17.3. Indeed I will confess that I had doubts as to whether I should discuss this portion of my inquiry, for there is no one, I will not say so unlearned, but so devoid of ordinary sense, as to hold that building, weaving or moulding vessels from clay are arts, and at the same time to consider that rhetoric, which, as I have already said, is the noblest and most sublime of tasks, has reached such a lofty eminence without the assistance of art.
17.3. me dubitasse confiteor, an hanc partem quaestionis tractandam putarem; nam quis est adeo non ab eruditione modo sed a sensu remotus hominis, ut fabricandi quidem et texendi et e luto vasa ducendi artem putet, rhetoricen autem, maximum ac pulcherrimum, ut supra diximus, opus, in tam sublime fastigium existimet sine arte venisse?
17.4. For my own part I think that those who have argued against this view did not realise what they were saying, but merely desired to exercise their wits by the selection of a difficult theme, like Polycrates, when he praised Busiris and Clytemnestra; I may add that he is credited with a not dissimilar performance, namely the composition of a speech which was delivered against Socrates.
17.4. illos, qui contra disputaverunt, non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quam exercere ingenia materiae difficultate credo voluisse, sicut Polycraten, cum Busirim laudaret et Clytaemnestram; quanquam is, quod his dissimile non est, composuisse orationem, quae est habita contra Socraten, dicitur.
17.5. Some would have it that rhetoric is a natural gift though they admit that it can be developed by practice. So Antonius in the de Oralore of Cicero styles it a knack derived from experience, but denies that it is an art:
17.5. naturalem esse rhetoricen volunt et tamen adiuvari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de Oratore dicit Antonius, observationem quandam esse non artem.
17.6. this statement is however not intended to be accepted by us as the actual truth, but is inserted to make Antonius speak in character, since he was in the habit of concealing his art. Still Lysias is said to have maintained this same view, which is defended on the ground that uneducated persons, barbarians and slaves, when speaking on their own behalf, say something that resembles an exordiam, state the facts of the case, prove, refute and plead for mercy just as an orator does in his peroration.
17.6. non ideo, ut pro vero accipiamus, est positum, sed ut Antoni persona servetur, qui dissimulator artis fuit. autem opinionem habuisse Lysias videtur. sententiae talis defensio est, quod indocti et barbari et servi, pro se cum loquuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio, narrent, probent, refutent, et (quod vim habeat epilogi) deprecentur.
17.7. To this is added the quibble that nothing that is based on art can have existed before the art in question, whereas men have always from time immemorial spoken in their own defence or in denunciation of others: the teaching of rhetoric as an art was, they say, a later invention dating from about the time of Tisias and Corax: oratory therefore existed before art and consequently cannot be an art.
17.7. adiiciunt illas verborum cavillationes, nihil, quod ex arte fiat, ante artem fuisse; atqui dixisse homines pro se et in alios semper, doctores artis sero et circa Tisian et Coraca primum repertos, orationem igitur ante artem fuisse eoque artem non esse.
17.8. For my part I am not concerned with the date when oratory began to be taught. Even in Homer we find Phoenix as an instructor not only of conduct but of speaking, while a number of orators are mentioned, the various styles are represented by the speeches of three of the chiefs and the young men are set to contend among themselves in contests of eloquence: moreover lawsuits and pleaders are represented in the engravings on the shield of Achilles.
17.8. porro, quando coeperit huius rei doctrina, non laboramus exquirere, quanquam apud Homerum et praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi tum etiam loquendi et oratores plures et omne in tribus ducibus orationis genus et certamina quoque proposita eloquentiae inter iuvenes invenimus, quin in caelatura clipei Achillis et lites sunt et actores.
17.9. It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature. Otherwise we might deny the title of art to medicine, which was discovered from the observation of sickness and health, and according to some is entirely based upon experiment: wounds were bound up long before medicine developed into an art, and fevers were reduced by rest and abstention from food, long before the reason for such treatment was known, simply because the state of the patient's health left no choice.
17.9. enim admonere satis est, omnia, quae ars consummaverit, a natura initia duxisse. tollatur medicina, quae ex observatione salubrium atque iis contrariorum reperta est, et, ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis; nam et vulnus deligavit aliquis, antequam haec ars esset, et febrem quiete et abstinentia, non quia rationem videbat, sed quia id valetudo ipsa cogebat, mitigavit.
17.10. So too building should not be styled an art; for primitive man built himself a hut without the assistance of art. Music by the same reasoning is not an art; for every race indulges in some kind of singing and dancing. If therefore any kind of speech is to be called eloquence, I will admit that it existed before it was an art.
17.10. fabrica sit ars; casas enim primi illi sine arte fecerunt; nec musica; cantatur ac saltatur per omnes gentes aliquo modo. si rhetorice vocari debet sermo quicunque, fuisse eam, antequam esset ars, confitebor;
17.11. If on the other hand not every man that speaks is an orator and primitive man did not speak like an orator, my opponents must needs acknowledge that oratory is the product of art and did not exist before it. This conclusion also rules out their argument that men speak who have never learnt how to speak, and that which a man does untaught can have no connexion with art.
17.11. si vero non quisquis loquitur, orator est, et tum non tanquam oratores loquebantur, necesse est, oratorem factum arte nec ante artem fuisse fateantur. illud quoque excluditur, quod dicunt, non esse artis id, quod faciat qui non didicerit, dicere autem homines et qui non didicerint.
17.12. In support of this contention they adduce the fact that Demades was a waterman and Aeschines an actor, but both were orators. Their reasoning is false. For no man can be an orator untaught and it would be truer to say that these orators learned oratory late in life than that they never learned at all; although as a matter of fact Aeschines had an acquaintance with literature from childhood since his father was a teacher of literature, while as regards Demades, it is quite uncertain that he never studied rhetoric and in any case continuous practice in speaking was sufficient to bring him to such proficiency as he attained: for experience is the best of all schools.
17.12. cuius rei confirmationem adferunt, Demaden remigem, et Aeschinen hypocriten oratores fuisse.; nam neque orator esse, qui non didicit, potest, et hos sero potius quam nunquam didicisse quis dixerit, quanquam Aeschines ab initio sit versatus in litteris, quas pater eius etiam docebat, Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit, et continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum, quantuscunque postea fuit, fecisse; nam id potentissimum discendi genus est.
17.13. On the other hand it may fairly be asserted that he would have achieved greater distinction, if he had received instruction: for although he delivered his speeches with great effect, he never ventured to write them for others.
17.13. et praestantiorem, si didicisset, futurum fuisse dicere licet; neque enim orationes scribere est ausus, ut eum multum valuisse in dicendo sciamus.
17.14. Aristotle, it is true, in his Gryllus produces some tentative arguments to the contrary, which are marked by characteristic ingenuity. On the other hand he also wrote three books on the art of rhetoric, in the first of which he not merely admits that rhetoric is an art, but treats it as a department of politics and also of logic.
17.14. Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam subtilitatis suae argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo; sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed ei particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices adsignat.
17.15. Critolaus and Athenodorus of Rhodes have produced many arguments against this view, while Agnon renders himself suspect by the very title of his book in which he proclaims that he is going to indict rhetoric. As to the statements of Epicurus on this subject, they cause me no surprise, for he is the foe of all systematic training.
17.15. Critolaus contra, multa Rhodius Athenodorus. quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil miror.
17.16. These gentlemen talk a great deal, but the arguments on which they base their statements are few. I will therefore select the most important of them and will deal with them briefly, to prevent the discussion lasting to all eternity.
17.16. complura dicunt sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breviter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio evadat.
17.17. Their first contention is based on the subject-matter; for they assert that all arts have their own subject-matter (which is true) and go on to say that rhetoric has none, which I shall show in what follows to be false.
17.17. iis argumentatio ex materia est. enim artes aiunt habere materiam, quod est verum; rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo.
17.18. Another slander is to the effect that no art will acquiesce in false opinions: since an art must be based on direct perception, which is always true: now, say they, rhetoric does give its assent to false conclusions and is therefore not an art.
17.18. est calumnia nullam artem falsis assentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper vera sit; rhetoricen assentiri falsis, non esse igitur artem.
17.19. I will admit that rhetoric sometimes substitutes falsehood for truth, but I will not allow that it does so because its opinions are false, since there is all the difference between holding a certain opinion oneself and persuading someone else to adopt an opinion. For instance a general frequently makes use of falsehood: Hannibal when hemmed in by Fabius persuaded his enemy that he was in retreat by tying brushwood to the horns of oxen, setting fire to them by night and driving the herds across the mountains opposite. But though he deceived Fabius, he himself was fully aware of the truth.
17.19. rhetoricen nonnunquam dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est, ipsi quid videri et, ut alii videatur, efficere. et imperator falsis utitur saepe, ut Hannibal, cum inclusus a Fabio, sarmentis circum cornua boum deligatis incensisque, per noctem in adversos montes agens armenta speciem hosti abeuntis exercitus dedit, sed illum fefellit, ipse, quid verum esset, non ignoravit.
17.20. Again when the Spartan Theopompus changed clothes with his wife and escaped from custody disguised as a woman, he deceived his guards, but was not for a moment deceived as to his own identity. Similarly an orator, when he substitutes falsehood for the truth, is aware of the falsehood and of the fact that he is substituting it for the truth.
17.20. vero Theopompus Lacedaemonius, cum permutato cum uxore habitu e custodia ut mulier evasit, falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit. orator, cum falso utitur pro vero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro vero uti; non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium.
17.21. He therefore deceives others, but not himself. When Cicero boasted that he had thrown dust in the eyes of the jury in the case of Cluentius, he was far from being blinded himself. And when a painter by his artistic skill makes us believe that certain objects project from the picture, while others are withdrawn into the background, he knows perfectly well that they are really all in the same plane.
17.21. Cicero, cum se tenebras offudisse iudicibus in causa Cluenti gloriatus est, nihil ipse vidit. pictor, cum vi artis suae efficit, ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus, ipse ea plana esse non nescit.
17.22. My opponents further assert that every art has some definite goal towards which it directs its efforts, but that rhetoric as a rule has no such goal, while at other times it professes to have an aim, but fails to perform its promise. They lie: I have already shown that rhetoric has a definite purpose and have explained what it is.
17.22. etiam omnes artes habere finem aliquem propositum, ad quem tendant; hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice, modo non praestari eum, qui promittatur.; nos enim esse finem iam ostendimus, et quis esset diximus.
17.23. And, what is more, the orator will always make good his professions in this respect, for he will always speak well. On the other hand this criticism may perhaps hold good as against those who think persuasion the end of oratory. But our orator and his art, as we define it, are independent of results. The speaker aims at victory, it is true, but if he speaks well, he has lived up to the ideals of his art, even if he is defeated.
17.23. praestabit hunc semper orator, semper enim bene dicet. autem hoc, quod opponitur, adversus eos fortasse sit, qui persuadere finem putaverunt. orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in eventu. quidem ad victoriam qui dicit; sed cum bene dixit, etiamsi non vincat, id quod arte continetur effecit.
17.24. Similarly a pilot will desire to bring his ship safe to harbour; but if he is swept out of his course by a storm, he will not for that reason cease to be a pilot, but will say in the wellknown words of the old poet “Still let me steer straight on!”
17.24. et gubernator vult salva nave in portum pervenire; si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator dicetque notum illud, clavum rectum teneam.
17.25. So too the doctor seeks to heal the sick; but if the violence of the disease or the refusal of the patient to obey his regimen or any other circumstance prevent his achieving his purpose, he will not have fallen short of the ideals of his art, provided he has done everything according to reason. So too the orator's purpose is fulfilled if he has spoken well. For the art of rhetoric, as I shall show later, is realised in action, not in the result obtained.
17.25. medicus sanitatem aegri petit; si tamen aut valetudinis vi aut intemperantia aegri aliove quo casu summa non contingit, dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinae fine non excidet. oratori bene dixisse finis est. est ars ea, ut post paulum clarius ostendemus, in actu posita non in effectu.
17.26. From this it follows that there is no truth in yet another argument which contends that arts know when they have attained their end, whereas rhetoric does not. For every speaker is aware when he is speaking well. These critics also charge rhetoric with doing what no art does, namely making use of vices to serve its ends, since it speaks the thing that is not and excites the passions.
17.26. falsum erit illud quoque, quod dicitur, artes scire quando sint finem consecutae, rhetoricen nescire. se quisque bene dicere intelligit. etiam vitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et falsum dicat et adfectus moveat.
17.27. But there is no disgrace in doing either of these things, as long as the motive be good: consequently there is nothing vicious in such action. Even a philosopher is at times permitted to tell a lie, while the orator must needs excite the passions, if that be the only way by which he can lead the judge to do justice.
17.27. neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque nec vitium. et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario movebit orator.
17.28. For judges are not always enlightened and often have to be tricked to prevent them falling into error. Give me philosophers as judges, pack senates and assemblies with philosophers, and you will destroy the power of hatred, influence, prejudice and false witness; consequently there will be very little scope for eloquence whose value will lie almost entirely in its power to charm.
17.28. enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent., si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientium contiones atque omne consilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus et prope in sola delectatione ponatur.
17.29. But if, as is the case, our hearers are fickle of mind, and truth is exposed to a host of perils, we must call in art to aid us in the fight and employ such means as will help our case. He who has been driven from the right road cannot be brought back to it save by a fresh detour.
17.29. et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt. enim, qui recta via depulsus est, reduci ad eam nisi alio flexu potest.
17.30. The point, however, that gives rise to the greatest number of these captious accusations against rhetoric, is found in the allegation that orators speak indifferently on either side of a case. From which they draw the following arguments: no art is self-contradictory, but rhetoric does contradict itself; no art tries to demolish what itself has built, but this does happen in the operations of rhetoric; or again:— rhetoric teaches either what ought to be said or what ought not to be said; consequently it is not an art because it teaches what ought not to be said, or because, while it teaches what ought to be said, it also teaches precisely the opposite.
17.30. vero ex eo contra rhetoricen cavillatio est, quod ex utraque causae parte dicatur. haec: nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi; nullam artem destruere quod effecerit, accidere hoc rhetorices operi; item aut dicenda eam docere aut non dicenda; ita vel per hoc non esse artem, quod non dicenda praecipiat, vel per hoc, quod, cum dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his doceat.
17.31. Now it is obvious that all such charges are brought against that type of rhetoric with which neither good men nor virtue herself will have anything to do; since if a case be based on injustice, rhetoric has no place therein and consequently it can scarcely happen even under the most exceptional circumstances that an orator, that is to say, a good man, will speak indifferently on either side.
17.31. omnia apparet de ea rhetorice dici, quae sit a bono viro atque ab ipsa virtute seiuncta; alioqui ubi iniusta causa est, ibi rhetorice non est, adeo ut vix admirabili quodam casu possit accidere, ut ex utraque parte orator, id est vir bonus, dicat.
17.32. Still it is in the nature of things conceivable that just causes may lead two wise men to take different sides, since it is held that wise men may fight among themselves, provided that they do so at the bidding of reason. I will therefore reply to their criticisms in such a way that it will be clear that these arguments have no force even against those who concede the name of orator to persons of bad character. For rhetoric is not self-contradictory.
17.32. quoniam hoc quoque in rerum naturam cadit, ut duos sapientes aliquando iustae causae in diversum trahant, (quando etiam pugnaturos eos inter se, si ratio ita duxerit, credunt) respondebo propositis, atque ita quidem, ut appareat, haec adversus eos quoque frustra excogitata, qui malis moribus nomen oratoris indulgent.
17.33. The conflict is between case and case, not between rhetoric and itself. And even if persons who have learned the same thing fight one another, that does not prove that what they have learned is not an art. Were that so, there could be no art of arms, since gladiators trained under the same master are often matched against each other;
17.33. rhetorice non est contraria sibi. enim cum causa, non illa secum ipsa componitur., si pugnent inter se, qui idem didicerunt, idcirco ars, quae utrique tradita est, non erit; alioqui nec armorum, quia saepe gladiatores sub eodem magistro eruditi inter se componuntur;
17.34. nor would the pilot's art exist, because in sea-fights pilots may be found on different sides; nor yet could there be an art of generalship, since general is pitted against general. In the same way rhetoric does not undo its own work. For the orator does not refute his own arguments, nor does rhetoric even do so, because those who regard persuasion as its end, or the two good men whom chance has matched against one another seek merely for probabilities: and the fact that one thing is more credible than another, does not involve contradiction between the two.
17.34. nec gubernandi, quia navalibus proeliis gubernator est gubernatori adversus; nec imperatoria, quia imperator cum imperatore contendit. non evertit opus rhetorice, quod efficit. enim positum a se argumentum solvit orator sed ne rhetorice quidem, quia apud eos, qui in persuadendo finem putant, aut si quis (ut dixi) casus duos inter se bonos viros composuerit, verisimilia quaerentur; non autem, si quid est altero credibilius, id ei contrarium est, quod fuit credibile.
17.35. There is no absolute antagonism between the probable and the more probable, just as there is none between that which is white and that which is whiter, or between that which is sweet and that which is sweeter. Nor does rhetoric ever teach that which ought not to be said, or that which is contrary to what ought to be said, but solely what ought to be said in each individual case.
17.35. ut candido candidius et dulci dulcius non est adversum, ita nec probabili probabilius. praecipit unquam non dicenda nec dicendis contraria, sed quae in quaque causa dicenda sunt.
17.36. But though the orator will as a rule maintain what is true, this will not always be the case: there are occasions when the public interest demands that he should defend what is untrue. The following objections are also put forward in the second book of Cicero's de Oratore: — “Art deals with things that are known. But the pleading of an orator is based entirely on opinion, not on knowledge, because he speaks to an audience who do not know, and sometimes himself states things of which he has no actual knowledge.”
17.36. semper autem ei, etiamsi frequentissime, tuenda veritas erit; sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas, ut etiam falsa defendat. hae quoque in secundo Ciceronis de Oratore libro contradictiones: artem earum rerum esse, quae sciantur; oratoris omnem actionem opinione, non scientia contineri, quia et apud eos dicat, qui nesciant, et ipse dicat aliquando, quod nesciat.
17.37. Now one of these points, namely whether the judges have knowledge of what is being said to them, has nothing to do with the art of oratory. The other statement, that art is concerned with things that are known, does however require an answer. Rhetoric is the art of speaking well and the orator knows how to speak well.
17.37. his alterum, id est, an sciat index, de quo dicatur, nihil ad oratoris artem; alteri respondendum, earum rerum est, quae sciuntur. ars est bene dicendi, bene autem dicere scit orator.
17.38. “But,” it is urged, “he does not know whether what he says is true.” Neither do they, who assert that all things derive their origin from fire or water or the four elements or indivisible atoms; nor they who calculate the distances of the stars or the size of the earth and sun. And yet all these call the subject which they teach an art. But if reason makes them seem not merely to hold opinions but, thanks to the cogency of the proofs adduced, to have actual knowledge, reason will do the same service to the orator.
17.38. nescit, an verum sit quod dicit. hi quidem, qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse, ex quibus res omnes initium duxerint, tradunt, nec qui intervalla siderum et mensuras solis ac terrae colligunt; disciplinam tamen suam artem vocant. ratio efficit, ut haec non opinari sed propter vim probationum scire videantur, eadem ratio idem praestare oratori potest.
17.39. “But,” they say, “he does not know whether the cause which he has undertaken is true.” But not even a doctor can tell whether a patient who claims to be suffering from a headache, really is so suffering: but he will treat him on the assumption that his statement is true, and medicine will still be an art. Again what of the fact that rhetoric does not always aim at telling the truth, but always at stating what is probable? The answer is that the orator knows that what he states is no more than probable.
17.39. an causa vera sit, nescit. medicus quidem, an dolorem capitis habeat, qui hoc se pati dicet; curabit tamen, tamquam id verum sit, et erit ars medicina. quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper vera dicendi, sed semper verisimilia? scit autem esse verisimilia quae dicit.
17.40. My opponents further object that advocates often defend in one case what they have attacked in another. This is not the fault of the art, but of the man. Such are the main points that are urged against rhetoric; there are others as well, but they are of minor importance and drawn from the same sources. That rhetoric is an art may, however, be proved in a very few words.
17.40. his, qui contra sentiunt, quod saepe, quae in allis litibus impugnarunt actores causarum, eadem in aliis defendant. non artis sed hominis est vitium. sunt praecipua, quae contra rhetoricen dicantur; alia et minora et tamen ex his fontibus derivata. autem esse artem eam breviter.
17.41. For if Cleanthes definition be accepted that “Art is a power reaching its ends by a definite path, that is, by ordered methods,” no one can doubt that there is such method and order in good speaking: while if, on the other hand, we accept the definition which meets with almost universal approval that art consists in perceptions agreeing and cooperating to the achievement of some useful end, we shall be able to show that rhetoric lacks none of these characteristics.
17.41. sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas via, id est ordine, efficiens, esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit; sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis observatur, artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad fine utilem vitae, iam ostendemus nihil non horum in rhetorice inesse.
17.42. Again it is scarcely necessary for me to point out that like other arts it is based on examination and practice. And if logic is an art, as is generally agreed, rhetoric must also be an art, since it differs from logic in species rather than in genus. Nor must I omit to point out that where it is possible in any given subject for one man to act without art and another with art, there must necessarily be an art in connexion with that subject, as there must also be in any subject in which the man who has received instruction is the superior of him who has not.
17.42. quod et inspectione et exercitatione ut artes ceterae constat? potest ars non esse, si est ars dialectice, quod fere constat, cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat. nec illa omittenda sunt, qua in re alius se inartificialiter alius artificialiter gerat, in ea esse artem, et in eo quod, qui didicerit, melius faciat quam qui non didicerit, esse artem.
17.43. But as regards the practice of rhetoric, it is not merely the case that the trained speaker will get the better of the untrained. For even the trained man will prove inferior to one who has received a better training. If this were not so, there would not be so many rhetorical rules, nor would so many great men have come forward to teach them. The truth of this must be acknowledged by everyone, but more especially by us, since we concede the possession of oratory to none save the good man.
17.43. non solum doctus indoctum, sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit, neque essent aliter eius tam multa praecepta tamque magni, qui docerent; idque cum omnibus confitendum est, tum nobis praecipue, qui rationem dicendi a bono viro non separamus.
18.1. Some arts, however, are based on examination, that is to say on the knowledge and proper appreciation of things, as for instance astronomy, which demands no action, but is content to understand the subject of its study: such arts are called theoretical. Others again are concerned with action: this is their end, which is realised in action, so that, the action once performed, nothing more remains to do: these arts we style practical, and dancing will provide us with an example.
18.1. sint autem artium aliae positae in inspectione, id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum, qualis est astrologia, nullum exigens actum sed ipso rei, cuius studium habet, intellectu contenta, quae θεωρητικὴ vocatur; aliae in agendo, quarum in hoc finis est et ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit, quae πρακτική dicitur, qualis saltatio est;
18.2. Thirdly there are others which consist in producing a certain result and achieve their purpose in the completion of a visible task: such we style productive, and painting may be quoted as an illustration. In view of these facts we must come to the conclusion that, in the main, rhetoric is concerned with action; for in action it accomplishes that which it is its duty to do.
18.2. aliae in effectu, quae operis, quod oculis subiicitur, consummatione finem accipiunt, quam ποητικήν appellamus, qualis est pictura: fere iudicandum est, rhetoricen in actu consistere; hoc enim, quod est officii sui, perficit.
18.3. This view is universally accepted, although in my opinion rhetoric draws largely on the two other kinds of art. For it may on occasion be content with the mere examination of a thing. Rhetoric is still in the orator's possession even though he be silent, while if he gives up pleading either designedly or owing to circumstances over which he has no control, he does not therefore cease to be an orator, any more than a doctor ceases to be a doctor when he withdraws from practice.
18.3. ita ab omnibus dictum est. autem videtur etiam ex illis ceteris artibus multum assumere. et potest aliquando ipsa res per se inspectione esse contenta. enim rhetorice in oratore etiam tacente, et si desierit agere vel proposito vel aliquo casu impeditus, non magis desinet esse orator quam medicus, qui curandi fecerit finem.
18.4. Perhaps the highest of all pleasures is that which we derive from private study, and the only circumstances under which the delights of literature are unalloyed are when it withdraws from action, that is to say from toil, and can enjoy the pleasure of self-contemplation.
18.4. est aliquis, ac nescio an maximus, etiam ex secretis studiis fructus ac tum pura voluptas litterarum, cum ab actu, id est opera, recesserunt et contemplatione sui fruuntur.
18.5. But in the results that the orator obtains by writing speeches or historical narratives, which we may reasonably count as part of the task of oratory, we shall recognise features resembling those of a productive art. Still, if rhetoric is to be regarded as one of these three classes of art, since it is with action that its practice is chiefly and most frequently concerned, let us call it an active or administrative art, the two terms being identical.
18.5. effectivae quoque aliquid simile scriptis orationibus vel historiis, quod ipsum opus in parte oratoria merito ponimus, consequetur. tamen una ex tribus artibus habenda sit, quia maxime eius usus actu continetur atque est in eo frequentissima, dicatur activa vel administrativa, nam et hoc eiusdem rei nomen est.
19.1. I quite realise that there is a further question as to whether eloquence derives most from nature or from education. This question really lies outside the scope of our inquiry, since the ideal orator must necessarily be the result of a blend of both. But I do regard it as of great importance that we should decide how far there is any real question on this point.
19.1. , quaeri etiam, naturane plus ad eloquentiam conferat an doctrina. ad propositum quidem operis nostri nihil pertinet (neque enim consummatus orator nisi ex utroque fieri potest), plurimum tamen referre arbitror, quam esse in hoc loco quaestionem velimus.
19.2. For if we make an absolute divorce between the two, nature will still be able to accomplish much without the aid of education, while the latter is valueless without the aid of nature. If, on the other hand, they are blended in equal proportions, I think we shall find that the average orator owes most to nature, while the perfect orator owes more to education. We may take a parallel from agriculture. A thoroughly barren soil will not be improved even by the best cultivation, while good land will yield some useful produce without any cultivation; but in the case of really rich land cultivation will do more for it than its own natural fertility.
19.2. si parti utrilibet omnino alteram detrahas, natura etiam sine doctrina multum valebit, doctrina nulla esse sine natura poterit. ex pari coeant, in mediocribus quidem utrisque maius adhuc credam naturae esse momentum, consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo; sicut terrae nullam fertilitatem habenti nihil optimus agricola profuerit, e terra uberi utile aliquid etiam nullo colente nascetur, at in solo fecundo plus cultor quam ipsa per se bonitas soli efficiet.
19.3. Had Praxiteles attempted to carve a statue out of a millstone, I should have preferred a rough block of Parian marble to any such statue. On the other hand, if the same artist had produced a finished statue from such a block of Parian marble, its artistic value would owe more to his skill than to the material. To conclude, nature is the raw material for education: the one forms, the other is formed. Without material art can do nothing, material without art does possess a certain value, while the perfection of art is better than the best material.
19.3. , si Praxiteles signum aliquod ex molari lapide conatus esset exsculpere, Parium marmor mallem rude; at si illud idem artifex expolisset, plus in manibus fuisset quam in marmore. natura materia doctrinae est; haec fingit, illa fingitur. ars sine materia, materiae etiam sine arte pretium est, ars summa materia optima melior.
20.1. More important is the question whether rhetoric is to be regarded as one of the indifferent arts, which in themselves deserve neither praise nor blame, but are useful or the reverse according to the character of the artist; or whether it should, as not a few even among philosophers hold, be considered as a virtue.
20.1. quaestio est maior, ex mediis artibus, quae neque laudari per se nec vituperari possunt, sed utiles aut secus secundum mores utentium fiunt, habenda sit rhetorice, an sit, ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet, virtus.
20.2. For my own part I regard the practice of rhetoric which so many have adopted in the past and still follow to-day, as either no art at all, or, as the Greeks call it, ἀτεχνία (for I see numbers of speakers without the least pretension to method or literary training rushing headlong in the direction in which hunger or their natural shamelessness calls them); or else it is a bad art such as is styled κακοτεχνία. For there have, I think, been many persons and there are still some who have devoted their powers of speaking to the destruction of their fellow-men.
20.2. illud, quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent, aut nullam artem, quae ἀτεχνία nominatur, puto, (multos enim video sine ratione, sine litteris, qua vel impudentia vel fames duxit, ruentes) aut malam quasi artem, quam κακοτεχνίαν dicimus. et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo, qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem converterint.
20.3. There is also an unprofitable imitation of art, a kind of ματαιοτεχνία which is neither good nor bad, but merely involves a useless expenditure of labour, reminding one of the man who shot a continuous stream of vetch-seeds from a distance through the eye of a needle, without ever missing his aim, and was rewarded by Alexander, who was a witness of the display, with the present of a bushel of vetch-seeds, a most appropriate reward.
20.3. ματαιοτεχνία quoque est quaedam, id est supervacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed vanum laborem, qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris ex spatio distanti missa in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat, quem cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur eiusdem leguminis modio, quod quidem praemium fuit illo opere dignissimum.
20.4. It is to such men that I would compare those who spend their whole time at the expense of much study and energy in composing declamations, which they aim at making as unreal as possible. The rhetoric on the other hand, which I am endeavouring to establish and the ideal of which I have in my mind's eye, that rhetoric which befits a good man and is in a word the only true rhetoric, will be a virtue.
20.4. ego comparandos existimo, qui in declamationibus, quas esse veritati dissimillimas volunt, aetatem multo studio ac labore consumunt. haec, quam instituere conamur et cuius imaginem animo concepimus, quae bono viro convenit quaeque est vere rhetorice, virtus erit.
20.5. Philosophers arrive at this conclusion by a long chain of ingenious arguments; but it appears to me to be perfectly clear from the simpler proof of my own invention which I will now proceed to set forth. The philosophers state the case as follows. If self-consistency as to what should and should not be done is an element of virtue (and it is to this quality that we give the name of prudence), the same quality will be revealed as regards what should be said and what should not be said, and if there are virtues, of which nature has given us some rudimentary sparks, even before we were taught anything about them, as for instance justice, of which there are some traces even among peasants and barbarians, it is clear that man has been so formed from the beginning as to be able to plead on his own behalf, not, it is true, with perfection, but yet sufficiently to show that there are certain sparks of eloquence implanted in us by nature.
20.5. philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus colligunt, mihi vero etiam planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione videtur esse perspicuum. illis haec dicuntur. consonare sibi in faciendis ac non faciendis virtus est, quae pars eius prudentia vocatur, eadem in dicendis ac non dicendis erit. si virtutes sunt, ad quas nobis etiam ante quam doceremur initia quaedam ac semina sunt concessa natura, ut ad iustitiam, cuius rusticis quoque ac barbaris apparet aliqua imago, nos certe sic esse ab initio formatos, ut possemus orare pro nobis, etiamsi non perfecte, tamen ut inessent quaedam (ut dixi) semina eius facultatis, manifestum est.
20.7. The same nature, however, is not to be found in those arts which have no connexion with virtue. Consequently, since there are two kinds of speech, the continuous which is called rhetoric, and the concise which is called dialectic (the relation between which was regarded by Zeno as being so intimate that he compared the latter to the closed fist, the former to the open hand), even the art of disputation will be a virtue. Consequently there can be no doubt about oratory whose nature is so much fairer and franker.
20.7. eadem autem natura est iis artibus, quae a virtute sunt remotae. cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice (quas quidem Zeno adeo coniunxit, ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam explicatae diceret similem), etiam disputatrix virtus erit. de hac, quae speciosior atque apertior tanto est, nihil dubitabitur. plenius hoc idem atque apertius intueri ex ipsis operibus volo.
20.8. I should like, however, to consider the point more fully and explicitly by appealing to the actual work of oratory. For how will the orator succeed in panegyric unless he can distinguish between what is honourable and the reverse? How can he urge a policy, unless he has a clear perception of what is expedient? How can he plead in the law-courts, if he is ignorant of the nature of justice? Again, does not oratory call for courage, since it is often directed against the threats of popular turbulence and frequently runs into peril through incurring the hatred of the great, while sometimes, as for instance in the trial of Milo, the orator may have to speak in the midst of a crowd of armed soldiers? Consequently, if oratory be not a virtue, perfection is beyond its grasp.
20.8. quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum et turpium peritus? aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta? aut in iudiciis, si iustitiae sit ignarus?? non fortitudinem postulat res eadem, cum saepe contra turbulentas populi minas, saepe cum periculosa potentium offensa, nonnunquam, ut iudicio Miloniano, inter circumfusa militum arma dicendum sit; ut, si virtus non est, ne perfecta quidem esse possit oratio.
20.9. If, on the other hand, each living thing has its own peculiar virtue, in which it excels the rest or, at any rate, the majority (I may instance the courage of the lion and the swiftness of the horse), it may be regarded as certain that the qualities in which man excels the rest are, above all, reason and powers of speech. Why, therefore, should we not consider that the special virtue of man lies just as much in eloquence as in reason? It will be with justice then that Cicero makes Crassus say that “eloquence is one of the highest virtues,” and that Cicero himself calls it a virtue in his letters to Brutus and in other passages.
20.9. ea in quoque animalium est virtus, qua praestat cetera vel pleraque, ut in leone impetus, in equo velocitas, hominem porro ratione atque oratione excellere ceteris certum est: cur non tam in eloquentia quam in ratione virtutem eius esse credamus, recteque hoc apud Ciceronem dixerit Crassus: enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis virtutibus, et ipse Cicero sua persona cum ad Brutum in epistulis, tum aliis etiam locis virtutem eam appellet?
20.10. “But,” it may be urged, “a bad man will at times produce an exordium or a statement of facts, and will argue a case in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired.” No doubt; even a robber may fight bravely without courage ceasing to be a virtue; even a wicked slave may bear torture without a groan, and we may still continue to regard endurance of pain as worthy of praise. We can point to many acts which are identical with those of virtue, but spring from other sources. However, what I have said here must suffice, as I have already dealt with the question of the usefulness of oratory.
20.10. prooemium aliquando ac narrationem dicet malus homo et argumenta, sic ut nihil sit in iis requirendum. et latro pugnabit acriter, virtus tamen erit fortitudo; et tormenta sine gemitu feret malus servus, tolerantia tamen doloris laude sua non carebit. fiunt eadem sed aliter. igitur haec, quia de utilitate supra tractavimus.
21.1. As to the material of oratory, some have asserted that it is speech, as for instance Gorgias in the dialogue of Plato. If this view be accepted in the sense that the word “speech” is used of a discourse composed on any subject, then it is not the material, but the work, just as a statue is the work of the sculptor. For speeches like statues require art for their production. If on the other hand we interpret “speech” as indicating the words themselves, they can do nothing unless they are related to facts. Some again hold that the material consists of persuasive arguments. But they form part of the work, are produced by art and require material themselves.
21.1. rhetorices quidam dixerunt esse orationem, qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias. si ita accipitur, ut sermo quacunque de re compositus dicatur oratio, non materia sed opus est, ut statuarii statua; nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut statua. hac appellatione verba ipsa significari putamus, nihil haec sine rerum substantia faciunt.
21.2. Some say that political questions provide the material. The mistake made by these lies not in the quality of their opinion but in its limitation. For political questions are material for eloquence but not the only material.
21.2. argumenta persuasibilia; quae et ipsa in parte sunt operis et arte fiunt et materia egent. civiles quaestiones; quorum opinio non qualitate sed modo erravit, est enim haec materia rhetorices sed non sola.
21.3. Some, on the ground that rhetoric is a virtue, make the material with which it deals to be the whole of life. Others, on the ground that life regarded as a whole does not provide material for every virtue, since most of them are concerned only with departments of life (justice, courage and self-control each having their own duties and their own end), would consequently restrict oratory to one particular department of life and place it in the practical or pragmatic department of ethics, that is to say the department of morals which deals with the business of life.
21.3. , quia virtus sit rhetorice, materiam eius totam vitam vocant., quia non omnium virtutum materia sit tota vita, sed pleraeque earum versentur in partibus, sicut iustitia, fortitudo, continentia propriis officiis et suo fine intelliguntur, rhetoricen quoque dicunt in una aliqua parte ponendam, eique locum in ethice negotialem adsignant id est πραγματικόν.
21.4. For my own part, and I have authority to support me, I hold that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that may be placed before it as a subject for speech. Plato, if I read him aright, makes Socrates say to Gorgias that its material is to be found in things not words; while in the Phaedrus he clearly proves that rhetoric is concerned not merely with law-courts and public assemblies, but with private and domestic affairs as well: from which it is obvious that this was the view of Plato himself.
21.4. (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecunque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt. Socrates apud Platonem dicere Gorgiae videtur, non in verbis esse materiam sed in rebus. in Phaedro palam, non in iudiciis modo et contionibus, sed in rebus etiam privatis ac domesticis rhetoricen esse demonstrat.
21.5. Cicero also in a passage of one of his works, states that the material of rhetoric is composed of the things which are brought before it, but makes certain restrictions as to the nature of these things. In another passage, however, he expresses his opinion that the orator has to speak about all kinds of things; I will quote his actual words: “although the very meaning of the name of orator and the fact that he professes to speak well seem to imply a promise and undertaking that the orator will speak with elegance and fullness on any subject that may be put before him.”
21.5. manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse. Cicero quodam loco materiam rhetorices vocat res, quae subiectae sint ei, sed certas demum putat esse subiectas. vero de omnibus rebus oratori dicendum arbitratur his quidem verbis: vis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri videtur, ut omni de re, quaecunque sit proposita, ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur.
21.6. And in another passage he says, “It is the duty of the true orator to seek out, hear, read, discuss, handle and ponder everything that befalls in the life of man, since it is with this that the orator is concerned and this that forms the material with which he has to deal.”
21.6. adhuc alibi: enim oratori, quae sunt in hominum vita, quandoquidem in ea versatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent.
21.7. But this material, as we call it, that is to say the things brought before it, has been criticised by some, at times on the ground that it is limitless, and sometimes on the ground that it is not peculiar to oratory, which they have therefore dubbed a discursive art, because all is grist that comes to its mill.
21.7. hanc autem, quam nos materiam vocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam modo infinitam modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt, eamque artem circumcurrentem vocaverunt, quod in omni materia diceret, cum quibus mihi minima pugna est.
21.8. I have no serious quarrel with these critics, for they acknowledge that rhetoric is concerned with every kind of material, though they deny that it has any peculiar material just because of that material's multiplicity. But in spite of this multiplicity, rhetoric is not unlimited in scope, and there are other minor arts whose material is characterised by the same multiplicity: such for instance is architecture, which deals with everything that is useful for the purpose of building: such too is the engraver's art which works on gold, silver, bronze, iron.
21.8. de omni materia dicere eam fatentur; propriam habere materiam, quia multiplicem habeat, negant. neque infinita est, etiamsi est multiplex; et aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, velut architectonice, namque ea in omnibus, quae sunt aedificio utilia, versatur, et caelatura, quae auro, argento, aere, ferro opera efficit.
21.9. As for sculpture, its activity extends to wood, ivory, marble, glass and precious stones in addition to the materials already mentioned.
21.9. sculptura etiam lignum, ebur, marmor, vitrum, gemmas praeter ea quae supra dixi complectitur.
21.10. And things which form the material for other artists, do not for that reason cease forthwith to be material for rhetoric. For if I ask what is the material of the sculptor, I shall be told bronze; and if I ask what is the material of the maker of vessels (I refer to the craft styled χαλκευτική by the Greeks), the answer will again be bronze: and yet there is all the difference in the world between vessels and statues.
21.10. protinus non est materia rhetorices, si in eadem versatur et alius. si quaeram, quae sit materia statuarii, dicetur aes; si quaeram quae sit excusoris, id est fabricae eius quam Graeci χαλκευτικήν vocant, similiter aes esse respondeant. plurimum statuis differunt vasa.
21.11. Similarly medicine will not cease to be an art, because, like the art of the gymnast, it prescribes rubbing with oil and exercise, or because it deals with diet like the art of cookery.
21.11. medicina ideo non erit ars, quia unctio et exercitatio cum palaestrica, ciborum vero qualitas etiam cum cocorum ei sit arte communis.
21.12. Again, the objection that to discourse of what is good, expedient or just is the duty of philosophy presents no difficulty. For when such critics speak of a philosopher, they mean a good man. Why then should I feel surprised to find that the orator whom I identify with the good man deals with the same material?
21.12. vero de bono, utili, iusto disserere philosophiae officium esse dicunt, non obstat. cum philosophum dicunt, hoc accipi volunt virum bonum. igitur oratorem, quem a bono viro non separo, in eadem materia versari mirer?
21.13. There is all the less reason, since I have already shown in the first book that philosophers only usurped this department of knowledge after it had been abandoned by the orators: it was always the peculiar property of rhetoric and the philosophers are really trespassers. Finally, since the discussion of whatever is brought before it is the task of dialectic, which is really a concise form of oratory, why should not this task be regarded as also being the appropriate material for continuous oratory? There is a further objection made by certain critics, who say “Well then, if an orator has to speak on every subject, he must be the master of all the arts.” I might answer this criticism in the words of Cicero, in whom I find the following passage:— “In my opinion no one can be an absolutely perfect orator unless he has acquired a knowledge of all important subjects and arts.” I however regard it as sufficient that an orator should not be actually ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak.
21.13. cum praesertim primo libro iam ostenderim, philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse, quae rhetorices propria semper fuisset, ut illi potius in nostra materia versentur. cum sit dialectices materia de rebus subiectis disputare, sit autem dialectice oratio concisa, cur non eadem perpetuae quoque materia videatur? a quibusdam et illud opponi: igitur artium peritus erit orator, si de omnibus ei dicendum est. hic Ciceronis respondere verbis, apud quem hoc invenio: quidem sententia nemo esse poterit omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus; sed mihi satis est eius esse oratorem rei de qua dicet non inscium.
21.15. For he cannot have a knowledge of all causes, and yet he should be able to speak on all. On what then will he speak? On those which he has studied. Similarly as regards the arts, he will study those concerning which he has to speak, as occasion may demand, and will speak on those which he has studied.
21.15. enim omnes causas novit, et debet posse de omnibus dicere. quibus ergo dicet? quibus didicit. de artibus quoque, de quibus dicendum erit, interim discet; et de quibus didicerit dicet.
21.16. What then?—I am asked—will not a builder speak better on the subject of building and a musician on music? Certainly, if the orator does not know what is the question at issue. Even an illiterate peasant who is a party to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does not know what the subject in dispute may be. But on the other hand if the orator receive instruction from the builder or the musician, he will put forward what he has thus learned better than either, just as he will plead a case better than his client, once he has been instructed in it.
21.16. ergo? non faber de fabrica melius aut de musice musicus? nesciat orator, quid sit, de quo quaeratur, plane melius. et litigator rusticus illitteratusque de causa sua melius, quam orator, qui nesciet quid in lite sit; sed accepta a musico, a fabro, sicut a litigatore melius orator quam ipse qui docuerit.
21.17. The builder and the musician will, however, speak on the subject of their respective arts, if there should be any technical point which requires to be established. Neither will be an orator, but he will perform his task like an orator, just as when an untrained person binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will be acting as one.
21.17. et faber, cum de fabrica, et musicus, cum de musica, si quid confirmationem desideraverit, dicet. quidem erit orator, sed faciet illud quasi orator, sicut cum vulnus imperitus deligabit, non erit medicus, sed faciet ut medicus.
21.18. Is it suggested that such topics never crop up in panegyric, deliberative or forensic oratory? When the question of the construction of a port at Ostia came up for discussion, had not the orator to state his views? And yet it was a subject requiring the technical knowledge of the architect.
21.18. huiusmodi res neque in laudem neque in deliberationem neque in iudicium veniunt? cum de faciendo portu Ostiensi deliberatum est, non debuit sententiam dicere orator? atqui opus erat ratione architectorum.
21.19. Does not the orator discuss the question whether livid spots and swellings on the body are symptomatic of ill-health or poison? And yet that is a question for the qualified physician. Will he not deal with measurements and figures? And yet we must admit that they form part of mathematics. For my part I hold that practically all subjects are under certain circumstances liable to come up for treatment by the orator. If the circumstances do not occur, the subjects will not concern him.
21.19. et tumores in corpore cruditatis an veneni signa sint, non tractat orator? at est id ex ratione medicinae. mensuras et numeros non versabitur? dicamus has geometriae esse partes. omnia fere credo posse casu aliquo venire in officium oratoris; quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta.
21.20. We were therefore right in asserting that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment, an assertion which is confirmed by the practice of everyday speech. For when we have been given a subject on which to speak, we often preface our remarks by calling attention to the fact that the matter has been laid before us.
21.20. sic quoque recte diximus, materiam rhetorices esse omnes res ad dicendum ei subiectas; quod quidem probat etiam sermo communis. cum aliquid, de quo dicamus, accepimus, positam nobis esse materiam frequenter etiam praefatione testamur.
21.21. Gorgias indeed felt so strongly that it was the orator's duty to speak on every subject, that he used to allow those who attended his lectures to ask him questions on any subject they pleased. Hermagoras also asserted that the material of oratory lay in the cause and the questions it involved, thereby including every subject that can be brought before it.
21.21. Gorgias quidem adeo rhetori de omnibus rebus putavit esse dicendum, ut se in auditoriis interrogari pateretur, qua quisque de re vellet. Hermagoras quoque, dicendo materiam esse in causa et in quaestionibus, omnes res subiectas erat complexus.
21.22. If he denies that general questions are the concern of oratory, he disagrees with me: but if they do concern rhetoric, that supports my contention. For there is nothing which may not crop up in a cause or appear as a question for discussion.
21.22. quaestiones si negat ad rhetoricen pertinere, dissentit a nobis; si autem ad rhetoricen pertinent, ab hoc quoque adiuvamur. est enim, quod non in causam aut quaestionem cadat.
21.23. Aristotle himself also by his tripartite division of oratory, into forensic, deliberative and demonstrative, practically brought everything into the orator's domain, since there is nothing that may not come up for treatment by one of these three kinds of rhetoric.
21.23. Aristoteles tres faciendo partes orationis, iudicialem, deliberativam, demonstrativam, paene et ipse oratori subiecit omnia; nihil enim non in haec cadit.
21.24. A very few critics have raised the question as to what may be the instrument of oratory. My definition of an instrument is that without which the material cannot be brought into the shape necessary for the effecting of our object. But it is not the art which requires an instrument, but the artist. Knowledge needs no instruments, for it may be complete although it produces nothing, but the artist must have them. The engraver cannot work without his chisel nor the painter without his brush. I shall therefore defer this question until I come to treat of the orator as distinct from his art.
21.24. a paucissimis et de instrumento est. voco, sine quo formari materia in id quod velimus effici opus non possit. hoc ego non artem credo egere sed artifice. enim scientia desiderat instrumentum, quae potest esse consummata, etiamsi nihil faciat, sed ille artifex, ut caelator caelum et pictor penicilla. haec in eum locum, quo de oratore dicturi sumus, differamus.