enim virtus durabit, non perveniet invidia.
1.22. Still, although so many writers have preceded me, I shall not shrink from expressing my own opinion on certain points. I am not a superstitious adherent of any school, and as this book will contain a collection of the opinions of many different authurs, it was desirable to leave it to my readers to selcet what they will. I shall be content if they praise me for my industry, wherever there is no scope for originality.
1.22. tamen post tot ac tantos auctores pigebit meam quibusdam locis posuisse sententiam. enim me cuiusquam sectae velut quadam superstitione imbutus addixi, et electuris quae volent facienda copia fuit, sicut ipse plurium in unum confero inventa, ubicunque ingenio non erit locus, curae testimonium meruisse contentus.
2.1. The question as to the origin of rhetoric need not keep us long. For who can doubt that mankind received the gift of speech from nature at its birth (for we can hardly go further back than that), while the usefulness of speech brought improvement and study, and finally method and exercise gave perfection?
2.1. diu nos moretur quaestio, quae rhetorices origo sit. cui dubium est, quia; sermonem ab ipsa rerum natura geniti protinus homines acceperint (quod certe principium est eius rei), huic studium et incrementum dederit utilitas, summam ratio et exercitatio?
2.2. I cannot understand why some hold that the elaboration of speech originated in the fact that those who were in peril owing to some accusation being made against them, set themselves to speak with studied care for the purpose of their own defence. This, however, though a more honourable origin, cannot possibly be the earlier, for accusation necessarily precedes defence. You might as well assert that the sword was invented for the purpose of self-defence and not for aggression.
2.2. video, quare curam dicendi patent quidam inde coepisse, quod ii, qui in discrimen aliquod vocabantur, accuratius loqui defendendi sui gratia instituerint. enim ut honestior causa, ita non utique prior est, cum praesertim accusatio praecedat defensionem; nisi quis dicet, etiam gladium fabricatum ab eo prius, qui ferrum in tutelam sui quam qui in perniciem alterius compararit.
2.3. It was, then, nature that created speech, and observation that originated the art of speaking. Just as men discovered the art of medicine by observing that some things were healthy and some the reverse, so they observed that some things were useful and some useless in speaking, and noted them for imitation or avoidance, while they added certain other precepts according as their nature suggested. These observations were confirmed by experience and each man proceeded to teach what he knew.
2.3. ergo dicendi dedit natura, initium artis observatio. enim, sicuti in medicina, cum viderent alia salubria, alia insalubria, ex observatione eorum effecerunt artem, ita, cum in dicendo alia utilia, alia inutilia deprehenderent, notarunt ea ad imitandum vitandumque, et quaedam secundum rationem eorum adiecerunt ipsi quoque; haec confirmata sunt usu, tum quae sciebat quisque docuit.
2.4. Cicero, it is true, attributes the origin of oratory to the founders of cities and the makers of laws, who must needs have possessed the gift of eloquence. But why he thinks this the actual origin, I cannot understand, since there still exist certain nomad peoples without cities or laws, and yet members of these peoples perform the duties of ambassadors, accuse and defend, and regard one man as a better speaker than another.
2.4. Cicero quidem initium orandi conditoribus urbium ac legum latoribus dedit, in quibus fuisse vim dicendi necesse est; cur tamen hanc primam originem putet, non video, cum sint adhuc quaedam vagae et sine urbibus ac sine legibus gentes, et tamen qui sunt in iis nati et legationibus fungantur et accusent aliqua atque defendant et denique alium alio melius loqui credant.
3.1. The art of oratory, as taught by most authorities, and those the best, consists of five parts:- invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action (the two latter terms being used synonymously). But all speech expressive of purpose involves also a subject and words.
3.1. autem orandi ratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat, inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione sive actione, utroque enim modo dicitur. vero sermo, quo quidem voluntas aliqua enuntiatur, habeat necesse est rem et verba.
3.2. If such expression is brief and contained within the limits of one sentence, it may demand nothing more, but longer speeches require much more. For not only what we say and how we say it is of importance, but also the circumstances under which we say it. It is here that the need of arrangement comes in. But it will be impossible to say everything demanded by the subject, putting each thing in its proper place, without the aid of memory.
3.2. si est brevis et una conclusione finitus, nihil fortasse ultra desideret; at oratio longior plura exigit. tantum enim refert, quid et quo modo dicamus, sed etiam quo loco; opus ergo est et dispositione. neque omnia, quae res postulat, dicere neque suo quaeque loco poterimus nisi adiuvante memoria; quapropter ea quoque pars quarta erit.
3.3. It is for this reason that memory forms the fourth department. But a delivery, which is rendered unbecoming cither by voice or gesture, spoils everything and almost entirely destroys the effect of what is said. Delivery therefore must be assigned the fifth place.
3.3. haec cuncta corrumpit ac propemodum perdit indecora vel voce vel gestu pronuntiatio. quoque igitur tribuendus est necessario quintus locus.
3.4. Those (and Albutins is among them), who maintain that there are only three departments on the ground that memory and delivery (for which I shall give instructions in their proper place ) are given us by nature not by art, may be disregarded, although Thrasymachus held the same views as regards delivery.
3.4. audiendi quidam, quorum est Albucius, qui tris modo primas esse partes volunt, quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contigant: quarum nos praecepta suo loco dabimus; licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit.
3.5. Some have added a sixth department, subjoining judgment to invention, on the ground that it is necessary first to invented and then to exercise our judgment. For my own part I do not believe that invention can exist apart from judgement, since we do not say that a speaker has invented incousistent, two-edged or foolish arguments, but merely that he has failed to avoid them. It is true that Cicero in his Rhetorica includes judgment under mention; but in my opinion judgment is so inextricably mingled with the first three departments of rhetoric (for without judgment neither expression nor arrangement are possible), that I think that even delivery owes much to it.
3.5. adiecerunt quidam sextam partem, ita ut inventioni iudicium subnecterent, quia primum esset invenire, deinde iudicare. porro ne invenisse quidem credo eum, qui non iudicavit; neque enim contraria, communia, stulta invenisse dicitur quisquam, sed non vitasse.
3.6. I say this with all the greater confidence because Cicero in his Partitiones oratoriae arrives at the same five-fold division of which I have just spoken. For after an initial division of oratory into invention and expression, he assigns matter and arrangement to invention, words and delivery to expression, and makes memory a fifth department common to them all and acting as their guardian. Again in the Orator he states that eloquence consists of five things, and in view of the fact that this is a later work we may accept this as his more settled opinion.
3.6. Cicero quidem in Rhetoricis iudicium subiecit invention; mihi autem adeo tribus primis partibus videtur esse permixtum (nam neque dispositio sine eo neque elocutio fuerit), ut pronuntiationem quoque vel plurimum ex eo mutuari putem. hoc audacius dixerim, quod in Partitionibus oratoriis ad easdem, de quibus supra dictum est, quinque pervenit partes. cum dupliciter primum divisisset in inventionem atque elocutionem, res ac dispositionem inventioni, verba et pronuntiationem elocutioni dedit quintamque constituit, communem ac velut custodem omnium, memoriam. in Oratore quinque rebus constare eloquentiam dicit, in quibus postea scriptis certior eius sententia est.
3.8. Others, who seem to me to have been no less desirous than those mentioned above to introduce some novelty, have added order, although they had already mentioned arrangement, as though arrangement was anything else than the marshalling of arguments in the best possible order. Dion taught that oratory consisted only of invention and arrangement, but added that each of these departments was twofold in nature, being concerned with words and things, so that expression comes under invention, and delivery under arrangement, while memory must be added as a fifth department. The followers of Theodorus divide invention into two parts, the one concerned with matter and the other with expression, and then add the three remaining departments.
3.8. minus mihi cupidi novitatis alicuius videntur fuisse, qui adiecerunt ordinem, cum dispositionem dixissent, quasi aliud sit dispositio quam rerum ordine quam optimo collocatio. Dion inventionem modo et dispositionem tradidit sed utramque duplicem, rerum et verborum, ut sit elocutio inventionis, pronuntiatio dispositionis, his quinta pars memoriae, accedat. Theodorei fere inventionem duplicem, rerum atque elocutionis, deinde tris ceteras partes.
3.9. Hermagoras places judgment, division, order and everything relating to expression under the heading of economy, a Greek word meaning the management of domestic affairs which is applied metaphorically to oratory and has no Latin equivalent.
3.9. Hermagoras iudicium, partitionem, ordinem, quaeque sunt elocutionis, subiicit oeconomiae, quae Graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine Latino caret.
3.10. A further question arises at this point, since some make memory follow invention in the list of departments, while others make it follow arrangement. Personally I prefer to place it fourth. For we ought not merely to retain in our minds the fruits of our invention, in order that we may be able to arrange them, or to remember our arraangement in order that we may express it, but we must also commit to memory the words which we propose to use, since memory embraces everything that goes to the compposition of a speech.
3.10. et circa hoc quaestio, quod memoriam in ordine partium quidam inventioni, quidam dispositioni subiunxerunt; nobis quartus eius locus maxime placet. enim tantum inventa tenere, ut disponamus, nec disposita, ut eloquamur, sed etiam verbis formata memoriae mandare debemus. enim omnia, quaecunque in orationem collata sunt, continentur.
3.11. There are also not a few who have held that these are not parts of rhetoric, but rather duties to be observed by the orator. For it is his business to invent, arrange, express, etcetera. If, however, we accept this view, we leave nothing to art.
3.11. etiam in hac opinione non pauci, ut has non rhetorices partes esse existimarent sed opera oratoris; eius enim esse invenire, disponere, eloqui et cetera.
3.12. For although the orator's task is to speak well, rhetoric is the science of speaking well. Or if we adopt another view, the task of the artist is to persuade, while the power of persuasion resides in the art. Consequently, while it is the duty of the orator to invent and arrange, intention and arrangement may be regarded as belonging to rhetoric.
3.12. si accipimus, nihil arti relinquemus. bene dicere est oratoris, rhetorice tamen erit bene dicendi scientia; vel, ut alii putant, artificis est persuadere, vis autem persuadendi artis. invenire quidem et disponere oratoris, inventio autem et dispositio rhetorices propria videri potest.
3.13. At this point there has been much disagreement, as to whether these are parts or duties of rhetoric, or, as Athenaeus believes, elements of rhetoric, which the Greeks call στοιχεῖα But they cannot correctly be called elements. For in that case we should have to regard them merely as first-principles, like the moisture, fire, matter or atoms of which the universe is said to be composed. Nor is it correct to call them duties, since they are not preformed by others, but perform something themselves. We must therefore conclude that they are parts.
3.13. eo plures dissenserunt, utrumne hae partes essent rhetorices an eiusdem opera an, ut Athenaeus credit, elementa, quae vocant στοιχεῖα Sed neque elementa recte quis dixerit, alioqui tantum initia erunt, ut mundi vel umor vel ignis vel materia vel corpora insecabilia; nec operum recte nomen accipient, quae non ab allis perficiuntur, sed aliud ipsa perficiunt: partes igitur.
3.14. For since rhetoric is composed of them, it follows that:, since a whole consists of parts, these must be parts of the whole which they compose. Those who have called them duties seem to me to have been further influenced by the fact that they wished to reserve the name of parts for another division of rhetoric: for they asserted that the parts of rhetoric were, panegyric, deliberative and forensic oratory. But if these are parts, they are parts rather of the material than of the art.
3.14. cum sit ex his rhetorice, fieri non potest ut, cum totum ex partibus constet, non sint partes totius ex quibus constat. autem mihi, qui haec opera dixerunt, eo quoque moti, quod in alia rursus divisione nollent in idem nomen incidere, partes enim rhetorices esse dicebant laudativam, deliberativam, iudicialem. si partes sunt, materiae sunt potius quam artis.
3.15. For each of them contains the whole of rhetoric, since each of them requires invention, arrangement, expression, memory and delivery. Consequently some writers have thought it better to say that there are three kinds of oratory; those whom Cicero has followed seem to me to have taken the wisest course in terming them kinds of causes.
3.15. in his singulis rhetorice tota est, quia et inventionem et dispositionem et elocutionem et memoriam et pronuntiationem quaecunque earum desiderat. quidam genera tria rhetorices dicere maluerunt, optime autem ii, quos secutus est Cicero, genera causarum.
4.1. There is, however, a dispute as to whether there are three kinds or more. But it is quite certain that all the most eminent authorities among ancient writers, following Aristotle who merely substituted the term public for deliberative, have been content with the threefold division.
4.1. tria an plura sint, ambigitur. dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelem secuti, qui nomine tantum alio contionalem pro deliberativa appellat, hac partitione contenti fuerunt.
4.2. Still a feeble attempt has been made by certain Greeks and by Cicero in his de Oratore, to prove that there are not merely more than three, but that the number of kinds is almost past calculation: and this view has almost been thrust down our throats by the greatest authority of our own times.
4.2. et tum leviter est temptatum, cum apud Graecos quosdam tum apud Ciceronem in libris de Oratore, et nunc maximo temporum nostrorum auctore prope impulsum, ut non modo plura haec genera, sed paene innumerabilia videantur.
4.3. Indeed if we place the task of praise and denunciation in the third division, on what kind of oratory are we to consider ourselves to be employed, when we complain, console, pacify, excite, terrify, encourage, instruct, explain obscurities, narrate, plead for mercy, thank, congratulate, reproach, abuse, describe, command, retract, express our desires and opinions, to mention no other of the many possibilities?
4.3. si laudandi ac vituperandi officium in parte tertia ponimus, in quo genere versari videbimur, cum querimur, consolamur, mitigamus, concitamus, terremus, confirmamus, praecipimus, obscure dicta interpretamur, narramus, deprecamur, gratias agimus, gratulamur, obiurgamus, maledicimus, describimus, mandamus, renuntiamus, optamus, opinamur, plurima alia?
4.4. As an adherent of the older view I must ask for indulgence and must enquire what was the reason that led earlier writers to restrict a subject of such variety to such narrow bounds. Those who think such authorities in error hold that they were influenced by the fact that these three subjects practically exhausted the range of ancient oratory.
4.4. ut mihi in illa vetere persuasione permanenti velut petenda sit venia, quaerendunque, quo moti priores rem tam late fusam tam breviter astrinxerint. qui errasse putant, hoc secutos arbitrantur, quod in his fere versari tum oratores videbant;
4.5. For it was customary to write panegyrics and denunciations and to deliver funeral orations, while the greater part of their activities was devoted to the law-courts and deliberative assemblies; as a result, they say, the old writers of text-books only included those kinds of oratory which were most in vogue.
4.5. nam et laudes ac vituperationes scribebantur, et ἐπιταφίους dicere erat moris, et plurimum in consiliis ac iudiciis insumebatur operae, ut scriptores artium pro solis comprehenderint frequentissima.
4.6. The defenders of antiquity point out that there are three kinds of audience: one which comes simply for the sake of getting pleasure, a second which meets to receive advice, a third to give judgement on causes. In the course of a thorough enquiry into the question it has occurred to me that the tasks of oratory must either be concerned with the law-courts or with themes lying outside the law-courts.
4.6. vero defendunt, tria faciunt genera auditorum, unum, quod ad delectationem conveniat, alterum, quod consilium accipiat, tertium, quod de causis iudicet. cuncta rimanti et talis quaedam ratio succurrit, quod omne orationis officium aut in iudiciis est aut extra iudicia.
4.7. The nature of the questions into which enquiry is made in the courts is obvious. As regards those matters which do not come before a judge, they must necessarily be concerned either with the past or the future. We praise or denounce past actions, we deliberate about the future.
4.7. , de quibus iudicio quaeritur, manifestum est genus; ea, quae ad iudicem non veniunt, aut praeteritum habent tempus aut futurum; praeterita laudamus aut vituperamus, de futuris deliberamus.
4.8. Again everything on which we have to speak must be either certain or doubtful. We praise or blame what is certain, as our inclination leads us: on the other hand where doubt exists, in some cases we are free to form our own views, and it is here that deliberation comes in, while in others, we leave the problem to the decision of others, and it is on these that litigation takes place.
4.8. omnia, de quibus dicendum est, aut certa sint necesse est aut dubia., ut cuique est animus, laudat aut culpat; ex dubiis partim nobis ipsis ad electionem sunt libera, de his deliberatur; partim aliorum sententiae commissa, de his lite contenditur.
4.9. Anaximenes regarded forensic and public oratory as genera but held that there were seven species:— exhortation, dissuasion, praise, denunciation, accusation, defence, inquiry, or as he called it ἐξεταστικόν. The first two, however, clearly belong to deliberative, the next to demonstrative, the three last to forensic oratory.
4.9. Anaximenes iudicialem et contionalem generales partes esse voluit, septem autem species: hortandi, dehortandi, laudandi, vituperandi, accusandi, defendendi, exquirendi, quod ἐξεταστικόν dicit; quarum duae primae deliberativi, duae sequentes demonstrativi, tres ultimae iudicialis generis sunt partes.
4.10. I say nothing of Protagoras, who held that oratory was to be divided only into the following heads: question and answer, command and entreaty, or as he calls it εὐχωλή. Plato in his Sophist in addition to public and forensic oratory introduces a third kind which he styles προσομιλητική, which I will permit myself to translate by “conversational.” This is distinct from forensic oratory and is adapted for private discussions, and we may regard it as identical with dialectic.
4.10. Protagoran transeo, qui interrogandi, respondendi, mandandi, precandi, quod εὐχωλήν dixit, partes solas putat. Plato in Sophiste iudiciali et contionali tertiam adiecit προσομιλητικήν, quam sane permittamus nobis dicere sermocinatricem; quae a forensi ratione diiungitur et est accommodata privatis disputationibus, cuius vis eadem profecto est quae dialecticae.
4.11. Isocrates held that praise and blame find a place in every kind of oratory. The safest and most rational course seems to be to follow the authority of the majority. There is, then, as I have said, one kind concerned with praise and blame, which, however, derives its name from the better of its two functions and is called laudatory; others however call it demonstrative. Both names are believed to be derived from the Greek in which the corresponding terms are encomiastic, and epideictic.
4.11. Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac vituperationem existimavit. et tutissimum est auctores plurimos sequi, et ita videtur ratio dictare. igitur, ut dixi, unum genus, quo laus ac uituperatio continetur, sed est appellatum a parte meliore laudativum; idem alii demonstrativum vocant. nomen ex Graeco creditur fluxisse, nam ἐγκωμιαστικόν aut ἐπιδεικτικόν dicunt.
4.13. The term epideictic seems to me however to imply display rather than demonstration, and to have a very different meaning from encomiastic. For although it includes laudatory oratory, it does not confine itself thereto.
4.13. mihi ἐπιδεικτικόν non tam demonstrationis vim habere quam ostentationis videtur et multum ab illo ἐγκωμιαστικῷ differre; nam ut continet laudativum in se genus, ita non intra hoc solum consistit.
4.14. Will any one deny the title of epideictic to panegyric? But yet panegyrics are advisory in form and frequently discuss the interests of Greece. We may therefore conclude that, while there are three kinds of oratory, all three devote themselves in part to the matter in land, and in part to display. But it may be that Romans are not borrowing from Greek when they apply the title demonstrative but are merely led to do so because praise and blame demonstrate the nature of the object with which they are concerned.
4.14. quisquam negaverit Panegyricos ἐπιδεικτικούς esse? formam suadendi habent et plerumque de utilitatibus Graeciae loquuntur; ut causarum quidem genera tria sint, sed ea tum in negotiis tum in ostentatione posita. forte non ex Graeco mutantes demonstrativum vocant, uerum id sequuntur, quod laus ac uituperatio quale sit quidque demonstrat.
4.15. The second kind is deliberative, the third forensic oratory. All other species fall under these three genera: you will not find one in which we have not to praise or blame, to advise or dissuade, to drive home or refute a charge, while conciliation, narration, proof, exaggeration, extenuation and the moulding of the minds of the audience by exciting or allaying their passions, are common to all three kind of oratory.
4.15. est deliberativum, tertium iudiciale. species in haec tria incident genera, nec invenietur ex his ulla, in qua non laudare ac vituperare, suadere ac dissuadere, intendere quid vel depellere debeamus. quoque sunt communia, conciliare, narrare, docere, augere, minuere, concitandis componendisve adfectibus animos audientium fingere.
4.16. I cannot even agree with those who hold that laudalory subjects are concerned with the question of what is honourable, deliberative with the question of what is expedient, and forensic with tie question of what is just: the division thus made is easy and neat rather than true: for all three kinds rely on the mutual assistance of the other. For we deal with justice and expediency in punegyric and with honour in (deliberations, while you will rarely find a forensic case, in part of which at any rate something of those questions just mentioned is not to be found.
4.16. iis quidem accesserim, qui laudativam materiam honestorum, deliberatiuam utilium, iudicialem iustorum quaestione contineri putant, celeri magis ac rotunda usi distributione quam vera. enim quodam modo mutuis auxiliis omnia. et in laude iustitia utilitasque tractatur et in consiliis honestas, et raro iudicialem inveneris causam, in cuius non parte aliquid eorum, quae supra diximus, reperiatur.
5.1. Every speech however consists at once of that which is expressed and that which expresses, that is to say of matter and words. Skill in speaking is perfected by nature, art and practice, to which some add a fourth department, namely imitation, which I however prefer to include under art.
5.1. autem oratio constat aut ex iis, quae significantur, aut et iis, quae significant, id est rebus et verbis. orandi consummatur natura, arte, exercitatione, cui partem quartam adiiciunt quidam imitationis, quam nos arti subiicimus.
5.2. There are also three aims which the orator must always have in view; he must instruct, move and charm his hearers. This is a clearer division than that made by those who divide the task of oratory into that which relates to things and that which concerns the emotions, since both of these will not always be present in the subjects which we shall have to treat. For some themes are far from calling for any appeal to the emotions, which, although room cannot always be found for them, produce a most powerful effect wherever they do succeed in forcing their way.
5.2. sunt item, quae praestare debeat orator; ut doceat, moveat, delectet. enim clarior divisio quam eorum, qui totum opus in res et in adfectus partiuntur. semper autem omnia in eam quae tractabitur materiam cadent. enim quaedam remotae ab adfectibus, qui ut non ubique habent locum, ita quocunque irruperunt, plurimum valent.
5.3. The best authorities hold that there are some things in oratory which require proof and others which do not, a view with which I agree. Some on the other hand, as for instance Celsus, think that the orator will not speak on any subject unless there is some question involved in it; but the majority of writers on rhetoric are against him, as is also the threefold division of oratory, unless indeed to praise what is allowed to be honourable and to denounce what is admittedly disgraceful are no part of an orator's duty.
5.3. auctoribus placet alia in rhetorice esse, quae probationem desiderent, alia quae non desiderent, cum quibus ipse consentio. vero, ut Celsus, de nulla re dicturum oratorem, nisi de qua quaeratur, existimant, cui cum maxima pars scriptorum repugnat tum etiam ipsa partitio; nisi forte laudare, quae constet esse honesta, et vituperare, quae ex confesso sint turpia, non est oratoris officium.
5.4. It is, however, universally agreed that all questions must be concerned either with something that is written or something that is not. Those concerned with what is written are questions of law, those which concern what is not written are questions of fact. Hermagoras calls the latter rational questions, the former legal questions, for so we may translate λογικόν and νομικόν.
5.4. iam omnes fatentur, esse quaestiones aut in scripto aut in non scripto; in scripto de iure, in non scripto de re. rationale hoc legale genus Hermagoras atque eum secuti vocant, id est νομικόν et λογικόν.
5.5. Those who hold that every question concerns either things or words, mean much the same. It is also agreed that questions are either definite or indefinite. Indefinite questions are those which may be maintained or impugned without reference to persons, time or place and the like. The Greeks call them theses, Cicero propositions, others general questions relating to civil life, others again questions suited for philosophical discussion, while Athenaeus calls them parts of a cause.
5.5. sentiunt, qui omnem quaestionem ponunt in rebus et in verbis. convenit, quaestiones esse aut infinitas aut finitas. sunt, quae remotis personis et temporibus et locis ceterisque similibus in utramque partem tractantur, quod Graeci θέσιν dicunt, Cicero propositum, alii quaestiones universales civiles, alii quaestiones philosopho convenientes, Athenaeus partem causae appellat.
5.6. Cicero distinguishes two kinds, the one concerned with knowledge, the other with action. Thus “Is the world governed by providence?” is a question of knowledge, while “Should we enter politics?” is a question of action. The first involves three questions, whether a thing is, what it is, and of what nature: for all these things may be unknown: the second involves two, how to obtain power and how to use it.
5.6. genus Cicero scientia et actione distinguit, ut sit scientiae, providentia mundus regatur; actionis, accedendum ad rempublicam administrandam. trium generum, an sit? quid sit? quale sit? omnia enim haec ignorari possunt; sequens duorum, quo modo adipiscamur? quo modo utamur?
5.7. Definite questions involve facts, persons, time and the like. The Greeks call them hypotheses, while we call them causes. In these the whole question turns on persons and facts.
5.7. autem sunt ex complexu rerum personarum temporum ceterorumque; hae ὑποθέσεις a Graecis dicuntur, causae a nostris. his omnis quaestio videtur circa res personasque consistere.
5.8. An indefinite question is always the more comprehensive, since it is from the indefinite question that the definite is derived. I will illustrate what I mean by an example. The question “Should a man marry?” is indefinite; the question “Should Cato marry?” is definite, and consequently may be regarded as a subject for a deliberative theme. But even those which have no connexion with particular persons are generally given a specific reference. For instance the question “Ought we to take a share in the government of our country?” is abstract, whereas “Ought we to take part in the government of our country under the sway of a tyrant?” has a specific reference.
5.8. est semper infinite, inde enim finita descendit. ut exemplo pateat, infinita est, uxor ducenda? finita, Catoni ducenda? ideoque esse suasoria potest. etiam remotae personis propriis ad aliquid referri solent. enim simplex, respublica administranda? refertur ad aliquid, in tyrannide administranda?
5.9. But in this latter case we may say that a person is tacitly implied. For the mention of a tyrant doubles the question, and there is an implicit admission of time and quality; but all the same you would scarcely be justified in calling it a cause or definite question. Those questions which I have styled indefinite are also called general: if this is correct, we shall have to call definite questions special questions. But in every special question the general question is implicit, since the genus is logically prior to the species.
5.9. hic quoque; subest velut latens persona:; tyrannus enim geminat quaestionem, subestque et temporis et qualitatis tacita vis; nondum tamen hoc proprie dixeris causam. autem, quas infinitas voco, et generales appellantur; quod si est verum, finitae speciales erunt. omni autem speciali utique inest generalis, ut quae sit prior.
5.10. And perhaps even in actual causes wherever the notion of quality comes into question, there is a certain intrusion of the abstract. “Milo killed Clodius: he was justified in killing one who lay in wait for him.” Does not this raise the general question as to whether we have the right to kill a man who lies in wait for us? What again of conjectures? May not they be of a general character, as for instance, “What was the motive for the crime? hatred? covetousness?” or “Are we justified in believing confessions made under torture?” or “Which should carry greater weight, evidence or argument?” As for definitions, everything that they contain is undoubtedly of a general nature.
5.10. nescio an in causis quoque, quidquid in quaestionem venit qualitatis, generale sit. Milo Clodium occidit, iure occidit insidiatorem; nonne hoc quaeritur, sit ius insidiatorem occidendi? in coniecturis? non illa generalia, causa sceleris odium? cupiditas? tormentis credendum? an argumentis maior fides habenda? finitione quidem comprehendi nihil non in universum certum erit.
5.11. There are some who hold that even those questions which have reference to persons and particular cases may at times be called theses, provided only they are put slightly differently: for instance, if Orestes be accused, we shall have a cause: whereas if it is put as question, namely “Was Orestes rightly acquitted?” it will be a thesis. To the same class as this last belongs the question “Was Cato right in transferring Marcia to Hortensius?” These persons distinguish a thesis from a cause as follows: a thesis is theoretical in character, while a cause has relation to actual facts, since in the former case we argue merely with a view to abstract truth, while in the latter we have to deal with some particular act.
5.11. putant etiam eas thesis posse aliquando nominari, quae personis causisque contineantur, aliter tantummodo positas: ut causa sit, cum Orestes accusatur: thesis, Orestes recte sit absolutus; cuius generis est, Cato recte Marciam Hortensio tradiderit. thesin a causa sic distinguunt, ut illa sit spectativae partis, haec activae; illic enim veritatis tantum gratia disputari, hic negotium agi.
5.12. Some, however, think that general questions are useless to an orator, since no profit is to be derived from proving that we ought to marry or to take part in politics, if we are prevented from so doing by age or ill health. But not all general questions are liable to this kind of objection. For instance questions such as “Is virtue an end in itself?” or “Is the world governed by providence?” cannot be countered in this way.
5.12. inutiles quidam oratori putant universales quaestiones, quia nihil prosit, quod constet ducendam esse uxorem vel administrandam rempublicam, si quis vel aetate vel valetudine impediatur. non omnibus eiusmodi quaestionibus sic occurri potest, ut illis, sitne virtus finis? regaturne providentia mundus?
5.13. Further in questions which have reference to a particular person, although it is not sufficient merely to handle the general question, we cannot arrive at any conclusion on the special point until we have first discussed the general question. For how is Cato to deliberate “whether he personally is to marry,” unless the general question “whether marriage is desirable” is first settled? And how is he to deliberate “whether he should marry Marcia,” unless it is proved that it is the duty of Cato to marry?
5.13. etiam in iis, quae ad personam referuntur, ut non est satis generalem tractasse quaestionem, ita perveniri ad speciem nisi illa prius excussa non potest. quomodo, an sibi uxor ducenda sit, deliberabit Cato, nisi constiterit, uxores esse ducendas? quomodo, an ducere debeat Marciam, quaeretur, nisi Catoni ducenda uxor est?
5.14. There are, however, certain books attributed to Hermagoras which support this erroneous opinion, though whether the attribution is spurious or whether they were written by another Hermagoras is an open question. For they cannot possibly be by the famous Hermagoras, who wrote so much that was admirable on the art of rhetoric, since, as is clear from the first book of the Rhetorica of Cicero, he divided the material of rhetoric into theses and causes. Cicero objects to this division, contends that theses have nothing to do with an orator, and refers all this class of questions to the philosophers.
5.14. tamen inscripti nomine Hermagorae libri, qui confirmant illam opinionem, sive falsus est titulus sive alius hic Hermagoras fuit. eiusdem esse quomodo possunt, qui de hac arte mirabiliter multa composuit, cum, sicut ex Ciceronis quoque rhetorico primo manifestum est, materiam rhetorices in thesis et causas diviserit? reprehendit Cicero ac thesin nihil ad oratorem pertinere contendit totumque hoc genus quaestionis ad philosophos refert.
5.15. But Cicero has relieved me of any feeling of shame that I might have in controverting his opinion, since he has not only expressed his disapproval of his Rhetorica, but in the Orator, the de Oratore and the Topica instructs us to abstract such discussions from particular persons and occasions, “because we can speak more fully on general than on special themes, and because what is proved of the whole must also be proved of the part.”
5.15. me liberavit respondendi verecundia, et quod ipse hos libros improbat, et quod in Oratore atque his, quos de Oratore scripsit, et Topicis praecipit, ut a propriis personis atque temporibus avocemus controversiam: quia latius dicere liceat de genere quam de specie, et, quod in universo probatum sit, in parte probatum esse necesse sit.
5.16. In all general questions, however, the essential basis is the same as in a cause or definite question. It is further pointed out that there are some questions which concern “things in themselves,” while others have a particular reference; an example of the former will be the question “Should a man marry?” of the latter “Should an old man marry?”; or again the question whether a man is brave will illustrate the first, while the question whether he is braver than another will exemplify the second.
5.16. autem in hoc omne genus materiae iidem, qui in causas, cadunt. adiicitur, alias esse quaestiones in rebus ipsis, alias quae ad aliquid referantur: illud, uxor ducenda? hoc, seni ducenda? illud, fortis? hoc,? et similia.
5.17. Apollodorus defines a cause in the following terms (I quote the translation of his pupil Valgius):— “A cause is a matter which in all its parts bears on the question at issue,” or again “a cause is a matter of which the question in dispute is the object.” He then defines a matter in the following terms:— " A matter is a combination of persons, circumstances of place and time, motives, means, incidents, acts, instruments, speeches, the letter and the spirit of the law.
5.17. finit Apollodorus, ut interpretation Valgi discipuli eius utar, ita: est negotium omnibus suis partibus spectans ad quaestionem; aut: est negotium, cuius finis est controversia. deinde negotium sic finit: est congregatio personarum, locorum, temporum, causarum, modorum, casuum, factorum, instrumentorum, sermonum, scriptorum et non scriptorum.
5.18. Let us then understand a cause in the sense of the Greek hypothesis or subject, and a matter in the sense of the Greek peristasis or collection of circumstances. But some, however, have defined a cause in the same way that Apollodorus defines a matter. Isocrates on the other hand defines a cause as some definite question concerned with some point of civil affairs, or a dispute in which definite persons are involved; while Cicero uses the following words:— “A cause may be known by its being concerned with certain definite persons, circumstances of time and place, actions, and business, and will relate either to all or at any rate to most of these.”
5.18. nunc intelligamus ὑπόθεσιν, negotium περίστασιν. et ipsam causam quidam similiter finierunt, ut Apollodorus negotium. Isocrates autem causam esse ait quaestionem finitam civilem aut rem controversam in personarum finitarum complexu; Cicero his verbis: certis personis, locis, temporibus, actionibus, negotiis cernitur, aut in omnibus aut in plerisque eorum.
6.1. VI. Since every cause, then, has a certain essential basis on which it rests, before I proceed to set forth how each kind of cause should be handled, I think I should first examine a question that is common to all of them, namely, what is meant by basis, whence it is derived and how many and of what nature such bases may be. Some, it is true, have thought that they were peculiar merely to forensic themes, but their ignorance will stand revealed when I have treated of all three kinds of oratory.
6.1. cum omnis causa contineatur aliquo statu, priusquam dicere aggredior, quo modo genus quodque causae sit tractandum, id quod est commune omnibus, quid sit status et unde ducatur et quot et qui sint, intuendum puto. id nonnulli ad iudiciales tantum pertinere materias putaverunt, quorum inscitiam, cum omnia tria genera fuero exsecutus, res ipsa deprehendet.
6.2. That which I call the basis some style the constitution, others the question, and others again that which may be inferred from the question, while Theodorus calls it the most general head, κεφάλαιον γενικώτατον, to which everything must be referred. These different names, however, all mean the same thing, nor is it of the least importance to students by what special name things are called, as long as the thing itself is perfectly clear.
6.2. nos statum, id quidam constitutionem vocant, alii quaestionem, alii quod ex quaestione appareat, Theodorus caput id est κεφάλαιον γενικώτατον, ad quod referantur omnia. diversa appellatio, vis eadem est; nec interest discentium, quibus quidque nominibus appelletur, dum res ipsa manifesta sit.
6.3. The Greeks call this essential basis στάσις, a name which they hold was not invented by Hermagoras, but according to some was introduced by Naucrates, the pupil of Isocrates, according to others by Zopyrus of Clazomenae, although Aeschines in his speech against Ctesiphon seems to employ the word, when he asks the jury not to allow Demosthenes to be irrelevant but to keep him to the stasis or basis of the case.
6.3. Graeci στάσιν vocant, quod nomen non primum ab Hermagora traditum putant, sed alii ab Naucrate, Isocratis discipulo, alii a Zopyro Clazomenio; quanquam videtur Aeschines quoque in oratione contra Ctesiphontem uti hoc verbo, cum a iudicibus petit, ne Demostheni permittant evagari, sed eum dicere de ipso causae statu cogant.
6.4. The term seems to be derived from the fact that it is on it that the first collision between the parties to the dispute takes place, or that it forms the basis or standing of the whole case. So much for the origin of the name. Now for its nature. Some have defined the basis as being the first conflict of the causes. The idea is correct, but the expression is faulty.
6.4. appellatio dicitur ducta vel ex eo, quod ibi sit primus causae congressus, vel quod in hoc causa consistat. nominis quidem haec origo; nunc quid sit. quidam dixerunt primam causarum conflictionem; quos recte sensisse, parum elocutos puto.
6.5. For the essential basis is not the first conflict, which we may represent by the clauses “You did such and such a thing” and “I did not do it.” It is rather the kind of question which arises from the first conflict, which we may represent as follows. “You did it,” “I did not,” “Did he do it?,” or “You did this,” “I did not do this,” “What did he do?” It is clear from these examples, that the first sort of question depends on conjecture, the second on definition, and that the contending parties rest their respective cases on these points: the bases of these questions will therefore be of a conjectural or definitive character respectively.
6.5. enim est status prima conflictio, fecisti, non feci; sed quod ex prima conflictione nascitur, id est genus quaestionis, fecisti, non feci, an fecerit? fecisti, non hoc feci, quid fecerit? ex his apparet, illud coniectura, hoc finitione quaerendum, atque in eo pars utraque insistit, erit quaestio coniecturalis vel finitivi status.