6.84. For there are some things, which, although not laudable in themselves, are yet permitted by law; witness the passage in the Twelve Tables authorising creditors to divide up a debtor's body amongst themselves, a law which is repudiated by public custom. There are also certain things which although equitable are prohibited by law; witness the restrictions placed on testamentary disposition.
6.84. illae quaestiones sive actiones sive translationes. enim quaedam non laudabilia non natura sed iure concessa, ut in XII tabulis debitoris corpus inter creditores dividi licuit, quam legem mos publicus repudiavit; et aliquid aequum sed prohibitum iure, ut libertas testamentorum.
6.85. The accuser likewise has four things which he must keep in mind: he must prove that something was done, that a particular act was done, that it was wrongly done, and that he brings his charge according to law. Thus every cause will turn on the same sorts of questions, though the parts of plaintiff and defendant will sometimes be interchanged: for instance in the case of a claim for a reward, it will be the plaintiffs task to show that what was done was right.
6.85. nihilo plura intuenda sunt, ut probet factum esse, hoc esse factum, non recte factum, iure se intendere. circa species easdem lis omnis versabitur translatis tantum aliquando partibus, ut in causis, quibus de praemio agitur, recte factum petitor probat.
6.86. These four schemes or forms of action which I then called general bases fall into two classes as I have shown, namely, the rational and the legal. The rational is the simpler, as it involves nothing more than the consideration of the nature of things. In this connection, therefore, a mere mention of conjeclure, definition and quality will suffice.
6.86. quattuor velut proposita formaeque actionis, quae tum generales status vocabam, in duo (ut ostendi) genera discedunt rationale et legale. simplicius est, quia ipsius tantum naturae contemplatione constat. in eo satis est ostendisse coniecturam, finitionem, qualitatem.
6.87. Legal questions necessarily have a larger number of species, since there are many laws and a variety of forms. In the case of one law we rely on the letter, in others on the spirit. Some laws we force to serve our turn, when we can find no law to support our case, others we compare with one another, and on others we put some novel interpretation.
6.87. plures sint species necesse est, propterea quod multae sunt leges et varias habent formas. est cuius verbis nitimur, alia cuius voluntate, alias nobis, cum ipsi nullam habeamus, adiungimus, alias inter se comparamus, alias in diversum interpretamur.
6.88. Thus from these three bases we get three resemblances of bases: sometimes simple, sometimes complex, but all having a character of their own, as, for instance, when questions of the letter of the law and its intention are involved, for these clearly come under conjecture or quality; or again where the syllogism is involved, for this is specially connected with quality; or where contradictory laws are involved, for these are on the same footing as the letter of the law and intention; or yet again in cases of ambiguity, which is always resolved by conjecture.
6.88. nascuntur haec velut simulacra ex illis tribus, interim simplicia, interim et mixta, propriam tamen faciem ostendentia, ut scripti et voluntatis, quae sine dubio aut qualitate aut coniectura continentur, et syllogismos, qui est maxime qualitatis, et leges contrariae, quae iisdem, quibus scriptum et voluntas, constant, et ἀμφιβολία, quae semper coniectura explicatur.
6.89. Definition also belongs to both classes of question, namely those concerned with the consideration of facts and those concerned with the letter of the law. All these questions, although they come under the three bases, yet since, as I have mentioned, they have certain characteristic features of their own, require to be pointed out to learners; and we must allow them to be called legal bases or questions or minor heads, as long as it is clearly understood that none of them involve any other questions than the three I have mentioned.
6.89. quoque utrique generi, quodque rerum quodque scripti contemplatione constat, communis est. omnia, etiamsi in illos tres status veniunt, tamen, quia (ut dixi) habent aliquid velut proprium, videntur demonstranda discentibus, et permittendum ea dicere vel status legales vel quaestiones vel capita quaedam minora, dum sciant, nihil ne in his quidem praeter tria, quae praediximus, quaeri.
6.90. As regards questions of quantity, number, relation, and, as some have thought, comparison, the case is different. For these have no connexion with the complexities of the law, but are concerned with reason only. Consequently they must always be regarded as coming under conjecture or quality, as, for instance, when we ask with what purpose, or at what time, or place something was done.
6.90. ? et multum? et aliquid et, ut nonnulli putarunt, comparativus non eandem rationem habent; sunt enim haec non ad varietatem iuris sed ad solam rationem referenda, ideoque semper in parte aut coniecturae aut qualitatis ponenda sunt, ut mente? et tempore? et loco?
6.91. But I will speak of individual questions when I come to handle the rules for division. This much is agreed to by all writers, that one cause possesses one basis, but that as regards secondary questions related to the main issue of the trial, there may frequently be a number in one single cause.
6.91. de singulis dicemus quaestionibus, cum tractare praecepta divisionis coeperimus. inter omnes convenit, in causis simplicibus singulos status esse causarum, quaestionum autem, quae velut subiacent his et ad illud, quo iudicium continetur, referuntur, saepe in unam cadere plures posse;
6.92. I also think there is at times some doubt as to which basis should be adopted, when many different lines of defence are brought to meet a single charge; and, just as in regard to the complexion to be given to the statement of the facts of the case, that complexion is said to be the best which the speaker can best maintain, so in the present connexion I may say that the best basis to choose is that which will permit the orator to develop a maximum of force.
6.92. etiam credo aliquando dubitari, quo statu sit utendum, cum adversus unam intentionem plura opponuntur; et sicut in colore dicitur narrationis, eum esse optimum, quem actor optime tueatur, ita hic quoque posse dici, eum statum esse faciendum, in quo tuendo plurimum adhibere virium possit orator;
6.93. It is for this reason that we find Cicero and Brutus taking up different lines in defence of Milo. Cicero says that Clodius was justifiably killed because he sought to waylay Milo, but that Milo had not designed to kill him; while Brutus, who wrote his speech merely as a rhetorical exercise, also exults that Milo has killed a bad citizen.
6.93. ideoque pro Milone aliud Ciceroni agenti placuit aliud Bruto, cum exercitationis gratia componeret orationem, cum ille iure tanquam insidiatorem occisum et tamen non Milonis consilio dixerit, ille etiam gloriatus sit occiso malo cive:
6.94. In complicated causes, however, two or three bases may be found, or different bases: for instance a man may plead that he did not do one thing, and that he was justified in doing another, or to take another similar class of case, a man may deny two of the charges.
6.94. in coniunctis vero posse duos et tris inveniri vel diversos, ut si quis aliud se non fecisse, aliud recte fecisse defendat, vel generis eiusdem, ut si quis duo crimina neget.
6.95. The same thing occurs when there is a question about some one thing which is claimed by a number of persons, who may all of them rely on the same kind of plea (for instance, on the right of the next of kin), or may put in different claims, one urging that the property was left him by will, another that he is next of kin. Now whenever a different defence has to be made against different claimants, there must be different bases, as for example the well-known controversial theme:
6.95. accidit etiam, si de una re quaeratur aliqua sed eam plures petant, vel eodem iure ut proximitatis vel diverso, ut cum hic testamento, ille proximitate nitetur. autem aliud alii petitori opponitur, dissimiles esse status necesse est, ut in illa controversia:
6.96. “Wills that are made in accordance with law shall be valid. When parents die intestate, their children shall be the heirs. A disinherited son shall receive none of his father's property. A bastard, if born before a legitimate son, shall be treated as legitimate, but if born after a legitimate son shall be treated merely as a citizen. It shall be lawful to give a son in adoption. Every son given in adoption shall have the right to re-enter his own family if his natural father has died childless. A father of two legitimate sons gave one in adoption, disinherited the other, and acknowledged a bastard, who was born to him later. Finally after making the disinherited son his heir he died. All three sons lay claim to the property.” Nothbus is the Greek word for a bastard; Latin, as Cato emphasized in one of his speeches, has no word of its own and therefore borrows the foreign term. But I am straying from the point.
6.96. legibus facta rata sint. parentium liberi heredes sint. ne quid de bonis patris capiat. ante legitimum natus legitimus filius sit, post legitimum nanus tantum civis. adoptionem dare liceat. adoptionem dato redire in familiam liceat, si paler naturalis sine liberis decesserit. ex duobus legitimis alterum in adoptionem dederat, alterum abdicaverat, sustulit nothum; institute herede abdicato decessit. omnes de bonis contendunt., qui non sit legitimus, Graeci vocant; Latinum rei nomen, ut Cato quoque in oratione quadam testatus est, non habemus ideoque utimur peregrino. ad propositum.
6.98. The son who was made heir by the will finds his way barred by the law “A disinherited son shall receive none of his father's property.” The basis is one resting on the letter of the law and intention, and the problem is whether he can inherit by any means at all? can he do so in accordance with the intention of his father? or in virtue of the fact that he was made heir by the will? The problem confronting the bastard is twofold, since he was born after the two legitimate sons and was not born before a legitimate son.
6.98. scripto opponitur lex, ne quid de bonis patris capiat; fit status scripti et voluntatis, an ullo modo capere possit, an ex voluntate patris, an heres scriptus. duplex fit quaestio, quod post legitimos natus sit et quod non sit ante legitimum natus.
6.99. The first problem involves a syllogism: are those sons who have been cast out from their own family to be regarded as though they had never been born? The second is concerned with the letter of the law and intention. For it is admitted that he was not born before any legitimate son, but he will defend his claim by appealing to the intention of the law, which he will maintain to imply that the bastard, born when there was no legitimate son in the family, should rank as legitimate.
6.99. syllogismon habet, an pro non natis sint habendi, qui a familia sunt alienati. et scripti et voluntatis. esse enim hunc natum ante legitimum convenit, sed voluntate legis se tuebitur, quam dicet talem fuisse, ut legitimus esset nothus tum natus, cum alius legitimus in domo non esset.
6.100. He will dismiss the letter of the law, pointing out that in any case the position of a bastard is not prejudiced by the fact that no legitimate son was born after him, and arguing as follows:— “Suppose that the only son is a bastard, what will his position be? Merely that of a citizen? and yet he was not born after any legitimate son. Or will he rank as a son in all respects? But he was not born before the legitimate sons. As it is impossible to stand by the letter of the law we must stand by its intentions.”
6.100. quoque legis excludet dicens, non utique, si postea legitimus natus non sit, notho nocere; uteturque hoc argumento: solum natum nothum, cuius condicionis erit? civis? atqui non erit post legitimum natus. filius? atqui non erit ante legitimos natus. si verbis legis stari non potest, voluntate standum est.
6.101. It need disturb no one that one law should originate two bases. The law is twofold, and therefore has the force of two laws. To the son who desires to re-enter the family, the disinherited's first reply is, “Even though you are allowed to re-enter the family, I am still the heir.” The basis will be the same as in the claim put forward by the disinherited son, since the question at issue is whether a disinherited son can inherit.
6.101. quemquam turbet, quod ex una lege duo status fiant; duplex est, ita vim duarum habet Redire in familiam volenti dicitur ab altero primum, tibi redire liceat, heres sum. status, qui in petitione abdicati; quaeritur enim, an possit esse heres abdicatus.
6.102. Both the disinherited and the bastard will object, “You cannot re-enter the family, for our father did not die childless.” But in this connexion each will rely on his own particular question. For the disinherited son will say that even a disinherited man does not cease to be a son, and will derive an argument from that very law which denies his claim to the inheritance; namely that it was unnecessary for a disinherited son to be excluded from possession of his father's property if he had ceased to be one of the family; but now, since in virtue of his rights as son he would have been his father's heir if he had died intestate, the law is brought to bar his claim; and yet the law does not deprive him of his position as son, but only of his position as heir. Here the basis is definitive, as turning on the definition of a son.
6.102. communiter a duobus, tibi in familiam non licet, non enim pater sine liberis decessit. in hoc propria quisque eorum quaestione nitetur. enim dicet abdicatum quoque inter liberos esse, et argumentum ducet ex ipsa, qua repellitur, lege; supervacuum enim fuisse prohiberi patris bonis abdicatum, si esset numero alienorum; Nunc quia filii iure futurus fuerit intestati heres, oppositam esse legem, quae tamen non id efficiat, ne filius sit, sed ne heres sit. finitivus, quid sit filius.
6.103. Again the bastard in his turn will urge that his father did not die childless, employing the same arguments that he had used in putting forward his claim that he ranked as a son; unless indeed he too has recourse to definition, and raises the question whether even bastards are not sons. Thus in one case we shall have either two special legal bases, namely the letter of the law and intention, with the syllogism and also definition, or those three which are really the only bases strictly so called, conjecture as regards the letter of the law and intention, quality in the syllogism, and definition, which needs no explanation.
6.103. nothus eisdem colligit argumentis, non sine liberis patrem decessisse, quibus in petitione usus est, ut probaret esse se filium. forte et hic finitionem movet, an liberi sint etiam non legitimi. ergo in unam controversiam vel specialiter duo legitimi status scripti et voluntatis et syllogismos et praeterea finitio, vel tres illi, qui natura soli sunt, coniectura in scripto et voluntate, qualitas in syllogismo, et, quae per se est aperta, finitio.
6.104. Further every kind of case will contain a cause, a point for the decision of the judge, and a central argument. For nothing can be said which does not contain a reason, something to which the decision of the judge is directed, and finally something which, more than aught else, contains the substance of the matter at issue. But as these vary in different cases and are as a rule explained by writers on judicial causes, I will postpone them to the appropriate portion of my work. For the present I shall follow the order which I prescribed by my division of causes into three classes.
6.104. quoque et iudicatio et continens est in omni genere causarum. enim dicitur, cui non insit ratio et quo iudicium referatur et quod rem maxime continent. quia magis haec variantur in litibus et fere tradita sunt ab iis, qui de iudicialibus causis aliqua composuerunt, in illam partem differantur., quia in tria genera causas divisi, ordinem sequar.
7.1. VII. I will begin with the class of causes which are concerned with praise and blame. This class appears to have been entirely divorced by Aristotle, and following him by Theophrastus, from the practical side of oratory (which they call πραγματικῇ, ) and to have been reserved solely for the delectation of audiences, which indeed is shown to be its peculiar function by its name, which implies display.
7.1. potissimum incipiam ab ea, quae constat laude ac vituperatione. genus videtur Aristoteles atque eum secutus Theophrastus a parte negotiali, hoc est πραγματικῇ removisse totamque ad solos auditores relegasse, et id eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, proprium est.
7.2. Roman usage on the other hand has given it a place in the practical tasks of life. For funeral orations are often imposed as a duty on persons holding public office, or entrusted to magistrates by decree of the senate. Again the award of praise or blame to a witness may carry weight in the courts, while it is also a recognised practice to produce persons to praise the character of the accused. Further the published speeches of Cicero directed against his rivals in the election to the consulship, and against Lucius Piso, Clodius and Curio, are full of denunciation, and were notwithstanding delivered in the senate as formal expressions of opinion in the course of debate.
7.2. mos Romanus etiam negotiis hoc munus inseruit. et funebres laudationes pendent frequenter ex aliquo publico officio atque ex senatus consulto magistratibus saepe mandantur, et laudare testem vel contra pertinet ad momentum iudiciorum, et ipsis etiam reis dare laudatores licet, et editi in Competitores, in L. Pisonem, in Clodium et Curionem libri vituperationem continent et tamen in Senatu loco sunt habiti sententiae.
7.3. I do not deny that some compositions of this kind are composed solely with a view to display, as, for instance, panegyrics of gods and heroes of the past, a consideration which provides the solution of a question which I discussed a little while back, and proves that those are wrong who hold that an orator will never speak on a subject unless it involves some problem.
7.3. infitias eo, quasdam esse ex hoc genere materias ad solam compositas ostentationem, ut laudes deorum virorumque, quos priora tempora tulerunt. solvitur quaestio supra tractata, manifestumque est errare eos, qui nunquam oratorem dicturum nisi de re dubia putaverunt.
7.4. But what problem is involved by the praise of Jupiter Capitolinus, a stock theme of the sacred Capitoline contest, which is undoubtedly treated in regular rhetorical form? However, just as panegyric applied to practical matters requires proof, so too a certain semblance of proof is at times required by speeches composed entirely for display.
7.4. laudes Capitolini Iovis, perpetua sacri certaminis materia, vel dubiae sunt vel non oratorio genere tractantur? desiderat autem laus, quae negotiis adhibetur, probationem, sic etiam illa, quae ostentationi componitur, habet interim aliquam speciem probationis;
7.5. For instance, a speaker who tells how Romulus was the son of Mars and reared by the she-wolf, will offer as proofs of his divine origin the facts that when thrown into a running stream he escaped drowning, that all his achievements were such as to make it credible that he was the offspring of the god of battles, and that his contemporaries unquestionably believed that he was translated to heaven.
7.5. ut qui Romulum Martis filium educatumque a lupa dicat, in argumentum caelestis ortus utatur his, quod abiectus in profluentem non potuerit exstingui, quod omnia sic egerit, ut genitum praeside bellorum deo incredibile non esset, quod ipsum quoque caelo receptum temporis eius homines non dubitaverint.
7.6. Some arguments will even wear a certain semblance of defence: for example, if the orator is speaking in praise of Hercules, he will find excuses for his hero having changed raiment with the Queen of Lydia and submitted to the tasks which legend tells us she imposed upon him. The proper function however of panegyric is to amplify and embellish its themes. This form of oratory is directed in the main to the praise of gods and men, but may occasionally be applied to the praise of animals or even of inanimate objects.
7.6. vero etiam in defensionis speciem cadent, ut si in laude Herculis permutatum cum regina Lydiae habitum et imperata, ut traditur, pensa orator excuset. proprium laudis est res amplificare et ornare. materia praecipue quidem in deos et homines cadit, est tamen et aliorum animalium, etiam carentium anima.
7.7. In praising the gods our first step will be to express our veneration of the majesty of their nature in general terms. next we shall proceed to praise the special power of the individual god and the discoveries whereby he has benefited the human race.
7.7. in deis generaliter primum maiestatem ipsius eorum naturae venerabimur, deinde proprie vim cuiusque et inventa, quae utile aliquid hominibus attulerint.
7.8. For example, in the case of Jupiter, we shall extol his power as manifested in the governance of all things, with Mars we shall praise his power in war, with Neptune his power over the sea; as regards inventions we shall celebrate Minerva's discovery of the arts, Mercury's discovery of letters, Apollo's of medicine, Ceres' of the fruits of the earth, Bacchus' of wine. Next we must record their exploits as handed down from antiquity. Even gods may derive honour from their descent, as for instance is the case with the sons of Jupiter, or from their antiquity, as in the case of the children of Chaos, or from their offspring, as in the case of Latona, the mother of Apollo and Diana.
7.8. ostenditur, ut in Iove regendorum omnium, in Marte belli, in Neptuno maris; inventa, ut artium in Minerva, Mercurio litterarum, medicinae Apolline, Cerere frugum, Libero vini. si qua ab iis acta vetustas tradidit, commemoranda. etiam dis honorem parentes, ut si quis sit filius Iovis; addit antiquitas, ut iis, qui sunt ex Chao; progenies quoque, ut Apollo ac Diana Latonae.
7.9. Some again may be praised because they were born immortal, others because they won immortality by their valour, a theme which the piety of our sovereign has made the glory even of these present times.
7.9. in quibusdam quod geniti immortales, quibusdam quod immortalitatem virtute sint consecuti; quod pietas principis nostri praesentium quoque temporum decus fecit. est varia laus hominum.
7.10. There is greater variety required in the praise of men. In the first place there is a distinction to be made as regards time between the period in which the objects of our praise lived and the time preceding their birth; and further, in the case of the dead, we must also distinguish the period following their death. With regard to things preceding a man's birth, there are his country, his parents and his ancestors, a theme which may be handled in two ways. For either it will be creditable to the objects of our praise not to have fallen short of the fair fame of their country and of their sires or to have ennobled a humble origin by the glory of their achievements.
7.10. primum dividitur in tempora, quodque ante eos fuit quoque ipsi vixerunt; in iis autem, qui fato sunt functi, etiam quod est insecutum. hominem patria ac parentes maioresque erunt, quorum duplex tractatus est: aut enim respondisse nobilitati pulchrum erit aut humilius genus illustrasse factis.
7.11. Other topics to be drawn from the period preceding their birth will have reference to omens or prophecies foretelling their future greatness, such as the oracle which is said to have foretold that the son of Thetis would be greater than his father.
7.11. quoque interim ex eo, quod ante ipsum fuit, tempore trahentur, quae responsis vel auguriis futuram claritatem promiserint, ut eum, qui ex Thetide natus esset, maiorem patre suo futurum cecinisse dicuntur oracula.
7.12. of the individual himself will be based on his character, his physical endowments and external circumstances. Physical and accidental advantages provide a comparatively unimportant theme, which requires variety of treatment. At times for instance we extol beauty and strength in honorific terms, as Homer does in the case of Agamemnon and Achilles; at times again weakness may contribute largely to our admiration, as when Homer says that Tydeus was small of stature but a good fighter.
7.12. vero laus hominis ex animo et corpore et extra positis peti debet. corporis quidem fortuitorumque cum levior, tum non uno modo tractanda est. et pulchritudinem interim roburque prosequimur honore verborum, ut Homerus in Agamemnone atque Achille, et interim confert admirationi multum etiam infirmitas, ut cum idem Tydea parvum sed bellatorem dicit fuisse.
7.13. Fortune too may confer dignity as in the case of kings and princes (for they have a fairer field for the display of their excellences) but on the other hand the glory of good deeds may be enhanced by the smallness of their resources. Moreover the praise awarded to external and accidental advantages is given, not to their possession, but to their honourable employment.
7.13. vero tum dignitatem adfert, ut in regibus principibusque (namque est haec materia ostendendae virtutis uberior), tum quo minores opes fuerunt, maiorem bene factis gloriam parit. omnia, quae extra nos bona sunt quaeque hominibus forte obtigerunt, non ideo laudantur, quod habuerit quis ea, sed quod iis honeste sit usus.
7.14. For wealth and power and influence, since they are the sources of strength, are the surest test of character for good or evil; they make us better or they make us worse.
7.14. divitiae et potentia et gratia, cum plurimum virium dent, in utramque partem certissimum faciunt morum experimentum, aut enim meliores sumus propter haec aut peiores. semper vera laus, sed non una per hoc opus via ducitur.
7.15. Praise awarded to character is always just, but may be given in various ways. It has sometimes proved the more effective course to trace a man's life and deeds in due chronological order, praising his natural gifts as a child, then his progress at school, and finally the whole course of his life, including words as well as deeds. At times on the other hand it is well to divide our praises, dealing separately with the various virtues, fortitude, justice, self-control and the rest of them and to assign to each virtue the deeds performed under its influence.
7.15. alias aetatis gradus gestarumque rerum ordinem sequi speciosius fuit, ut in primis annis laudaretur indoles, tum disciplinae, post hoc operum id est factorum dictorumque contextus; alias in species virtutum dividere laudem, fortitudinis, iustitiae, continentiae ceterarumque, ac singulis adsignare, quae secundum quamque earum gesta erunt.
7.16. We shall have to decide which of these two methods will be the more serviceable, according to the nature of the subject; but we must bear in mind the fact that what most pleases an audience is the celebration of deeds which our hero was the first or only man or at any rate one of the very few to perform: and to these we must add any other achievements which surpassed hope or expectation, emphasising what was done for the sake of others rather than what he performed on his own behalf.
7.16. sit autem harum via utilior, cum materia deliberabimus, dum sciamus gratiora esse audientibus, quae solus quis aut primus aut certe cum paucis fecisse dicetur, si quid praeterea supra spem aut exspectationem, praecipue quod aliena potius causa quam sua.
7.17. It is not always possible to deal with the time subsequent to our hero's death: this is due not merely to the fact that we sometimes praise him, while still alive, but also that there are but few occasions when we have a chance to celebrate the award of divine honours, posthumous votes of thanks, or statues erected at the public expense.
7.17. , quod finem hominis insequitur, non semper tractare contingit; non solum quod viventes aliquando laudamus, sed quod rara haec occasio est, ut referri possint divini honores et decreta et publice statuae constitutae.
7.18. Among such themes of panegyric I would mention monuments of genius that have stood the test of time. For some great men like Menander have received ampler justice from the verdict of posterity than from that of their own age. Children reflect glory on their parents, cities on their founders, laws on those who made them, arts on their inventors and institutions on those that first introduced them; for instance Numa first laid down rules for the worship of the gods, and Publicola first ordered that the lictors' rods should be lowered in salutation to the people.
7.18. quae numeraverim ingeniorum monumenta, quae saeculis probarentur. quidam, sicut Menander, iustiora posterorum quam suae aetatis iudicia sunt consecuti. laudem liberi parentibus, urbes conditoribus, leges latoribus, artes inventoribus nec non instituta quoque auctoribus, ut a Numa traditum deos colere, a Publicola fasces populo summittere.
7.19. The same method will be applied to denunciations as well, but with a view to opposite effects. For humble origin has been a reproach to many, while in some cases distinction has merely served to increase the notoriety and unpopularity of vices. In regard to some persons, as in the story of Paris, it has been predicted that they would be the cause of destruction to many, some like Thersites and Irus have been despised for their poverty and mean appearance, others have been loathed because their natural advantages were nullified by their vices: the poets for instance tell us that Nireus was a coward and Pleisthenes a debauchee.
7.19. omnis etiam in vituperatione ordo constabit, tantum in diversum. et turpitudo generis opprobrio multis fuit, et quosdam claritas ipsa notiores circa vitia et invisos magis fecit, et in quibusdam, ut in Paride traditum est, praedicta pernicies, et corporis ac fortunae quibusdam mala contemptum, sicut Thersitae atque Iro, quibusdam bona vitiis corrupta odium attulerunt, ut Nirea imbellem, Plisthenen impudicum a poetis accepimus.
7.20. The mind too has as many vices as virtues, and vice may be denounced, as virtue may be praised, in two different ways. Some have been branded with infamy after death like Maelius, whose house was levelled with the ground, or Marcus Manlius, whose first name was banished from his family for all generations to come.
7.20. animo totidem vitia, quot virtutes sunt, nec minus quam in laudibus duplici ratione tractantur. post mortem adiecta quibusdam ignominia est, ut Maelio, cuius domus solo aequata, Marcoque Manlio, cuius praenomen e familia in posterum exemptum est;
7.21. The vices of the children bring hatred on their parents; founders of cities are detested for concentrating a race which is a curse to others, as for example the founder of the Jewish superstition; the laws of Gracchus are hated, and we abhor any loathsome example of vice that has been handed down to posterity, such as the criminal form of lust which a Persian is said to have been the first to practise on a woman of Samos.
7.21. et parentes malorum odimus; et est conditoribus urbium infame contraxisse aliquam perniciosam ceteris gentem, qualis est primus Iudaicae superstitionis auctor; et Gracchorum leges invisae; et si quod est exemplum deforme posteris traditum, quale libidinis vir Perses in muliere Samia instituere ausus dicitur primus.
7.22. And even in the case of the living the judgment of mankind serves as a proof of their character, and the fairness or foulness of their fame proves the orator's praise or blame to be true.
7.22. in viventibus quoque iudicia hominum velut argumenta sunt morum, et honos aut ignominia veram esse laudem vel vituperationem probat.
7.23. Aristotle however thinks that the place and subject of panegyrics or denunciations make a very considerable difference. For much depends on the character of the audience and the generally received opinion, if they are to believe that the virtues of which they approve are pre-eminently characteristic of the person praised and the vices which they hate of the person denounced. For there can be little doubt as to the attitude of the audience, if that attitude is already determined prior to the delivery of the speech.
7.23. tamen Aristoteles putat, ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperetur. plurimum refert, qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio, ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo, qui laudabitur, credant, aut in eo, contra quem dicemus, ea quae oderunt. non dubium erit iudicium, quod orationem praecesserit.
7.24. It will be wise too for him to insert some words of praise for his audience, since this will secure their good will, and wherever it is possible this should be done in such a manner as to advance his case. Literature will win less praise at Sparta than at Athens, endurance and courage more. Among some races the life of a freebooter is accounted honourable, while others regard it as a duty to respect the laws. Frugality might perhaps be unpopular with the Sybarites, whilst luxury was regarded as a crime by the ancient Romans.
7.24. etiam permiscenda laus semper, nam id benevolos facit; quotiens autem fieri poterit, cum materiae utilitate iungenda. Lacedaemone studia litterarum quam Athenis honores merebuntur, plus patientia ac fortitudo. vivere quibusdam honestum, aliis cura legum. apud Sybaritas forsitan odio foret, veteribus Romanis summum luxuria crimen.
7.25. Similar differences of opinion are found in individuals. A judge is most favourable to the orator whose views he thinks identical with his own. Aristotle also urges a point, which at a later date Cornelius Celsus emphasised almost to excess, to the effect that, since the boundary between vice and virtue is often ill-defined, it is desirable to use words that swerve a little from the actual truth, calling a rash man brave, a prodigal generous, a mean man thrifty; or the process may, if necessary, be reversed. But this the ideal orator, that is to say a good man, will never do, unless perhaps he is led to do so by consideration for the public interest.
7.25. in singulis differentia. favet iudex, qui sibi dicentem assentiri putat. praecipit illud quoque (quod mox Cornelius Celsus prope supra modum invasit), quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas, utendum proxima derivatione verborum, ut pro temerario fortem, pro prodigo liberalem, pro avaro parcum vocemus; quae eadem etiam contra valet. quidem orator, id est vir bonus, nunquam faciet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducetur.
7.26. Cities are praised after the same fashion as men. The founder takes the place of the parent, and antiquity carries great authority, as for instance in the case of those whose inhabitants are said to be sprung from the soil. The virtues and vices revealed by their deeds are the same as in private individuals. The advantages arising from site or fortifications are however peculiar to cities. Their citizens enhance their fame just as children bring honour to their parents.
7.26. autem urbes similiter atque homines. pro parente est conditor, et multum auctoritatis adfert vetustas, ut iis, qui terra dicuntur orti; et virtutes ac vitia circa res gestas eadem quae in singulis, illa propria quae ex loci positione ac munitione sunt. illis ut hominibus liberi decori.
7.27. Praise too may be awarded to public works, in connexion with which their magnificence, utility, beauty and the architect or artist must be given due consideration. Temples for instance will be praised for their magnificence, walls for their utility, and both for their beauty or the skill of the architect. Places may also be praised, witness the praise of Sicily in Cicero. In such cases we consider their beauty and utility: beauty calls for notice in places by the sea, in open plains and pleasant situations, utility in healthy or fertile localities.
7.27. laus et operum, in quibus honor, utilitas, pulchritudo, auctor spectari solet. ut in templis, utilitas ut in muris, pulchritudo vel auctor utrobique. et locorum, qualis Siciliae apud Ciceronem, in quibus similiter speciem et utilitatem intuemur; speciem in maritimis, planis, amoenis; utilitatem in salubribus, fertilibus. et dictorum honestorum factorumque laus generalis, erit et rerum omnis modi.
7.28. Again praise in general terms may be awarded to noble sayings or deeds. Finally things of every kind may be praised. Panegyrics have been composed on sleep and death, and physicians have written eulogies on certain kinds of food. While therefore I do not agree that panegyric concerns only questions regarding what is honourable, I do think that it comes as a rule under the heading of quality, although all three bases may he involved in Panegyric and it was observed by Cicero that all were actually used by Gaius Caesar in his denunciation of Cato. But panegyric is akin to deliberative oratory inasmuch as the same things are usually praised in the former as are advised in the latter.
7.28. et somni et mortis scriptae laudes et quorundam a medicis ciborum., ut non consensi hoc laudativum genus circa solam versari honesti quaestionem, sic qualitate maxime contineri puto; quamquam tres status omnes cadere in hoc opus possint, iisque usum C. Caesarem in vituperando Catone notaverit Cicero. totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis, quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi, hic laudari solent.
8.1. VIII. I am surprised that deliberative oratory also has been restricted by some authorities to questions of expediency. If it should be necessary to assign one single aim to deliberative I should prefer Cicero's view that this kind of oratory is primarily concerned with what is honourable. I do not doubt that those who maintain the opinion first mentioned adopt the lofty view that nothing can be expedient which is not good.
8.1. quoque miror a quibusdam sola utilitate finitas. si quid in his unum sequi oporteret, potior fuisset apud me Ciceronis sententia, qui hoc materiae genus dignitate maxime contineri putat. dubito, quin ii, qui sunt in illa priore sententia, secundum opinionem pulcherrimam ne utile quidem, nisi quod honestum esset, existimarint.
8.2. That opinion is perfectly sound so long as we are fortunate enough to have wise and good men for counsellors. But as we most often express our views before an ignorant audience, and more especially before popular assemblies, of which the majority is usually uneducated, we must distinguish between what is honourable and what is expedient and conform our utterances to suit ordinary understandings.
8.2. est haec ratio verissima, si consilium contingat semper bonorum atque sapientium. apud imperitos, apud quos frequenter dicenda sententia est, populumque praecipue, qui ex pluribus constat indoctis, discernenda sunt haec et secundum communes magis intellectus loquendum.
8.3. For there are many who do not admit that what they really believe to be the honourable course is sufficiently advantageous, and are misled by the prospect of advantage into approving courses of the dishonourable nature of which there can be no question: witness the Numantine treaty and the surrender of the Caudine Forks.
8.3. enim multi, qui etiam, quae credunt honesta, non tamen satis eadem utilia quoque existiment, et quae turpia esse dubitare non possunt, utilitatis specie ducti probent, ut foedus Numantinum iugumque Caudinum.
8.4. Nor does it suffice to restrict deliberative oratory to the basis of quality which is concerned with questions of honour and expediency. For there is often room for conjecture as well. Sometimes again definition is necessary or legal problems require handling; this is especially the case when advice has to be given on private matters, where there is some doubt of the legality of the course under consideration. Of conjecture' I shall speak more fully a little later on.
8.4. qualitatis quidem statu, in quo et honestorum et utilium quaestio est, complecti eas satis est. frequenter in his etiam coniecturae locus est, nonnunquam tractatur aliqua finitio, aliquando etiam legales possunt incidere tractatus, in privata maxime consilia, si quando ambigetur an liceat.
8.5. Returning to definition for the moment, we find it in the question raised by Demosthenes, “whether Philip should give or restore Halonnesus,” and to that discussed by Cicero in the Philippics as to the nature of a tumultus. Again does not the question raised in connection with the statue of Servius Sulpicius as to “whether statues should be erected only in honour of those ambassadors who perish by the sword ” bear a strong resemblance to the questions that are raised in the law courts?
8.5. coniectura paulo post pluribus. est finitio apud Demosthenen, Det Halonnesum Philippus, an reddat? apud Ciceronem in Philippicis, Quid sit tumultus?? non illa similis iudicialium quaestio de statua Servi Sulpici, an iis demum ponenda sit, qui in legatione ferro sunt interempti?
8.6. The deliberative department of oratory (also called the advisory department), while it deliberates about the future, also enquires about the past, while its functions are twofold and consist in advising and dissuading. Deliberative oratory does not always require an exordium, such as is necessary in forensic speeches, since he who asks an orator for his opinion is naturally well disposed to him. But the commencement, whatever be its nature, must have some resemblance to an exordium. For we must not begin abruptly or just at the point where the fancy takes us, since in every subject there is something which naturally comes first.
8.6. pars deliberativa, quae eadem suasoria dicitur, de tempore futuro consultans quaerit etiam de praeterito. constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi., quale est in iudicialibus, non ubique eget, quia conciliatus est ei quisque, quem consulit. tamen quodcunque debet habere aliquam prooemii speciem; neque enim abrupte nec unde libuit incipiendum, quia est aliquid in omni materia naturaliter primum.
8.7. In addressing the senate or the people the same methods apply as in the law courts, and we must aim as a rule at acquiring the goodwill of our audience. This need cause no surprise, since even in panegyric we seek to win the favour of our hearers when our aim is praise pure and simple, and not the acquisition of any advantage. Aristotle, it is true, holds, not without reason, that in deliberative speeches we may often begin with a reference either to ourselves or to our opponent, borrowing this practice from forensic oratory, and sometimes producing the impression that the subject is of greater or less importance than it actually is.
8.7. senatu et utique in contionibus eadem ratio quae apud iudices, adquirendae sibi plerumque eorum, apud quos dicendum sit, benevolentiae. mirum, cum etiam in panegyricis petatur audientium favor, ubi emolumentum non in utilitate aliqua, sed in sola laude consistit.
8.8. On the other hand he thinks that in demonstrative oratory the exordium may be treated with the utmost freedom, since it is sometimes drawn from irrelevant material, as for example in Isocrates' Praise of Helen, or from something akin to the subject, as for instance in the Panegyricus of the same author, when he complains that more honour is given to physical than to moral excellence, or as Gorgias in his speech delivered at the Olympic games praises the founders of the great national games.
8.8. Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et a nostra et ab eius, qui dissentiet, persona duci frequenter in consiliis exordium, quasi mutuantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere, nonnunquam etiam, ut minor res maiorve videatur; in demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.
8.9. Sallust seems to have imitated these authors in his Jugurthine War and in the introduction to his Catiline, which has no connection with his narrative. But it is time for me to return to deliberative oratory in which, even when we introduce an exordium, we must content ourselves with a brief prelude, which may amount to no more than a mere heading. As regards the statement of facts, this is never required in speeches on private subjects, at least as regards the subject on which an opinion has to be given, because everyone is acquainted with the question at issue.
8.9. et longe a materia duci, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari; et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos, qui primi tales instituerint conventus. secutus videlicet C. Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae nihil ad historiam pertinentibus principiis orsus est. nunc ad suasoriam, in qua, etiam cum prooemio utemur, breviore tamen et velut quodam capite tantum et initio debebimus esse contenti. vero nunquam exigit privata deliberatio, eius duntaxat rei, de qua dicenda sententia est; quia nemo ignorat id de quo consulit.
8.11. Statements as to external matters which are relevant to the discussion may however frequently be introduced. In addressing public assemblies it will often be necessary to set forth the order of the points which have to be treated.
8.11. possunt pertinentia ad deliberationem multa narrari. contionibus saepe est etiam illa, quae ordinem rei docet, necessaria.
8.12. As regards appeals to the emotions, these are especially necessary in deliberative oratory. Anger has frequently to be excited or assuaged and the minds of the audience have to be swayed to fear, ambition, hatred, reconciliation. At times again it is necessary to awaken pity, whether it is required, for instance, to urge that relief should be sent to a besieged city, or we are engaged in deploring the overthrow of an allied state. But what really carries greatest weight in deliberative speeches is the authority of the speaker.
8.12. ut quae maxime postulat. M et concitanda et lenienda frequenter est ira, et ad metum, cupiditatem, odium, conciliationem impellendi animi. etiam movenda miseratio, sive, ut auxilium obsessis feratur, suadere oportebit sive sociae civitatis eversionem deflebimus.
8.13. For he, who would have all men trust his judgment as to what is expedient and honourable, should both possess and be regarded as possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character. In forensic speeches the orator may, according to the generally received opinion, indulge his passion to some extent. But all will agree that the advice given by a speaker should be in keeping with his moral character. The majority of Greek writers have held that this kind of oratory is entirely concerned with addressing public assemblies and have restricted it to politics.
8.13. autem in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. et prudentissimus esse haberique et optimus debet, qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit. iudiciis enim vulgo fas habetur indulgere aliquid studio suo; consilia nemo est qui neget secundum mores dari. Graecorum quidem plurimi omne hoc officium contionale esse iudicaverunt et in sola reipublicae administratione posuerunt.
8.14. Even Cicero himself deals chiefly with this department. Consequently those who propose to offer advice upon peace, war, troops, public works or revenue must thoroughly acquaint themselves with two things, the resources of the state and the character of its people, so that the method employed in tendering their advice may be based at once on political realities and the nature of their hearers.
8.14. et Cicero in hac maxime parte versatur. suasuris de pace, bello, copiis, operibus, vectigalibus haec duo esse praecipue nota voluit, vires civitatis et mores, ut ex natura cum ipsarum rerum tum audientium ratio suadendi duceretur.
8.15. This type of oratory seems to me to offer a more varied field for eloquence, since both those who ask for advice and the answers given to them may easily present the greatest diversity. Consequently there are three points which must be specially borne in mind in advice or dissuasion: first the nature of the subject under discussion, secondly the nature of those who are engaged in the discussion, and thirdly the nature of the speaker who offers them advice.
8.15. maior in re videtur varietas, nam et consultantium et consiliorum plurima sunt genera. in suadendo et dissuadendo tria primum spectanda erunt, quid sit de quo deliberetur, qui sint qui deliberent, qui sit qui suadeat.
8.16. As to the subject under discussion its practicability is either certain or uncertain. In the latter case this will be the chief, if not the only point for consideration; for it will often happen that we shall assert first that something ought not to be done, even if it can be done, and secondly, that it cannot be done. Now when the question turns on such points as to whether the Isthmus can be cut through, the Pontine Marshes drained, or a harbour constructed at Ostia, or whether Alexander is likely to find land beyond the Ocean, we make use of conjecture.
8.16. , de qua deliberatur, aut certum est posse fieri aut incertum. incertum, haec erit quaestio sola aut potentissima; saepe enim accidet, ut prius dicamus, ne si possit quidem fieri, esse faciendum, deinde fieri non posse. autem de hoc quaeritur, coniectura est, an Isthmos intercidi, an siccari palus Pomptina, an portus fieri Ostiae possit, an Alexander terras ultra Oceanum sit inventurus.
8.17. But even in connection with things that are undoubtedly feasible, there may at times be room for conjecture, as for instance in questions such as whether Rome is ever likely to conquer Carthage, whether Hannibal will return to Africa if Scipio transports his army thither, or whether the Samnites are likely to keep faith if the Romans lay down their arms. There are some things too which we may believe to be both feasible and likely to be carried into effect, but at another time or place or in another way.
8.17. in iis quoque quae constabit posse fieri, coniectura aliquando erit, si quaeretur, an utique futurum sit, ut Carthaginem superent Romani; ut redeat Hannibal, si Scipio exercitum in Africam transtulerit; ut servent fidem Samnites, si Romani arma deposuerint. et fieri posse et futura esse credibile est, sed aut alio tempore aut alio loco aut alio modo.
8.18. When there is no scope for conjecture, our attention will be fixed on other points. In the first place advice will be asked either on account of the actual thing on which the orator is required to express his views, or on account of other causes which affect it from without. It is on the actual thing that the senate for instance debates, when it discusses such questions as whether it is to vote pay for the troops. In this case the material is simple.
8.18. coniecturae non erit locus, alia sunt intuenda. primum aut propter ipsam rem, de qua sententiae rogantur, consultabitur aut propter alias intervenientes extrinsecus causas. ipsam deliberant Patres conscripti, an stipendium militi constituant?
8.19. To this however may be added reasons for taking action or the reverse, as for example if the senate should discuss whether it should deliver the Fabii to the Gauls when the latter threaten war, or Gaius Caesar should deliberate whether he should persist in the invasion of Germany, when his soldiers on all sides are making their wills. These deliberative themes are of a twofold nature.
8.19. materia simplex erit. causae aut faciendi, ut deliberant patres conscripti, an Fabios dedant Gallis bellum minitantibus; aut non faciendi, ut deliberat C. Caesar, an perseveret in Germaniam ire, cum milites passim testamenta facerent.
8.20. In the first case the reason for deliberation is the Gallic threat of war, but there may still be a further question as to whether even without such threat of war they should surrender those who, contrary to the law of nations, took part in a battle when they had been sent out as ambassadors and killed the king with whom they had received instructions to treat.
8.20. suasoriae duplices sunt. et illic causa deliberandi est, quod bellum Galli minitentur; esse tamen potest quaestio, dedendine fuerint etiam citra hanc denuntiationem, qui contra fas, cum legati missi essent, proelium inierint, regemque, ad quem mandata acceperant, trucidarint.
8.21. In the second case Caesar would doubtless never deliberate on the question at all, but for the perturbation shown by his soldiers; but there is still room for enquiry whether quite apart from this occurrence it would be wise to penetrate into Germany. But it must be remembered that we shall always speak first on that subject which is capable of discussion quite apart from the consequences.
8.21. hic nihil Caesar sine dubio deliberaret nisi propter hanc militum perturbationem; est tamen locus quaerendi, an citra hunc quoque casum penetrandum in Germaniam fuerit. autem de eo prius loquemur, de quo deliberari etiam detractis sequentibus possit.
8.22. Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech are honour, expediency and necessity. I can find no place for the last. For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything.
8.22. suadendi quidam putaverunt honestum, utile, necessarium. non invenio huic tertiae locum. enim vis ingruat, aliquid fortasse pati necesse sit, nihil facere; de faciendo autem deliberatur.
8.23. Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy, and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words “otherwise we shall perish” must needs be added: consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact the Saguntines did not surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from Opitergium.
8.23. hanc vocant necessitatem, in quam homines graviorum metu coguntur, utilitatis erit quaestio; ut si obsessi et impares et aqua ciboque defecti de facienda ad hostem deditione deliberent et dicatur, necesse est; nempe sequitur, ut hoc subiiciatur, alioqui pereundum est: ita propter id ipsum non est necesse, quia perire potius licet.
8.24. It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour. “But,” it will be urged, “if a man would beget children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife.” Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife.
8.24. non fecerunt Saguntini nec in rate Opitergina circumventi. in his quoque causis aut de sola utilitate ambigetur aut quaestio inter utile atque honestum consistet. enim si quis liberos procreare volet, necesse habet ducere uxorem.
8.25. It appears to me, therefore, that where necessity exists, there is no room for deliberation, any more than where it is clear that a thing is not feasible. For deliberation is always concerned with questions where some doubt exists. Those therefore are wiser who make the third consideration for deliberative oratory to be τὸ δυνατόν or “possibility” as we translate it; the translation may seem clumsy, but it is the only word available.
8.25. dubitat? sed ei, qui pater vult fieri, liqueat necesse est uxorem esse ducendam. mihi ne consilium quidem videtur, ubi necessitas est, non magis quam ubi constat, quid fieri non possit. Omnis enim deliberatio de dubiis est. igitur, qui tertiam partem dixerunt δυνατόν quod nostri possibile nominant, quae ut dura videatur appellatio, tamen sola est.
8.26. That all these considerations need not necessarily obtrude themselves in every case is too obvious to need explanation. Most writers, however, say that there are more than three. But the further considerations which they would add are really but species of the three general considerations just mentioned. For right, justice, piety, equity and mercy (for thus they translate τὸ ἥμερον ), with any other virtues that anyone may be pleased to add, all come under the heading of that which is honourable.
8.26. partes non omnes in omnem cadere suasoriam manifestius est, quam ut docendum sit. apud plerosque earum numerus augetur, a quibus ponuntur ut partes, quae superiorum species sunt partium. fas, iustum, pium, aequum, mansuetum quoque (sic enim sunt interpretati τὸ ἥμερον ) et si qua adhuc adiicere quis eiusdem generis velit, subiici possunt honestati.
8.27. On the other hand, if the question be whether a thing is easy, great, pleasant or free from danger, it comes under questions of expediency. Such topics arise from some contradiction; for example a thing is expedient, but difficult, or trivial, or unpleasant, or dangerous. Some however hold that at times deliberation is concerned solely with the question whether a thing is pleasant, as for instance when discussion arises as to whether a theatre should be built or games instituted. But in my opinion you will never find any man such a slave to luxury as not to consider anything but pleasure when he delivers an advisory speech.
8.27. sit autem facile, magnum, iucundum, sine periculo, ad quaestionem pertinet utilitatis. loci oriuntur ex contradictione: quidem utile sed difficile, parvum, iniucundum, periculosum. Tamen quibusdam videtur esse nonnunquam de iucunditate sola consultatio, ut si de aedificando theatro, instituendis ludis deliberetur. neminem adeo solutum luxu puto, ut nihil in causa suadendi sequatur praeter voluptatem.
8.29. For there must needs be something on every occasion that takes precedence of pleasure: in proposing the institution of public games there is the honour due to the gods; in proposing the erection of a theatre the orator will consider the advantages to be derived from relaxation from toil, and the unbecoming and undesirable struggle for places which will arise if there is no proper accommodation; religion, too, has its place in the discussion, for we shall describe the theatre as a kind of temple for the solemnization of a sacred feast.
8.29. enim semper aliquid necesse est, ut in ludis honor deorum, in theatro non inutilis laborum remissio, deformis et incommoda turbae, si id non sit, conflictatio, et nihilominus eadem illa religio, cum theatrum veluti quoddam illius sacri templum vocabimus.
8.30. Often again we shall urge that honour must come before expediency; as for instance when we advise the men of Opitergium not to surrender to the enemy, even though refusal to do so means certain death. At times on the other hand we prefer expediency to honour, as when we advise the arming of slaves in the Punic War.
8.30. vero et utilitatem despiciendam esse dicimus, ut honesta faciamus, ut cum illis Opiterginis damus consilium, ne se hostibus dedant, quanquam perituri sint, nisi fecerint; et utilia honestis praeferimus, ut cum suademus, ut bello Punico servi armentur.
8.31. But even in this case we must not openly admit that such a course is dishonourable: we can point out that all men are free by nature and composed of the same elements, while the slaves in question may perhaps be sprung from some ancient and noble stock; and in the former case when the danger is so evident, we may add other arguments, such as that they would perish even more cruelly if they surrendered, should the enemy fail to keep faith, or Caesar (a more probable supposition) prove victorious.
8.31. neque hic plane concedendum est esse id inhonestum, liberos enim natura omnes et eisdem constare elementis et fortasse antiquis etiam nobilibus ortos dici potest; et illic, ubi manifestum periculum est, opponenda alia, ut crudelius etiam perituros adfirmemus, si se dediderint, sive hostis non servaverit fidem, sive Caesar vicerit, quod est vero similius.