8.32. But in such a conflict of principles it is usual to modify the names which we give them. For expediency is often ruled out by those who assert not merely that honour comes before expediency, but that nothing can be expedient that is not honourable, while others say that what we call honour is vanity, ambition and folly, as contemptible in substance as it is fair in sound.
8.32. autem, quae tantum inter se pugnant, plerumque nominibus deflecti solent. et utilitas ipsa expugnatur ab iis, qui dicunt, non solum potiora esse honesta quam utilia, sed ne utilia quidem esse, quae non sint honesta; et contra, quod nos honestum, illi vanum, ambitiosum, stolidum, verbis quam re probabilius vocant.
8.33. Nor is expediency compared merely with inexpediency. At times we have to choose between two advantageous courses after comparison of their respective advantages. The problem may be still more complicated, as for instance when Pompey deliberated whether to go to Parthia, Africa or Egypt. In such a case the enquiry is not which of two courses is better or worse, but which of three or more.
8.33. tantum inutilibus comparantur utilia, sed inter se quoque ipsa, ut si ex duobus eligamus, in altero quid sit magis, in altero quid sit minus. hoc adhuc. interim triplices etiam suasoriae incidunt: ut cum Pompeius deliberabat, Parthos an Africam an Aegyptum peteret. non tantum, utrum melius sed quid sit optimum, quaeritur, itemque contra.
8.34. On the other hand in deliberative oratory there will never be any doubt about circumstances wholly in our favour. For there can clearly be no doubt about points against which there is nothing to be said. Consequently as a rule all deliberative speeches are based simply on comparison, and we must consider what we shall gain and by what means, that it may be possible to form an estimate whether there is more advantage in the aims we pursue or greater disadvantage in the means we employ to that end.
8.34. unquam incidet in hoc genere materiae dubitatio rei, quae undique secundum nos sit. ubi contradictioni locus non est, quae potest esse causa dubitandi? fere omnis suasoria nihil est aliud quam comparatio, videndumque, quid consecuturi simus et per quid, ut aestimari possit, plus in eo quod petimus sit commodi, an vero in eo per quod petimus incommodi.
8.35. A question of expediency may also be concerned with time (for example, “it is expedient, but not now” ) or with place ( “it is expedient, but not here” ) or with particular persons ( “it is expedient, but not for us” or “not as against these” ) or with our method of action ( “it is expedient, but not thus” ) or with degree ( “it is expedient, but not to this extent” ). But we have still more often to consider personality with reference to what is becoming, and we must consider our own as well as that of those before whom the question is laid.
8.35. utilitatis et in tempore quaestio, expedit sed non nunc; et in loco, non hic; et in persona, non nobis, non contra hos; et in genere agendi, non sic; et in modo, non in tantum. personam saepius decoris gratia intuemur, quae et in nobis et in iis, qui deliberant, spectanda est.
8.36. Consequently, though examples are of the greatest value in deliberative speeches, because reference to historical parallels is the quickest method of securing assent, it matters a great deal whose authority is adduced and to whom it is commended. For the minds of those who deliberate on any subject differ from one another and our audience may be of two kinds.
8.36. quamvis exempla plurimum in consiliis possint, quia facillime ad consentiendum homines ducuntur experimentis, refert tamen, quorum auctoritas et quibus adhibeatur.
8.37. For those who ask us for advice are either single individuals or a number, and in both cases the factors may be different. For when advice is asked by a number of persons it makes a considerable difference whether they are the senate or the people, the citizens of Rome or Fidenae, Greeks or barbarians, and in the case of single individuals, whether we are urging Cato or Gaius Marius to stand for office, whether it is the elder Scipio or Fabius who is deliberating on his plan of campaign.
8.37. sunt enim deliberantium animi, duplex condicio. consultant aut plures aut singuli; sed in utrisque differentia, quia et in pluribus multum interest, senatus sic an populus, Romani an Fidenates, Graeci an barbari, et in singulis, Catoni petendos honores suadeamus an C. Mario, de ratione belli Scipio prior ani Fabius deliberet.
8.38. Further sex, rank, and age, must be taken into account, though it is character that will make the chief difference. It is an easy task to recommend an honourable course to honourable men, but if we are attempting to keep men of bad character to the paths of virtue, we must take care not to seem to upbraid a way of life unlike our own.
8.38. intuenda sexus, dignitas, actas. mores praecipue discrimen dabunt. honesta quidem honestis suadere facillimum est; si vero apud turpes recta obtinere conabimur, ne videamur exprobrare diversam vitae sectam, cavendum.
8.39. The minds of such an audience are not to be moved by discoursing on the nature of virtue, which they ignore, but by praise, by appeals to popular opinion, and if such vanities are of no avail, by demonstration of the advantage that will accrue from such a policy, or more effectively perhaps by pointing out the appalling consequences that will follow the opposite policy.
8.39. animus deliberantis non ipsa honesti natura, quam he non respicit, permouendus, sed laude, vulgi opinion, et si parum proficiet haec vanitas, secutura ex his utilitate, aliquanto vero magis obiiciendo aliquos, si diversa fecerint, metus.
8.40. For quite apart from the fact that the minds of unprincipled men are easily swayed by terror, I am not sure that most men's minds are not more easily influenced by fear of evil than by hope of good, for they find it easier to understand what is evil than what is good.
8.40. praeter id quod his levissimi cuiusque animus facillime terretur, nescio an etiam naturaliter apud plurimos plus valeat malorum timor quam spes bonorum, sicut facilior eisdem turpium quam honestorum intellectus est.
8.41. Sometimes again we urge good men to adopt a somewhat unseemly course, while we advise men of poor character to take a course in which the object is the advantage of those who seek our advice. I realise the thought that will immediately occur to my reader: “Do you then teach that this should be done or think it right?” Cicero might clear me from blame in the matter; for he writes to Brutus in the following terms, after setting forth a number of things that might honourably be urged on Caesar: “Should I be a good man to advise this? No. For the end of him who gives advice is the advantage of the man to whom he gives it. But, you say, your advice is right. Certainly, but there is not always room for what is right in giving advice.” However, this is a somewhat abstruse question, and does not concern deliberative oratory alone. I shall therefore reserve it for my twelfth and concluding book.
8.41. bonis quoque suadentur parum decora, dantur parum bonis consilia, in quibus ipsorum qui consulunt spectator utilitas. me fallit, quae statim cogitatio subire possit legentem: Hoc ergo praecipis? et hoc fas putas? me liberare Cicero, qui ita scribit ad Brutum, praepositis plurimis, quae honeste suaderi Caesari possint: bonus vir, si haec suadeam?. Suasoris enim finis est utilitas eius, cui quisque suadet. recta sunt. negat? sed non est semper rectis in suadendo locus. quia est altior quaestio nec tantum ad suasorias pertinet, destinatus est mihi hic locus duodecimo, qui summus futurus est, libro.
8.43. For my part I would not have anything done dishonourably. But for the meantime let us regard these questions as at least belonging to the rhetorical exercises of the schools: for knowledge of evil is necessary to enable us the better to defend what is right.
8.43. ego quicquam fieri turpiter velim. interim haec vel ad scholarum exercitationes pertinere credantur, nam et iniquorum ratio noscenda est, ut melius aequa tueamur.
8.44. For the present I will only say that if anyone is going to urge a dishonourable course on honourable man, he should remember not to urge it as being dishonourable, and should avoid the practice of certain declaimers who urge Sextus Pompeius to piracy just because it is dishonourable and cruel. Even when we address bad men, we should gloss over what is unsightly. For there is no man so evil as to wish to seem so.
8.44. si quis bono inhonesta suadebit, meminerit non suadere tanquam inhonesta, it quidam declamatores Sextum Pompeium ad piraticam propter hoc ipsum quod turpis et crudelis sit, impellunt; sed dandus illis deformibus color idque etiam apud malos.
8.45. Thus Sallust makes Catiline speak as one who is driven to crime not by wickedness but by indignation, and Varius makes Atreus say:My wrongs are past all speech,And such shall be the deeds they force me to.How much more has this pretence of honour to be kept up by those who have a real regard for their own good name!
8.45. enim quisquam est tam malus, ut videri velit. Catilina apud Sallustium loquitur, ut rem sceleratissimam non militia, sed indignatione videatur audere. Atreus apud Varium: — fero (inquit) infandissima, facere cogor. magis eis, quibus cura famae fuit, conservandus est hic velut ambitus?
8.46. Therefore when we advise Cicero to beg Antonius for mercy or even to burn the Philippics if Antonius promises to spare him on that condition, we shall not empliasise the love of life in our advice (for if that passion has any force with him, it will have it none the less if we are silent), but we shall exhort him to save himself in the interest of the state.
8.46. et, cum Ciceroni dabimus consilium, ut Antonium roget, vel etiam ut Philippicas (ita vitam pollicente eo) exurat, non cupiditatem lucis allegabimus (haec enim si valet in animo eius, tacentibus quoque nobis valet), sed ut reipublicae se servet hortabimur.
8.47. For he needs some such reason as that to preserve him from feeling shame at entreating such a one as Antony. Again if we urge Gaius Caesar to accept the crown we shall assert that the state is doomed to destruction unless controlled by a monarchy. For the sole aim of the man who is deliberating about committing a criminal act is to make his act appear as little wicked as possible.
8.47. illi opus est occasione, ne eum talium precum pudeat. C. Caesari suadentes regnum adfirmabimus stare iam rempublicam nisi uno regente non posse. qui de re nefaria deliberat, id solum quaerit, quomodo quam minimum peccare videatur.
8.48. It also makes a great deal of difference who it is that is offering the advice: for if his past has been illustrious, or if his distinguished birth or age or fortune excite high expectations, care must be taken that his words are not unworthy of him. If on the other hand he has none of these advantages he will have to adopt a humbler tone. For what is regarded as liberty in some is called licence in others. Some receive sufficient support from their personal authority, while others find that the force of reason itself is scarce sufficient to enable them to maintain their position.
8.48. refert etiam, quae sit persona suadentis; quia anteacta vita si illustris fuit aut clarius genus aut aetas aut fortuna adfert expectationem, providendum est, ne quae dicuntur ab eo qui dicit dissentiant. his contraria summissiorem quendam modum postulant. quae in aliis libertas est, in aliis licentia vocatur, et quibusdam sufficit auctoritas, quosdam ratio ipsa aegre tuetur.
8.49. Consequently I regard impersonation as the most difficult of tasks, imposed as it is in addition to the other work involved by a deliberative theme. For the same speaker has on one occasion to impersonate Caesar, on another Cicero or Cato. But it is a most useful exercise because it demands a double effort and is also of the greatest use to future poets and historians, while for orators of course it is absolutely necessary.
8.49. longe mihi difficillimae videntur prosopopoeiae, in quibus ad reliquum suasoriae laborem accedit etiam personae difficultas. idem illud aliter Caesar, aliter Cicero, aliter Cato suadere debebit. vero haec exercitatio, vel quod duplicis est operis, vel quod poetis quoque aut historiarum futuris scriptoribus plurimum confert. et oratoribus necessaria.
8.50. For there are many speeches composed by Greek and Latin orators for others to deliver, the words of which had to be adapted to suit the position and character of those for whom they were written. Do you suppose that Cicero thought in the same way or assumed the same character when he wrote for Gnaeus Pompeius and when he wrote for Titus Ampius and the rest? Did he not rather bear in mind the fortune, rank and achievements of each single individual and represent the character of all to whom he gave a voice so that though they spoke better than they could by nature, they still might seem to speak in their own persons?
8.50. sunt multae a Graecis Latinisque compositae orationes, quibus alii uterentur, ad quorum condicionem vitamque aptanda quae dicebantur fuerunt. eodem modo cogitavit aut eandem personam induit Cicero, cum scriberet Cn. Pompeio et cum T. Ampio ceterisve; ac non uniuscuiusque eorum fortunam, dignitatem, res gestas intuitus omnium, quibus vocem dabat, etiam imagine expressit? ut melius quidem sed tamen ipsi dicere viderentur.
8.51. For a speech which is out of keeping with the man who delivers it is just as faulty as the speech which fails to suit the subject to which it should conform. It is for this reason that Lysias is regarded as having shown the highest art in the speeches which he wrote for uneducated persons, on account of their extraordinary realism. In the case of declaimers indeed it is of the first importance that they should consider what best suits each character: for they rarely play the role of advocates in their declamations. As a rule they impersonate sons, parents, rich men, old men, gentle or harsh of temper, misers, superstitious persons, cowards and mockers, so that hardly even comic actors have to assume more numerous roles in their performances on the stage than these in their declamations.
8.51. enim minus vitiosa est oratio, si ab homine quam si ab re, cui accommodari debuit, dissidet; ideoque Lysias optime videtur in iis, quae scribebat indoctis, servasse veritatis fidem. praecipue declamatoribus considerandum est, quid cuique personae conveniat, qui paucissimas controversias ita dicunt ut advocati, plerumque filii, parentes, divites, senes, asperi, lenes, avari, denique superstitiosi, timidi, derisores fiunt; ut vix comoediarum actoribus plures habitus in pronuntiando concipiendi sint quam his in dicendo.
8.52. All these rôles may be regarded as forming part of impersonation, which I have included under delibertive themes, from which it differs merely in that it involves the assumption of a role. It is sometimes introduced even with controversial themes, which are drawn from history and involve the appearance of definite historical characters as pleaders.
8.52. omnia possunt videri prosopopoeiae, quam ego suasoriis subieci, quia nullo alio ab iis quam persona distat. haec aliquando etiam in controversias ducitur, quae ex historiis compositae certis agentium nominibus continentur.
8.53. I am aware also that historical and poetical themes are often set for the sake of practice, such as Priam's speech to Achilles or Sulla's address to the people on his resignation of the dictatorship. But these will fall under one or other of the three classes into which I have divided causes. For entreaty, statement, and argument, with other themes already mentioned, are all of frequent occurrence in forensic, deliberative or demonstrative subjects, according as circumstances demand, and we often introduce fictitious speeches of historical persons, whom we select ourselves.
8.53. ignoro plerumnque exercitationis gratia poni et poeticas et historicas, ut Priami verba apud Achillem aut Sullae dictaturam deponentis in contione. haec in partem cedent trium generum, in quae causas divisimus. et rogare, indicare, rationem reddere et alia, de quibus supra dictum est, varie atque ut res tulit in materia iudiciali, deliberativa, demonstrativa, solemus.
8.54. Cicero for instance in the pro Caelio makes both Appius Caecus and her brother Clodius address Clodia, the former rebuking her for her immorality, the latter exhorting her thereto.
8.54. vero in iis utimur ficta personarum, quas ipsi substituimus, oratione, ut apud Ciceronem pro Caelio Clodiam et Caecus Appius et Clodius frater, ille in castigationem, hic in exhortationem vitiorum compositus, alloquitur.
8.55. In scholastic declamations the fictitious themes for deliberative speeches are often not unlike those of controversial speeches and are a compromise between the two forms, as for instance when the theme set is a discussion in the presence of Gaius Caesar of the punishment to be meted out to Theodotus; for it consists of accusation and defence, both of them peculiar to forensic oratory.
8.55. in scholis fingi materiae ad deliberandum similiores controversiis et ex utroque genere commixtae, ut cum apud C. Caesarem consultatio de poena Theodoti ponitur. enim accusatione et defensione causa eius, quod est iudicialium proprium.
8.56. But the topic of expediency also enters into the case, in such questions as whether it was to Caesar's advantage that Pompeius should be slain; whether the execution of Theodotus would involve the risk of a war with the king of Egypt; whether such a war would be highly inopportune at such a critical moment, would prove dangerous and be certain to last a long time.
8.56. tamen est et utilitatis ratio, an pro Caesare fuerit occidi Pompeium, an timendum a rege bellum, si Theodotus sit occisus, an id minime opportunum hoc tempore et periculosum et certe longum sit futurum.
8.57. There is also a question of honour. Does it befit Caesar to avenge Pompeius' death? or is it to be feared that an admission that Pompeius did not deserve death will injure the cause of the Caesarian party?
8.57. et de honesto, deceatne Caesarem ultio Pompeii, an sit verendum, ne peiorem faciat suarum partium causam, si Pompeium indignum morte fateatur.
8.58. It may be noted that discussions of such a kind may well occur in actual cases. Declaimers have however often been guilty of an error as regards deliberative themes which has involved a series of consequences. They have considered deliberative themes to be different and absolutely opposed to forensic themes. For they have always affected abrupt openings, an impetuous style and a generous embellishment, as they call it, in their language, and have been especially careful to make shorter notes for deliberative than for forensic themes.
8.58. genus accidere etiam veritati potest. simplex autem circa suasorias error in plerisque declamatoribus fuit, qui dicendi genus in iis diversum atque in totum illi iudiciali contrarium esse existimaverunt. et principia abrupta et concitatam semper orationem et in verbis effusiorem, ut ipsi vocant, cultum adfectaverunt, et earum breviores utique commentarios quam legalis materiae facere laborarunt.
8.59. For my part while I realise that deliberative themes do not require an exordium, for reasons which I have already stated, I do not, however, understand why they should open in such a wild and exclamatory manner. When a man is asked to express his opinion on any subject, he does not, if he is sane, begin to shriek, but endeavours as far as possible to win the assent of the man who is considering the question by a courteous and natural opening.
8.59. porro ut prooemio video non utique opus esse suasoriis, propter quas dixi supra causas, ita cur initio furioso sit exclamandum, non intelligo; cum proposita consultatione rogatus sententiam, si modo est sanus, non quiritet, sed quam maxime potest civili et humano ingressu mereri adsensum deliberantis velit.
8.60. Why, I ask, in review of the fact that deliberations require moderation above all else, should the speaker on such themes indulge in a torrential style of eloquence kept at one high level of violence? I acknowledge that in controversial speeches the tone is often lowered in the exordium, the statement of facts and the argument, and that if you subtract these three portions, the remainder is more or less of the deliberative type of speech, but what remains must likewise be of a more even flow, avoiding all violence and fury.
8.60. autem torrens et utique aequaliter concitata sit in ea dicentis oratio, cum vel praecipue moderationem consilia desiderent? ego negaverim, saepius subsidere in controversiis impetum dicendi prooemio, narratione, argumentis; quae si detrahas, id fere supererit, quo suasoriae constant, verum id quoque aequalius erit non tumultuosius atque turbidius.
8.61. With regard to manificence of language, deliblerative declaimers should avoid straining after it more than others, but it comes to them more naturally. For there is a preference among those who invent such themes for selecting great personages, such as kings, princes, senators and peoples, while the theme itself is generally on a grander scale. Consequently since the words are suited to the theme, they acquire additional splendour from the magnificence of the matter.
8.61. autem magnificentia non validius est adfectanda suasorias declamantibus, sed contingit magis; nam et personae fere magnae fingentibus placent, regum, principum, senatus, populi et res ampliores; ita cum verba rebus aptentur, ipso materiae nitore clarescunt.
8.62. In actual deliberations the case is different, and consequently Theophrastus laid it down that in the deliberative class of oratory the language should as far as possible be free from all affectation: in stating this view he followed the authority of his instructor, although as a rule he is not afraid to differ from him. For Aristotle held that the demonstrative type of oratory was the best suited for writing and that the next best was forensic oratory: his reason for this view was that the first type is entirely concerned with display, while the second requires art, which will even be employed to deceive the audience, if expedience should so demand, whereas advice requires only truth and prudence.
8.62. veris consiliis ratio est, ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni adfectione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem, secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui, quanquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet. Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam proximamque ab ea iudicialem putavit, videlicet quoniam prior ilia tota esset ostentationis, haec secunda egeret artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas, consilia fide prudentiaque constarent.
8.64. I agree with this view as regards demonstrative oratory (in fact all writers are agreed on this point), but as regards forensic and deliberative themes I think that the style must be suited to the requirements of the subject which has to be treated.
8.64. in demonstrativa consentio, nam et omnes alii scriptores idem tradiderunt; in iudiciis autem consiliisque secundum condicionem ipsius, quae tractabitur, rei accommodandam dicendi credo rationem.
8.65. For I notice that the Philippics of Demosthenes are pre-eminent for the same merits as his forensic speeches, and that the opinions expressed by Cicero before the senate or the people are as remarkable for the splendour of their eloquence as the speeches which he delivered in accusing or defending persons before the courts. And yet Cicero says of deliberative oratory that the whole speech should be simple and dignified, and should derive its ornament rather from the sentiments expressed than the actual words.
8.65. et Philippicas Demosthenis iisdem quibus habitas in iudiciis orationes video eminere virtutibus, et Ciceronis sententiae et contiones non minus clarum, quam est in accusationibus ac defensionibus, eloquentiae lumen ostendunt. tamen idem de suasoria hoc modo: autem oratio simplex et gravis et sententiis debet ornatior esse quam verbis.
8.66. As regards the use of examples practically all authorities are with good reason agreed that there is no subject to which they are better suited, since as a rule history seems to repeat itself and the experience of the past is a valuable support to reason.
8.66. exemplorum nulli materiae magis convenire merito fere omnes consentiunt, cum plerumque videantur respondere futura praeteritis, habeaturque experimentum velut quoddam rationis testimonium.
8.67. Brevity and copiousness are determined not so much by the nature as by the compass of the subject. For, just as in deliberations the question is generally less complicated, so in forensic cases it is often of less importance. Anyone who is content to read not merely speeches, but history as well, in preference to growing grey over the notebooks of the rhetoricians, will realise the truth of what I say: for in the historians the speeches delivered to the people and the opinions expressed in the senate often provide examples of advice and dissuasion.
8.67. quoque aut copia non materiae genere sed modo constat. ut in consiliis plerumque simplicior quaestio est, ita saepe in causis minor. omnia vera esse sciet, si quis non orationes modo, sed historias etiam (namque in iis contiones atque sententiae plerumque suadendi ac dissuadendi funguntur officio), legere maluerit quam in commentariis rhetorum consenescere.
8.68. he will find an avoidance of abrupt openings in deliberatire speeches and will note that the forensic style is often the more impetuous of the two, while in both cases the words are suited to the matter and forensic speeches are often shorter than deliberative.
8.68. enim nec in consiliis abrupta initia et concitatius saepe in iudiciis dictum et verba aptata rebus in utroque genere et breviores aliquando causarum orationes quam sententiarum.
8.69. Nor will he find in them those faults into which some of our declaimers fall, namely a coarse abuse of those who hold opposite opinions and a general tendency to speak in such a way as to make it seem that the speaker's views are in opposition to those of the persons who ask his advice. Consequently their aim seems to be invective rather than persuasion.
8.69. illa quidem in iis vitia deprehendet, quibus quidam declamatores laborant, quod et contra sentientibus inhumane conviciantur et ita plerumque dicunt, tanquam ab iis qui deliberant utique dissentiant, ideoque obiurgantibus similiores sunt quam suadentibus.
8.70. I would have my younger readers realise that these words are penned for their special benefit that they may not desire to adopt a different style in their exercises from that in which they will be required to speak, and may not be hampered by having to unlearn what they have acquired. For the rest if they are ever summoned to take part in the counsels of their friends, or to speak their opinions in the senate, or advise the emperor on some point on which he may consult them, they will learn from practice what they cannot perhaps put to the credit of the schools.
8.70. adolescentes sibi scripta sciant, ne aliter quam dicturi sunt exerceri velint et in desuescendis morentur., cum advocari coeperint in consilia amicorum, dicere sententiam in senatu, suadere si quid consulet princeps, quod praeceptis fortasse non credunt, usu docebuntur.
9.1. IX. I now come to the forensic kind of oratory, which presents the utmost variety, but whose duties are no more than two, the bringing and rebutting of charges. Most authorities divide the forensic speech into five parts: the exordium, the statement of facts, the proof, the refutation, and the peroration. To these some have added the partition into heads, proposition and digression, the two first of which form part of the proof.
9.1. de iudiciali genere, quod est praecipue multiplex, sed officiis constat duobus intentionis ac depulsionis. partes, ut plurimis auctoribus placuit, quinque sunt: prooemium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, peroratio. adiecerunt quidam partitionem, propositionem, excessum; quarum priores duae probationi succedunt.
9.2. For it is obviously necessary to propound what you are going to prove as well as to conclude. Why then, if proposition is a part of a speech, should not conclusion be also? Partition on the other hand is merely one aspect of arrangement, and arrangement is a part of rhetoric itself, and is equally distributed through every theme of oratory and their whole body, just as are invention and style.
9.2. proponere quidem, quae sis probaturus, necesse est, sed et concludere; cur igitur si illa pars causae est, non et haec sit? vero dispositionis est species, ipsa dispositio pars rhetorices et per omnes materias totumque earum corpus aequaliter fusa, sicut inuentio, elocutio.
9.3. Consequently we must regard partition not as one part of a whole speech, but as a part of each individual question that may be involved. For what question is there in which an orator cannot set forth the order in which he is going to make his points? And this of course is the function of partition. But how ridiculous it is to make each question an aspect of proof, but partition which is an aspect of a question a part of the whole speech.
9.3. eam non orationis totius partem unam esse credendum est sed quaestionum etiam singularum. est enim quaestio, in qua non promittere possit orator, quid primo, quid secundo, quid tertio sit loco dicturus? quod est proprium partitionis. ergo ridiculum est, quaestionem quidem speciem esse probationis, partitionem autem, quae sit species quaestionis, partem totius orationis vocari?
9.4. As for digression (egressio, now more usually styled excessus ), if it lie outside the case, it cannot be part of it, while, if it lie within it, it is merely an accessory or ornament of that portion of the case from which digression is made. For if anything that lies within the case is to be called part of it, why not call argument, comparison, commonplace, pathos, illustration parts of the case?
9.4. vero vel, quod usitatius esse coepit, excessus, sive est extra causam, non potest esse pars causae, sive est in causa, adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum, ex quibus egreditur. si, quidquid in causa est, pars causae vocabitur, cur non argumentum, similitudo, locus communis, adfectus, exempla partes vocentur?
9.5. On the other hand I disagree with those who, like Aristotle, would remove refuation from the list on the ground that it forms part of the proof: for the proof is constructive, and the reputation destructive. Aristotle also introduces another slight novelty in making proposition, not statement of facts, follow the exordium. This however he does because he regards proposition as the genus and statement of facts as the species, with the result that he holds that, whereas the former is always and everywhere necessary, the latter may sometimes be dispensed with.
9.5. nec iis adsentior, qui detrahunt refutationem tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est, quae constituat, illa, quae destruat. quoque idem aliquatenus novat, quod prooemio non narrationem subiungit sed propositionem. id facit, quia propositio ei genus, narratio species videtur, et hac non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse.
9.6. It is however necessary to point out as regards these five parts which I have established, that that which has to be spoken first is not necessarily that which requires our first consideration. But above all we must consider the nature of the case, the question at issue and the arguments for and against. Next we must consider what points are to be made, and what refuted, and then how the facts are to be stated.
9.6. ex his quas constitui partibus non, ut quidque primum dicendum, ita primum cogitandum est; sed ante omnia intueri oportet, quod sit genus causae, quid in ea quaeratur, quae prosint, quae noceant, deinde quid confirmandum sit ac refellendum, tum quo modo narrandum.
9.7. For the stalement of facts is designed to prepare the way for the proofs and must needs be unprofitable, unless we have first determined what proofs. are to be promised in the statement. Finally we must consider how best to win the judge to take our view. For we cannot be sure until we have subjected all the parts of the case to careful scrutiny, what sort of impression we wish to make upon the judge: are we to mollify him or increase his severity, to excite or relax his interest in the case, to render him susceptible to influence or the reverse?
9.7. enim probationum est praeparatio, nec esse utilis potest, nisi prius constiterit, quid debeat de probatione promittere. intuendum, quemadmodum iudex sit conciliandus. enim nisi totius causae partibus diligenter inspectis scire possumus, qualem nobis facere animum cognoscentis expediat, severum an mitem, concitatum an remissum, adversum gratiae an obnoxium.
9.8. I cannot however approve the view of those who think that the exordium should actually be written last. For though we must collect all our material and determine the proper place for each portion of it, before we begin to speak or write, we must commence with what naturally comes first.
9.8. ideo tamen eos probaverim, qui scribendum quoque prooemium novissime putant. ut conferri materiam omnem et, quid quoque loco sit opus, constare decet, antequam dicere aut scribere ordiamur, ita incipiendum ab iis, quae prima sunt.
9.9. No one begins a portrait by painting or modelling the feet, and no art finds its completion at the point where it should begin. Otherwise what will happen if we have not time to write our speech? Will not the result of such a reversal of the proper order of things be that we shall be caught napping? We must therefore review the subject-matter in the order laid down, but write our speech in the order in which we shall deliver it.
9.9. nec pingere quisquam aut fingere coepit a pedibus, nec denique ars ulla consummatur ibi, unde ordiendum est. fiet alioqui, si spatium componendi orationem stilo non fuerit? nonne nos haec inversa consuetudo deceperit? igitur materia est, quo praecepimus ordine, scribenda, quo dicemus.
10.1. X. Every cause in which one side attacks and the other defends consists either of one or more controversial questions. In the first case it is called simple, in the second complex. An example of the first is when the subject of enquiry is a theft or an adultery taken by itself. In complex cases the several questions may all be of the same kind, as in cases of extortion, or of different kinds, as when a man is accused at one and the same time of homicide and sacrilege. Such cases no longer arise in the public courts, since the praetor allots the different charges to different courts in accordance with a definite rule; but they still are of frequent occurrence in the Imperial or Senatorial courts, and were frequent in the days when they came up for trial before the people. Private suits again are often tried by one judge, who may have to determine many different points of law.
10.1. causa omnis, in qua pars altera agentis est, altera recusantis, aut unius rei controversia constat aut plurium. simplex dicitur, illa coniuncta. controversia est per se furti, per se adulterii. aut eiusdem generis, ut in pecuniis repetundis, aut diversi, ut si quis sacrilegii et homicidii simul accusetur. nunc in publicis iudiciis non accidit, quoniam praetor certa lege sortitur, principum autem et senatus cognitionibus frequens est et populi fuit; privata quoque iudicia saepe unum iudicem habere multis et diversis formulis solent.
10.2. There are no other species of forensic causes, not even when one person brings the same suit on the same grounds against two different persons, or two persons bring the same suit against one, or several against several, as occasionally occurs in lawsuits about inheritances. Because although a number of parties may be involved, there is still only one suit, unless indeed the different circumstances of the various parties alter the questions at issue.
10.2. aliae species erunt, etiamsi unus a duobus dumtaxat eandem rem atque ex eadem causa petet aut duo ab uno aut plures a pluribus, quod accidere in hereditariis litibus interim scimus, quia quamvis in multis personis causa tamen una est, nisi si condicio personarum quaestiones variaverit.
10.3. There is however said to be a third and different class, the comparative. Questions of comparison frequently require to be handled in portions of a cause, as for instance in the centum viral court, when after other questions have been raised the question is discussed as to which of two claimants is the more deserving of an inheritance. It is rare however for a case to be brought into court on such grounds alone, as in divinations which take place to determine who the accuser shall be, and occasionally when two informers dispute as to which has earned the reward.
10.3. his tertium genus, quod dicitur comparativum; cuius rei tractatus in parte causae frequens est, ut cum apud centumviros post alia quaeritur et hoc, uter dignior hereditate sit. est autem, ut in foro iudicia propter id solum constituantur, sicut divinationes, quae fiunt de accusatore constituendo, et nonnunquam inter delatores, uter praemium meruerit.
10.4. Some again have added a fourth class, namely mutual accusation, which they call ἀντικατηγορία Others, however, regard it as belonging to the comparative group, to which indeed the common case of reciprocal suits on different grounds bears a strong resemblance. If this latter case should also be called ἀντικατηγορία (for it has no special name of its own), we must divide mutual accusation into two classes, in one of which the parties bring the same charge against each other, while in the other they bring different charges. The same division will also apply to claims.
10.4. quidam numero mutuam accusationem, quae ἀντικατηγορία vocatur, allis videlicet succedere hanc quoque comparativo generi existimantibus, cui similis erit petitionum invicem diversarum, quod accidit vel frequentissime. si et ipsum vocari debet ἀντικατηγορία (nam proprio caret nomine) duo genera erunt eius, alterum quo litigatores idem crimen invicem intentant, alterum quo aliud atque aliud. et petitionum condicio par est.
10.5. As soon as we are clear as to the kind of cause on which we are engaged, we must then consider whether the act that forms the basis of the charge is denied or defended, or given another name or excepted from that class of action. Thus we determine the basis of each case.
10.5. apparuerit genus causae, tum intuebimur, negeturne factum, quod intenditur, an defendatur, an alio nomine appelletur, an a genere actionis repellatur; unde sunt status.
11.1. XI. As soon as these points are ascertained, the next step, according to Hermagoras, should be to consider what is the question at issue, the line of defence, the point for the judge's decision and the central point, or, as others call it, the foundation of the case. The question in its more general sense is taken to mean everything on which two or more plausible opinions may be advanced.
11.1. inventis, intuendum deinceps Hermagorae videtur, quid sit quaestio, ratio, iudicatio, continens, vel, ut alii vocant, firmamentum. latius intelligitur omnis, de qua in utramque partem vel in plures partes dici credibiliter potest.
11.2. In forensic subjects however it must be taken in two senses: first in the sense in which we say that a controversial matter involves many questions, thereby including all minor questions; secondly in the sense of the main question on which the case turns. It is of this, with which the basis originates, that I am now speaking. We ask whether a thing has been done, what it is that has been done, and whether it was rightly done.
11.2. iudiciali autem materia dupliciter accipienda est: altero modo, quo dicimus multas quaestiones habere controversiam, quo etiam minores omnes complectimur, altero, quo significamus summam illam, in qua causa vertitur; de hac nunc loquor, ex qua nascitur status, an factum sit, quid factum sit, an recte factum sit.
11.3. To these Hermagoras and Apollodorus and many other writers have given the special name of questions; Theodorus on the other hand, as I have already said, calls them general heads, while he designates minor questions or questions dependent on these general heads as special heads. For it is agreed that question may spring from question, and species be subdivided into other species.
11.3. Hermagoras et Apollodorus et alii plurimi scriptores proprie quaestiones vocant, Theodorus, ut dixi, capita generalia, sicut illas minores aut ex illis pendentes specialia. et quaestionem ex quaestione nasci et speciem in species dividi convenit.
11.4. This main question, then, they call the ζήτημα. The line of defence is the method by which an admitted act is defended. I see no reason why I should not use the same example to illustrate this point that has been used by practically all my predecessors. Orestes has killed his mother: the fact is admitted. He pleads that he was justified in so doing: the basis will be one of quality, the question, whether he was justified in his action, the line of defence that Clytemnestra killed her husband, Orestes' father. This is called the αἴτιον or motive. The point for the decision of the judge is known as the κρινόμενον and in this case is whether it was right that even a guilty mother should be killed by her son.
11.4. igitur quaestionem veluti principalem vocant ζήτημα. autem est, qua id, quod factum esse constat, defenditur. cur non utamur eodem, quo sunt usi omnes fere, exemplo? Orestes matrem occidit, hoc constat; dicit se iuste fecisse: status erit qualitatis; quaestio, an iuste fecerit, ratio, quod Clytaemnestra maritum suum, patrem Orestis, occidit; hoc αἴτιον dicitur. κρινόμενον autem iudicatio, an oportuerit vel nocentem matrem a filio occidi.
11.5. Some have drawn a distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτίαν making αἴτιον mean the cause of the trial, namely the murder of Clytemnestra, αἰτία the motive urged in defence, namely the murder of Agamemnon. But there is such lack of agreement over these two words, that some make αἰτία the cause of the trial and αἴτιον the motive of the deed, while others reverse the meanings. If we turn to Latin writers we find that some have given these causes the names of initinum, the beginning, and ratio, the reason, while others give the same name to both.
11.5. diviserunt αἴτιον et αἰτίαν ut esset altera, propter quam iudicium constitutum est, ut occisa Clytaemnestra, altera, qua factum defenditur, ut occisus Agamemnon. tanta est circa verba dissensio, ut alii αἰτίαν causam iudicii, αἴτιον autem facti vocent, alii eadem in contrarium vertant. Latinorum quidam haec initium et rationem vocaverunt, quidam utrumque eodem nomine appellant.
11.6. Moreover cause seems to spring from cause, or as the Greeks say αἴτιον ἐξ αἰτίον as will be seen from the following:— Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon, because he had sacrificed their daughter and brought home a captive woman as his paramour. The same authors think that there may be several lines of defence to one question: for instance Orestes may urge that he killed his mother because driven to do so by oracles. But the number of points for the decision of the judge will be the same as the number of alleged motives for the deed: in this case it will be whether he ought to have obeyed the oracles.
11.6. quoque ex causa, id est αἴτιον ἐξ αἰτίου nasci videtur, quale est: Occidit Agamemnonem Clytaemnestra, quia ille filiam communem immolaverat et captivam pellicem adducebat. putant et sub una quaestione plures esse rationes, ut si Orestes et alteram adferat causam matris necatae, quod responsis sit impulsus; quot autem causas faciendi, totidem iudicationes; nam et haec erit iudicatio, an responsis parere debuerit.
11.7. But one alleged motive may also in my opinion involve several questions and several points for the decision of the judge, as for instance in the case when the husband caught his wife in adultery and slew her and later slew the adulterer, who had escaped, in the market place. The motive is but one: “he was an adulterer.” But there arise as questions and points for decision by the judge, whether it was lawful to kill him at that time and at that place.
11.7. et una causa plures habere quaestiones et iudicationes (ut ego arbitror) potest, ut in eo, qui, cum adulteram deprehensam occidisset, adulterum, qui tum effugerat, postea in foro occidit. enim est una, adulter fuit; quaestiones et iudicationes, an illo tempore, an illo loco licuerit occidere.
11.8. But just as, although there be several questions, each with its special basis, the basis of the case is but one, namely that to which all else is referred, even so the real point for the decision of the judge is, strictly speaking, that on which judgment is given.
11.8. sicut, cum sint plures quaestiones omnesque suos status habeant, causae tamen status unus sit, ad quem referuntur omnia, ita iudicatio maxime propria, de qua pronuntiatur.
11.9. As for the σύνεχον the central argument, as I have mentioned it is called by some, or the foundation as it is called by others, or as Cicero styles it the strongest argument of the defender and the most relevant to the decision of the judge, some regard it as being the point after which all enquiry ceases, others as the main point for adjudication.
11.9. συνέχον autem (quod, ut dixi, continens alii, firmamentum alii putant, Cicero firmissimam argumentationem defensoris et adpositissimam ad iudicationem ) quibusdam id videtur esse, post quod nihil quaeritur, quibusdam id quod ad iudicationem firmissimum adfertur.
11.10. The motive of the deed does not arise in all controversial cases. For how can there be a motive for the deed, when the deed is denied? But when the motive for the deed does come up for discussion, they deny that the point for the decision of the judge rests on the same ground as the main question at issue, and this view is maintained by Cicero in his Rhetorica and Partitiones.
11.10. facti non in omnes controversias cadit. quae fuerit causa faciendi, ubi factum negatur? ubi causa tractetur, negant eodem loco esse iudicationem quo quaestionem, idque et in Rhetoricis Cicero et in Partitionibus dicit.
11.11. For when it has been asserted and denied that a deed was done, the question whether it was done is resolved by conjecture, and the decision of the judge and the main question rest on the same ground, since the first question and the final decision are concerned with the same point. But when it is stated and denied that Orestes was justified in killing his mother, considerations of quality are introduced: the question is whether he was justified in killing her, but this is not yet the point for the decision of the judge. When, then, does it become so? “She killed my father.” “Yes, but that did not make it your duty to murder your mother.” The point for the decision of the judge is whether it was his duty to kill her.
11.11. in coniectura est quaestio ex illo, non factum an factum sit. ergo iudicatio, ubi quaestio, quia in eadem re prima quaestio et extrema disceptatio. in qualitate, Orestes occidit: recte, non recte, an recte occiderit, quaestio nec statim iudicatio. ergo? patrem meum occiderat; sed non ideo tu matrem debuisti occidere; an debuerit, hic iudicatio.
11.12. As regards the foundation, I will put it in the words of Cicero himself:— “The foundation is the strongest argument for the defence, as for instance, if Orestes were ready to say that the disposition of his mother towards his father, himself and his sisters, the kingdom, the reputation of the race and the family were such that it was the peculiar duty of her children to punish her.”
11.12. Firmamentum autem verbis ipsius ponam: si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum ac sorores, in regnum, in famam generis et familiae, ut ab ea poenas liberi potissimum sui petere debuerint.
11.13. Others again use illustrations such as the following:— “He who has spent his patrimony, is not allowed to address the people.” “But he spent it on public works.” The question is whether everyone that spends his patrimony is to be prohibited, while the point for decision is whether he who spent it in such a way is to be prohibited.
11.13. alii et talibus exemplis: bona paterna consumpserit, ne contionetur; in opera publica consumpsit; quaestio, an, quisquis consumpserit, prohibendus sit: iudicatio, an, qui sic.
11.14. Or again take the case of the soldier Arruntius, who killed the tribune Lusius for assaulting his honour. The question is whether he was justified in so doing, the line of defence, that the murdered man made an assault upon his honour, the point for the decision of the judge, whether it was right that a man should be killed uncondemned or a tribune by a soldier.
11.14. , ut in causa militis Arrunti, qui Lusium tribunum vim sibi inferentem interfecit, quaestio, an iure fecerit, ratio, quod is vim afferebat; iudicatio, an indemnatum, an tribunum a milite occidi oportuerit.
11.15. Some even regard the basis of the question as being different from the basis of the decision. The question as to whether Milo was justified in killing Clodius, is one of quality. The point for the decision of the judge, namely whether Clodius lay in wait for Milo, is a matter for conjecture.
11.15. etiam status quaestionem, alterius iudicationem putant. qualitatis, an recte Clodium Milo occiderit.
11.16. They also urge that a case is often diverted to the consideration of some matter irrelevant to the question, and that it is on this matter that judgment is given. I strongly disagree. Take the question whether all who have spent their patrimony are to be prohibited from addressing the people. This question must have its point for decision, and therefore the question and the point for decision are not different, but there are more than one question and more than one point for decision in the case. Again, in the case of Milo, is not the question of fact ultimately referred to the question of quality?
11.16. coniecturalis, an Clodius insidias fecerit. et illud, saepe causam in aliquam rem dimitti, quae non sit propria quaestionis, et de ea iudicati. A quibus multum dissentio. et illa quaestio, an omnes, qui paterna bona consumpserint, contione sint prohibendi, habeat oportet suam iudicationem. non alia quaestio alia iudicatio erit, sed plures quaestiones et plures iudicationes.
11.17. For if Clodius lay in wait for Milo, it follows that he was justifiably killed. But when the case is shifted to some other point far removed from the original question, even in this case the question will be found to reside in the point for decision.
11.17. ? non in causa Milonis ipsa coniectura refertur ad qualitatem? nam si est insidiatus Clodius, sequitur, ut recte sit occisus. vero in aliquam rem missa causa recessum est a quaestione, quae erat, et hic constituta quaestio, ubi iudicatio est.
11.18. As regards these questions Cicero is slightly inconsistent with himself. For in the Rhetorica, as I have already mentioned, he followed Hermagoras, while in the Topicai he holds that the κρινόμενον or disputed point is originated by the basis, and in addressing the lawyer Trebatius on this subject he calls it the point at issue, and describes the elements in which it resides as central arguments or foundations of the defence which hold it together and the removal of which causes the whole defence to fall to the ground.
11.18. in his secum etiam Cicero dissentit. in Rhetoricis (quemadmodum supra dixi) Hermagoran est secutus; in Topicis ex statu effectam contentionem κρινόμενον existimat, idque Trebatio, qui iuris erat consultus, adludens qua de re agitur appellat; quibus id contineatur, continentia, quasi firmamenta defensionis, quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit;
11.19. But in the Partitiones Oratoriae he gives the name of foundation to that which is advanced against the defence, on the ground that the central argument, as it logically comes first, is put forward by the accuser, while the line of defence is put forward by the accused, and the point for the decision of the judge arises from the question jointly raised by the central argument and the line of defence. The view therefore of those who make the basis, the central argument, and the point for the decision of the judge identical, is at once more concise and nearer to the truth. The central argument, they point out, is that the removal of which makes the whole case fall to the ground.
11.19. at in Partitionibus oratoriis firmamentum, quod opponitur defensioni, quia continens, quod primum sit, ab accusatore dicatur, ratio a reo, ex rationis et firmamenti quaestione disceptatio sit iudicationum. igitur et brevius ii, qui statum et continens et iudicationem idem esse voluerunt; continens autem id esse, quo sublato lis esse non possit.
11.20. In this central argument they seem to me to have included both the alleged causes, that Orestes killed his mother and that Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon. the same authorities have likewise always held that the basis and the point for the decision of the judge are in agreement; any other opinion would have been inconsistent with their general views.
11.20. mihi videntur utramque causam complexi, et quod Orestes matrem et quod Clytaemnestra Agamemnonem occiderit. iudicationem et statum consentire semper existimarunt, neque enim aliud eorum rationi conveniens fuisset.
11.21. But this affectation of subtlety in the invention of technical terms is mere laborious ostentation: I have undertaken the task of discussing them solely that I might not be regarded as having failed to make sufficient inquiry into the subject which I have chosen as my theme. But it is quite unnecessary for an instructor proceeding on less technical lines to destroy the coherence of his teaching by attention to such minute detail.
11.21. haec adfectata subtilitas circa nomina rerum ambitiose laborat, a nobis in hoc assumpta solum, ne parum diligenter inquisisse de opere, quod aggressi sumus, videremur; simplicius autem instituenti non est necesse per tam minutas rerum particulas rationem docendi concidere.
11.22. Many however suffer from this drawback, more especially Hermagoras who, although he labours these points with such anxious diligence, was a man of penetrating intellect and in most respects deserves our admiration, so that even where we must needs blame him, we cannot withhold a certain meed of praise.
11.22. vitio multi quidem laborarunt, praecipue tamen Hermagoras, vir alioqui subtilis et in plurimis admirandus, tantum diligentiae nimium sollicitae, ut ipsa eius reprehensio laude aliqua non indigna sit.
11.23. But the shorter method, which for that very reason is also by far the most lucid, will not fatigue the learner by leading him through a maze of detail, nor destroy the coherence of his eloquence by breaking it up into a number of minute departments. For he who has a clear view of the main issue of a dispute, and divines the aims which his own side and his opponents intend to follow and the means they intend to employ (and it is to the intentions of his own side that he must pay special attention), will without a doubt be in possession of a knowledge of all the points which I have discussed above.
11.23. autem brevior et vel ideo lucidior multo via neque discentem per ambages fatigabit nec corpus orationis in parva momenta diducendo consumet. qui viderit, quid sit, quod in controversiam veniat, quid in eo et per quae velit efficere pars diversa, quid nostra, quod in primis est intuendum, nihil eorum ignorare, de quibus supra diximus, poterit.
11.24. And there is hardly anyone, unless he be a born fool without the least acquaintance with the practice of speaking, who does not know what is the main issue of a dispute (or as they call it the cause or central argument ) and what is the question between the parties and the point on which the judge has to decide, these three being identical. For the question is concerned with the matter in dispute and the decision of the judge is given on the point involved in the question.
11.24. est fere quisquam modo non stultus atque ab omni prorsus usu dicendi remotus, quin sciat, et quid litem faciat, (quod ab illis causa vel continens dicitur) et quae sit inter litigantes quaestio, et de quo iudicari oporteat; quae omnia idem sunt. et de eo quaestio est, quod in controversiam venit, et de eo iudicatur, de quo quaestio est.
11.25. Still we do not keep our attention rigidly fixed on such details, but the desire to win praise by any available means and the sheer delight in speaking make us wander away from the subject, since there is always richer material for eloquence outside the strict theme of the case, inasmuch as the points of any given dispute are always few, and there is all the world outside, and in the one case we speak according to our instructions, in the other on the subjects of our own choice.
11.25. non perpetuo intendimus in haec animum et cupiditate laudis utcunque acquirendae vel dicendi voluptate evagamur, quando uberior semper extra causam materia est, quia in controversia pauca sunt, extra omnia, et hic dicitur de his, quae accepimus, illic, de quibus volumus.
11.26. We should teach not so much that it is our duty to discover the question, the central argument, and the point for the decision of the judge (an easy task), as that we should continually keep our attention on our subject, or if we digress, at least keep looking back to it, lest in our desire to win applause we should let our weapons drop from our grasp.
11.26. tam hoc praecipiendum est, ut quaestionem, continens, iudicationem inveniamus (nam id quidem facile est), quam ut intueamur semper, aut certe si digressi fuerimus saltem respiciamus, ne plausum adfectantibus arma excidant.
11.27. The school of Theodorus, as I have said, groups everything under heads, by which they mean several things. First they mean the main question, which is to be identified with the basis; secondly they mean the other questions dependent on the main question, thirdly the proposition and the statement of the proofs. The word is used as we use it when we say “It is the head of the whole business,” or, as Menander says, κεφάλαιόν ἐστιν. But generally speaking, anything which has to be proved will be a head of varying degrees of importance. I have now set forth the principles laid down by the writers of text-books, though I have done so at a greater length than was necessary. I have also explained what are the various parts of forensic causes. My next book therefore shall deal with the exordium.
11.27. Theodori schola, ut dixi, omnia refert ad capita. plura intelliguntur: uno modo summa quaestio item ut status, altero ceterae quae ad summam referuntur, tertio propositio cum adfirmatione; ut dicimus, rei est, apud Menandrum κεφάλαιόν ἐστιν. universum autem, quidquid probandum est, erit caput; sed id maius aut minus. quoniam, quae de his erant a scriptoribus artium tradita, verbosius etiam quam necesse erat exposuimus, praeterea, quae partes essent iudicialium causarum, supra dictum est, proximus liber a prima, id est exordio incipiet.