9.8. There are other indications or εἰκότα, that is probabilities, as the Greeks call them, which do not involve a necessary conclusion. These may not be sufficient in themselves to remove doubt, but may yet be of the greatest value when taken in conjunction with other indications.
9.8. sunt signa non necessaria, quae εἰκότα Graeci vocant; quae etiamsi ad tollendam dubitationem sola non sufficiunt, tamen adiuncta ceteris plurimum valent.
9.9. The Latin equivalent of the Greek σημεῖον is signum, a sign, though some have called it indicium, an indication, or vestigium, a trace. Such signs or indications enable us to infer that something else has happened; blood for instance may lead us to infer that a murder has taken place. But bloodstains on a garment may be the result of the slaying of a victim at a sacrifice or of bleeding at the nose. Everyone who has a bloodstain on his clothes is not necessarily a murderer.
9.9. vocatur, ut dixi, σημεῖον quamquam id quidam indicium quidam vestigium nominaverunt, per quod alia res intellegitur, ut per sanguinem caedes. sanguis vel ex hostia respersisse uestem potest vel e naribus profluxisse: non utique, qui vestem cruentam habuerit, homicidium fecerit.
9.10. But although such an indication may not amount to proof in itself, yet it may be produced as evidence in conjunction with other indications, such for instance as the fact that the man with the bloodstain was the enemy of the murdered man, had threatened him previously or was in the same place with him. Add the indication in question to these, and what was previously only a suspicion may become a certainty.
9.10. ut per se non sufficit, ita ceteris adiunctum testimonii loco ducitur, si inimicus, si minatus ante, si eodem in loco fuit; quibus signum cum accessit, efficit ut, quae suspecta erant, certa videantur.
9.11. On the other hand there are indications which may be made to serve either party, such as livid spots, swellings which may be regarded as symptoms either of poisoning or of bad health, or a wound in the breast which may be treated as a proof of murder or of suicide. The force of such indications depends on the amount of extraneous support which they receive.
9.11. sunt quaedam signa utrique parti communia, ut livores, tumores (nam videri possunt et veneficii et cruditatis) et vulnus in pectore sua manu et aliena perisse dicentibus, in quo est. proinde firma habentur atque extrinsecus adiuvantur.
9.12. Hermagoras would include among such indications as do not involve a necessary conclusion, an argument such as the following, “Atalanta cannot be a virgin, as she has been roaming the woods in the company of young men.” If we accept this view, I fear that we shall come to treat all inferences from a fact as indications. None the less such arguments are in practice treated exactly as if they were indications.
9.12. autem, quae signa sunt quidem, sed non necessaria, genus Hermagoras putat, non esse virginem Atalantam, quia cum iuvenibus per silvas vagetur. si receperimus, vereor, ne omnia quae ex facto ducuntur signa faciamus. tamen ratione qua signa tractantur.
9.13. Nor do the Areopagites, when they condemned a boy for plucking out the eyes of quails, seem to have had anything else in their mind than the consideration that such conduct was an indication of a perverted character which might prove hurtful to many, if he had been allowed to grow up. So, too, the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was regarded as an indication that they were aiming at supreme power.
9.13. mihi videntur Areopagitae, cum damnaverint puerum coturnicum oculos eruentem, aliud iudicasse quam id signum esse perniciosissimae mentis multisque malo futurae, si adolevisset. Spurii Maelii Marcique Manlii popularitas signum adfectati regni est existimatum.
9.14. However, I fear that this line of reasoning will carry us too far. For if it is an indication of adultery that a woman bathes with men, the fact that she revels with young men or even an intimate friendship will also be indications of the same offence. Again depilation, a voluptuous gait, or womanish attire may be regarded as indications of effeminacy and unmanliness by anyone who thinks that such symptoms are the result of an immoral character, just as blood is the result of a wound: for anything, that springs from the matter under investigation and comes to our notice, may properly be called an indication.
9.14. vereor, ne longe nimium nos ducat haec via. si est signum adulterae lavari cum viris, erit et convivere cum adolescentibus, deinde etiam familiariter alicuius amicitia uti; fortasse corpus vulsum, fractum incessum, vestem muliebrem dixerit mollis et parum viri signa, si cui (cum signum id proprie sit, quod ex eo, de quo quaeritur, natum sub oculos venit) ut sanguis e caede, ita illa ex impudicitia fluere videantur.
9.15. Similarly it is also usual to give the names of signs to frequently observed phenomena, such as prognostics of the weather which we may illustrate by the VergilianFor wind turns Phoebe's face to ruddy goldandThe crowWith full voice, good-for-naught, invites the rain.If these phenomena are caused by the state of the atmosphere, such an appellation is correct enough.
9.15. quoque quae, quia plerumque observata sunt, vulgo signa creduntur, ut prognostica. rubet aurea Phoebe et plena pluviam vocat improba voce, si causas ex qualitate caeli trahunt, sane ita appellentur.
9.16. For if tile moon turns red owing to the wind, her hue is certainly a sign of wind. And if, as the same poet infers, the condensation and rarification of the atmosphere causes that “concert of bird-voices” of which he speaks, we may agree in regarding it as a sign. We may further note that great things are sometimes indicated by trivial signs, witness the Vergilian crow; that trivial events should be indicated by signs of greater importance is of course no matter for wonder.
9.16. si vento rubet luna, signum venti est rubor. si, ut idem poeta colligit, densatus et laxatus aer facit, ut sit inde ille avium concentus, idem sentiemus. autem signa etiam parva magnorum, ut vel haec ipsa cornix; nam maiora minorum esse, nemo miratur.
10.1. I now turn to arguments, the name under which we comprise the ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, and ἀποδείξεις of the Greeks, terms which, in spite of their difference, have much the same meaning. For the enthymeme (which we translate by commentun or commentatio, there being no alternative, though we should be wiser to use the Greek name) has three meanings: firstly it means anything conceived in the mind (this is not however the sense of which I am now speaking);
10.1. de argumentis. enim nomine complectimur omnia, quae Graeci ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, ἀποδείξεις, vocant, quanquam apud illos est aliqua horum nominum differentia, etiamsi vis eodem fere tendit. enthymema (quod nos commentum sane aut commentationem interpretemur, quia aliter non possumus, Graeco melius usuri) unum intellectum habet, quo omnia mente concepta significat (sed nunc non de eo loquimur); alterum, quo sententiam cum ratione;
10.2. secondly it signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an argument drawn either from denial of consequents or from incompatibles; although there is some controversy on this point. For there are some who style a conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it will be found that the majority hold the view that an epicheireme is a conclusion from incompatibles: wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argument from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism, since such precision is not specially required by the orator.
10.2. tertium, quo certam quandam argumenti conclusionem vel ex consequentibus vel ex repugnantibus, quanquam de hoc parum convenit. enim, qui illud prius epichirema dicant, pluresque invenias in ea opinione, ut id demum, quod pugna constat, enthymema accipi velint, et ideo illud Cornificius contrarium appellat.
10.3. Valgius translates ἐπιχείρημα by aggressio, that is an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be truer to say that it is not our handling of the subject, but the thing itself which we attempt which should be called an ἐπιχείρημα, that is to say the argument by which we try to prove something and which, even if it has not yet been stated in so many words, has been clearly conceived by the mind.
10.3. alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii imperfectum syllogismum vocaverunt, quia nec distinctis nec totidem partibus concluderetur; quod sane non utique ab oratore desideratur. Valgius aggressionem vocat; verius autem iudico, non nostram administrationem sed ipsam rem quam aggredimur, id est argumentum, quo aliquid probaturi sumus, etiamsi nondum verbis explanatum, iam tamen mente conceptum, epichirema dici.
10.5. Others regard it not as an attempted or imperfect proof, but a complete proof, falling under the most special species of proof; consequently, according to its proper and most generally received appellation it must be understood in the sense of a definite conception of some thought consisting of at least three parts. Some call an ἐπιχείρημα a reason, but Cicero is more correct in calling it a reasoning, although he too seems to derive this name from the syllogism rather than anything else; for he calls the syllogistic basis a ratiocinative basis and quotes philosophers to support him.
10.5. videtur non destinata vel inchoata, sed perfecta probatio hoc nomen accipere, ultima specie; ideoque propria eius appellatio et maxime in usu est posita, qua significatur certa quaedam sententiae comprehensio, quae ex tribus minimum partibus constat.
10.6. And since there is a certain kinship between a syllogism and an epicheireme, it may be thought that he was justified in his use of the latter term. An ἀπόδεξις is a clear proof; hence the use of the term γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις, “linear demonstrations” by the geometricians. Caecilius holds that it differs from the epicheireme solely in the kind of conclusion arrived at and that an apodeixis is simply an incomplete epicheireme for the same reason that we said an enthymeme differed from a syllogism. For an epicheireme is also part of a syllogism. Some think that an apodeixis is portion of an epicheireme, namely the part containing the proof.
10.6. epichirema rationem appellarunt, Cicero melius ratiocinationem, quanquam et ille nomen hoc duxisse magis a syllogismo videtur. et statum syllogisticum ratiocinativum appellat, exemplisque utitur philosophorum. quoniam est quaedam inter syllogismum et epichirema vicinitas, potest videri hoc nomine recte abusus. Ἀπόδειξις est evidens probatio, ideoque apud Geometras γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις dicuntur Hanc et ab epichiremate Caecilius putat differre solo genere conclusionis et esse apodixin imperfectum epichirema eadem causa, qua diximus enthymema syllogismo distare. et epichirema syllogismi pars est. inesse epichiremati apodixin putant et esse partem eius confirmantem.
10.8. But all authorities, however much they may differ on other points, define both in the same way, in so far as they call both a method of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain. Indeed this is the nature of all arguments, for what is certain cannot be proved by what is uncertain. To all these forms of argument the Greeks give the name of πίστεις, a term which, though the literal translation is fides “a warrant of credibility,” is best translated by probatio “proof.” But argument has several other meanings.
10.8. autem quanquam diversi auctores eodem modo finiunt, ut sit ratio per ea, quae certa sunt, fidem dubiis adferens; quae natura est omnium argumentorum, neque enim certa incertis declarantur. omnia generaliter πίστεις appellant, quod etiamsi propria interpretatione dicere fidem possumus, apertius tamen probationem interpretabimur. argumentum quoque plura significat.
10.9. For the plots of plays composed for acting in the theatre are called arguments, while Pedianus, when explaining the themes of the speeches of Cicero, says The argument is as follows. Cicero himself in writing to Brutus says, Fearing that I might transfer something from that source to my Cato, although the argument is quite different. It is thus clear that all subjects for writing are so called.
10.9. et fabulae ad actum scenarum compositae argumenta dicuntur, et orationum Ciceronis velut thema ipse exponens Pedianus,, inquit, tale est; et ipse Cicero ad Brutum ita scribit: ueritus fortasse, ne nos in Catonem nostrum transferremus illinc aliquid, etsi argumentum simile non erat. apparet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiam ita appellari.
10.10. Nor is this to be wondered at, since the term is also in common use among artists; hence the Vergilian phrase A mighty argument. Again a work which deals with a number of different themes is called “rich in argument.” But the sense with which we are now concerned is that which provides proof Celsus indeed treats the terms, proof, indication, credibility, attempt, simply as different names for the same things, in which, to my thinking, he betrays a certain confusion of thought.
10.10. mirum, cum id inter opifices quoque vulgatum sit, unde Vergilius, ingens; vulgoque paulo numerosius opus dicitur argumentosum. nunc de eo dicendum argumento est, quod probationem praestat. Celsus quidem probationem, indicium, fidem, adgressionem eiusdem rei nomina facit, parum distincte, ut arbitror.
10.11. For proof and credibility are not merely the result of logical processes, but may equally be secured by inartificial arguments. Now I have already distinguished signs or, as he prefers to call them, indications from arguments. Consequently, since an argument is a process of reasoning which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain, there must needs be something in every case which requires no proof.
10.11. probatio et fides efficitur non tantum per haec quae sunt rationis, sed etiam per inartificialia. autem, quod ille indicium vocat, ab argumentis iam separavi., cum sit argumentum ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat, necesse est esse aliquid in causa, quod probatione non egeat.
10.12. Otherwise there will be nothing by which we can prove anything; there must be something which either is or is believed to be true, by means of which doubtful things may be rendered credible. We may regard as certainties, first, those things which we perceive by the senses, things for instance that we hear or see, such as signs or indications; secondly, those things about which there is general agreement, such as the existence of the gods or the duty of loving one's parents;
10.12. nihil erit quo probemus, nisi fuerit quod aut sit verum aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat. certis autem habemus primum, quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae uidemus, audimus, qualia sunt signa; deinde ea, in quae communi opinione consensum est, deos esse, praestandam pietatem parentibus;
10.13. thirdly, those things which are established by law or have passed into current usage, if not throughout the whole world, at any rate in the nation or state where the case is being pleaded—there are for instance many rights which rest not on law, but on custom; finally, there are the things which are admitted by either party, and whatever has already been proved or is not disputed by our adversary.
10.13. praeterea, quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione etiamsi non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis, in qua res agitur, in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed moribus constant; si quid inter utramque partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicunque adversarius non contradicit. enim fiet argumentum, providentia mundus regatur, administranda respublica est;
10.14. Thus for instance it may be argued that since the world is governed by providence, the state should similarly be governed by some controlling power: it follows that the state must be so governed, once it is clear that the world is governed by providence.
10.14. sequitur ut administranda respublica sit, si liquebit mundum prouidentia regi.
10.15. Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments or εἰκότα as the Greeks call them.
10.15. etiam nota esse recte argumenta tractaturo vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat; hinc enim sunt, quae εἰκότα dicuntur.
10.16. With regard to credibility there are three degrees. First, the highest, based on what usually happens, as for instance the assumption that children are loved by their parents. Secondly, there is the highly probable, as for instance the assumption that a man in the enjoyment of good health will probably live till to-morrow. The third degree is found where there is nothing absolutely against an assumption, such as that a theft committed in a house was the work of one of the household.
10.16. autem genera sunt tria: unum firmissimum, quia fere accidit, ut liberos a parentibus amari; alterum velut propensius, eum qui recte valeat in crastinum perventurum; tertium tantum non repugnans, in domo furtum factum ab eo qui domi fuit.
10.17. Consequently Aristotle in the second book of his Rhetoric has made a careful examination of all that commonly happens to things and persons, and what things and persons are naturally adverse or friendly to other things or persons, as for instance, what is the natural result of wealth or ambition or superstition, what meets with the approval of good men, what is the object of a soldier's or a farmer's desires, and by what means everything is sought or shunned.
10.17. Aristoteles in secundo de Arte Rhetorica libro diligentissime est exsecutus, quid cuique rei et quid cuique homini soleret accidere, et quas res quosque homines quibus rebus aut hominibus vel conciliasset vel alienasset ipsa natura: ut divitias quid sequatur aut ambitum aut superstitionem, quid boni probent, quid mali petant, quid milites, quid rustici, quo quaeque modo res vitari vel appeti soleat. hoc exsequi mitto;
10.18. For my part I do not propose to pursue this subject. It is not merely a long, but an impossible or rather an infinite task; moreover it is within the compass of the common understanding of mankind. If, however, anyone wishes to pursue the subject, I have indicated where he may apply.
10.18. non enim longum tantum, sed etiam impossibile aut potius infinitum est, praeterea positum in communi omnium intellectu. quis tamen desideraverit, a quo peteret, ostendi. autem credibilia, in quibus pars maxima consistit argumentationis, ex huiusmodi fontibus fluunt: an credibile sit a filio patrem occisum, incestum cum filia commissum;
10.19. But all credibility, and it is with credibility that the great majority of arguments are concerned, turns on questions such as the following: whether it is credible that a father has been killed by his son, or that a father has committed incest with his daughter, or to take questions of an opposite character, whether it is credible that a stepmother has poisoned her stepchild, or that a man of luxurious life has committed adultery; or again whether a crime has been openly committed, or false evidence given for a small bribe, since each of these crimes is the result of a special cast of character as a rule, though not always; if it were always so, there would be no room for doubt, and no argument.
10.19. et contra, veneficium in noverca, adulterium in luxurioso; illa quoque, an scelus palam factum, an falsum propter exiguam summam, quia suos quidque horum velut mores habet, plerumque tamen, non semper; alioqui indubitata essent, non argumenta.
10.20. Let us now turn to consider the “places” of arguments, although some hold that they are identical with the topics which I have already discussed above. But I do not use this term in its usual acceptance, namely, commonplaces directed against luxury, adultery, and the like, but in the sense of the secret places where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth. For just as all kinds of produce are not provided by every country, and as you will not succeed in finding a particular bird or beast, if you are ignorant of the localities where it has its usual haunts or birthplace, as even the various kinds of fish flourish in different surroundings, some preferring a smooth and others a rocky bottom, and are found on different shores and in divers regions (you will for instance never catch a sturgeon or wrasse in Italian waters), so not every kind of argument can be derived from every circumstance, and consequently our search requires discrimination.
10.20. nunc argumentorum locos; quanquam quibusdam hi quoque, de quibus supra dixi, videntur. appello non, ut vulgo nunc intelliguntur, in luxuriam et adulterium et similia; sed sedes argumentorum, in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda., ut in terra non omni generantur omnia, nec avem aut feram reperias, ubi quaeque nasci aut morari soleat ignarus, et piscium quoque genera alia planis gaudent alia saxosis, regionibus etiam litoribusque discreta sunt, nec helopem nostro mari aut scarum ducas, ita non omne argumentum undique venit ideoque non passim quaerendum est.
10.22. Otherwise we shall fall into serious error, and after wasting our labour through lack of method we shall fail to discover the argument which we desire, unless assisted by some happy chance. But if we know the circumstances which give rise to each kind of argument, we shall easily see, when we come to a particular “place,” what arguments it contains.
10.22. alioqui error est; exhausto labore, quod non ratione scrutabimur, non poterimus invenire nisi casu. si scierimus, ubi quodque nascatur, cum ad locum ventum erit, facile quod in eo est pervidebimus.
10.23. Firstly, then, arguments may be drawn from persons; for, as I have already said, all arguments fall into two classes, those concerned with things and those concerned with persons, since causes, time, place, occasion, instruments, means and the like are all accidents of things. I have no intention of tracing all the accidents of persons, as many have done, but shall confine myself to those from which arguments may be drawn.
10.23. primis igitur argumenta a persona ducenda sunt; cum sit, ut dixi, divisio, ut omnia in haec duo partimur, res atque personas, ut causa, tempus, locus, occasio, instrumentum, modus et cetera, rerum sint accidentia. autem non quidquid accidit exsequendum mihi est, ut plerique fecerunt, sed unde argumenta sumi possunt.
10.24. Such are birth, for persons are generally regarded as having some resemblance to their parents and ancestors, a resemblance which sometimes leads to their living disgracefully or honourably, as the case may be; then there is nationality, for races have their own character, and the same action is not probable in the case of a barbarian, a Roman and a Greek;
10.24. porro sunt, genus, nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque creduntur, et nonnunquam ad honeste turpiterque vivendum inde causae fluunt; natio, nam et gentibus proprii mores sunt, nec idem in barbaro, Romano, Graeco probabile est;
10.25. country is another, for there is a like diversity in the laws, institutions and opinions of different states; sex, since for example a man is more likely to commit a robbery, a woman to poison; age, since different actions suit different ages; education and training, since it makes a great difference who were the instructors and what the method of instruction in each individual case;
10.25. patria, quia similiter etiam civitatum leges, instituta, opiniones habent differentiam; sexus, ut latrocinium facilius in viro, veneficium in femina credas; aetas, quia aliud aliis annis magis convenit; educatio et disciplina, quoniam refert, a quibus et quo quisque modo sit institutus; habitus corporis, ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae, his contraria in diversum;
10.26. bodily constitution, for beauty is often introduced as an argument for lust, strength as an argument for insolence, and their opposites for opposite conduct; fortune, since the same acts are not to be expected from rich and poor, or from one who is surrounded by troops of relations, friends or clients and one who lacks all these advantages; condition, too, is important, for it makes a great difference whether a man be famous or obscure, a magistrate or a private individual, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, a free man or a slave, married or unmarried, a father or childless.
10.26. fortuna, neque enim idem credibile est in divite ac paupere, propinquis amicis clientibus abundante et his omnibus destitute; condicionis etiam distantia, nam clarus an obscurus, magistratus an privatus, pater an filius, civis an peregrinus, liber an servus, maritus an caelebs, parens liberorum an orbus sit, plurimum distat; animi natura, etenim avaritia, iracundia, misericordia, crudelitas, severitas aliaque his similia adferunt frequenter fidem aut detrahunt, sicut victus luxuriosus an frugi an sordidus, quaeritur;
10.27. Nor must we pass by natural disposition, for avarice, anger, pity, cruelty, severity and the like may often be adduced to prove the credibility or the reverse of a given act; it is for instance often asked whether a man's way of living be luxurious, frugal or parsimonious. Then there is occupation, since a rustic, a lawyer, a man of business, a soldier, a sailor, a doctor all perform very different actions. We must also consider the personal ambitions of individuals, for instance whether they wish to be thought rich or eloquent, just or powerful. Past life and previous utterances are also a subject for investigation, since we are in the habit of inferring the present from the past. To these some add passion, by which they mean some temporary emotion such as anger or fear; they also add design, which may refer to the past, present or future.
10.27. studia quoque, nam rusticus, forensis, negotiator, miles, navigator, medicus aliud atque aliud efficiunt. etiam, quid adfectet quisque, locuples videri an disertus, iustus an potens. ante acta dictaque, ex praeteritis enim aestimari solent praesentia. adiiciunt quidam commotionem; hanc accipi volunt temporarium animi motum, sicut iram, pavorem;
10.29. These latter, however, although accidents of persons, should be referred to that class of arguments which we draw from causes, as also should certain dispositions of mind, for example when we inquire whether one man is the friend or enemy of another.
10.29. consilia autem et praesentis et praeteriti et futuri temporis; quae mihi, etiamsi personis accidunt, per se referenda tamen ad illam partem argumentorum videntur, quam ex causis ducimus; sicut habitus quidam animi, quo tractatur, amicus an inimicus. in persona et nomen;
10.30. Names also are treated as accidents of persons; this is perfectly true, but names are rarely food for argument, unless indeed they have been given for some special reasons, such as the titles of Wise, Great, Pious, or unless the name has suggested some special thought to the bearer. Lentulus for instance had the idea of conspiracy suggested to him by the fact that according to the Sibylline books and the Responses of the soothsayers the tyranny was promised to three members of the Cornelian family, and he considered himself to be the third in succession to Sulla and Cinna, since he too bore the name Cornelius.
10.30. quod quidem ei accidere necesse est, sed in argumentum raro cadit, nisi cum aut ex causa datum est, ut Sapiens, Magnus, Pius; aut et ipsum alicuius cogitationis attulit causam, ut Lentulo coniurationis, quod libris Sibyllinis aruspicumque responsis dominatio dari tribus Corneliis dicebatur, seque eum tertium esse credebat post Sullam Cinnamque, quia et ipse Cornelius erat. et illud apud Euripidem frigidum sane, quod nomen Polynicis, ut argumentum morum, frater incessit.
10.31. On tile other hand the conceit employed by Euripides where he makes Eteocles taunt his brother Polynices on the ground that his name is evidence of character, is feeble in the extreme. Still a name will often provide the subject for a jest, witness the frequent jests of Cicero on the name of Verres. Such, then, and the like are the accidents of persons. It is impossible to deal with them all either here or in other portions of this work, and I must content myself with pointing out the lines on which further enquiry should proceed.
10.31. tamen ex eo frequens materia, qua Cicero in Verrem non semel usus est. fere circa personas sunt aut his similia. enim complecti omnia vel hac in parte vel in ceteris possumus, contenti rationem plura quaesituris ostendere.
10.32. I now pass to things: of these actions are the most nearly connected with persons and must therefore be treated first. In regard to every action the question arises either Why or Where or When or How or By what means the action is performed.
10.32. ad res transeo, in quibus maxime sunt personis iuncta, quae agimus, ideoque prima tractanda. omnibus porro, quae fiunt, quaeritur aut Quare? aut Ubi? aut Quando? aut Quomodo? aut Per quae facta sunt?
10.33. Consequently arguments are drawn from the causes of past or future actions. The matter of these causes, by some called ὕλη, by others δύναμις, falls into two genera, which are each divided into four species. For the motive for any action is as a rule concerned with the acquisition, increase, preservation and use of things that are good or with the avoidance, diminution, endurance of things that are evil or with escape there from. All these considerations carry great weight in deliberative oratory as well.
10.33. igitur argumenta ex causis factorum vel futurorum; quarum materiam, quam quidam ὕλην, alii δύναμιν nominaverunt, in duo genera, sed quaternas utriusque dividunt species. fere versatur ratio faciendi circa bonorum adeptionem, incrementum, conservationem, usum, aut malorum evitationem, liberationem, imminutionem, tolerantiam;
10.34. But right actions have right motives, while evil actions are the result of false opinions, which originate in the things which men believe to be good or evil. Hence spring errors and evil passions such as anger, hatred, envy, desire, hope, ambition, audacity, fear and others of a similar kind. To these accidental circumstances may often be added, such as drunkenness or ignorance, which serve sometimes to excuse and sometimes to prove a charge, as for instance when a man is said to have killed one person while lying in wait for another. Further, motives are often discussed not merely to convict the accused of the offence with which he is charged, but also to defend him when he contends that his action was right, that is to say proceeded from an honourable motive, a theme of which I have spoken more fully in the third book.
10.34. quae et in deliberando plurimum valent. honestas causas habent recta, prava contra ex falsis opinionibus veniunt. est his initium ex iis, quae credunt bona aut mala; inde errores existunt et pessimi adfectus, in quibus sunt ira, odium, invidia, cupiditas, spes, ambitus, audacia, metus, cetera generis eiusdem. aliquando fortuita, ebrietas, ignorantia, quae interim ad veniam valent, interim ad probationem criminis, ut si quis, dum alii insidiatur, alium dicitur interemisse. porro non ad convincendum modo, quod obiicitur, sed ad defendendum quoque excuti solent, cum quis se recte fecisse, id est honesta causa, contendit; qua de re latius in tertio libro dictum est.
10.36. Questions of definition are also at times intimately connected with motives. Is a man a tyrannicide if he kills a tyrant by whom he has been detected in the act of adultery? Or is lie guilty of sacrilege who tore down arms dedicated in a temple to enable him to drive the enemy from the city?
10.36. quoque quaestiones ex causis interim pendent. tyrannicida, qui tyrannum, a quo deprehensus in adulterio fuerat, occidit? sacrilegus, qui, ut hostes urbe expelleret, arma templo adfixa detraxit?
10.37. Arguments are also drawn from place. With a view to proving our facts we consider such questions as whether a place is hilly or level, near the coast or inland, planted or uncultivated, crowded or deserted, near or far, suitable for carrying out a given design or the reverse. This is a topic which is treated most carefully by Cicero in his pro Milone.
10.37. argumenta et ex loco. enim ad fidem probationis, montanus an planus, maritimus an mediterraneus, consitus an incultus, frequens an desertus, propinquus an remotus, opportunus consiliis an adversus; quam partem videmus vehementissime pro Milone tractasse Ciceronem.
10.38. These points and the like generally refer to questions of fact, but occasionally to questions of law as well. For we may ask whether a place is public or private, sacred or profane, our own or another's, just as where persons are concerned we ask whether a man is a magistrate, a father, a foreigner.
10.38. haec quidem ac similia ad coniecturam frequentius pertinent, sed interim ad ius quoque: privatus an publicus, sacer an profanus, noster an alienus; ut in persona, magistratus, pater, peregrinus. enim quaestiones oriuntur:
10.39. Hence arise such questions as the following. “You have stolen private money, but since you stole it from a temple, it is not theft but sacrilege.” You have killed adulterers, an act permitted by law, but since the act was done in a brothel, it is murder. "You have committed an assault, but since the object of your assault was a magistrate, the crime is lèse-majesté.
10.39. pecuniam sustulisti; uerum quia de templo, non furtum sed sacrilegium est. adulterum, quod lex permittit; sed quia in lupanari, caedes est. fecisti; sed quia magistratui, maiestatis actio est.
10.40. Similarly it may be urged in defence, “The act was lawful, because I was a father, a magistrate.” But such points afford matter for argument when there is a controversy as to the facts, and matter for enquiry when the dispute turns on a point of law. Place also frequently affects the quality of an action, for the same action is not always lawful or seemly under all circumstances, while it makes considerable difference in what state the enquiry is taking place, for they differ both in custom and law.
10.40. contra:, quia pater eram, quia magistratus. circa facti controuersiam argumenta praestant, circa iuris lites materiam quaestionum. qualitatem quoque frequenter pertinet locus, neque enim idem ubique aut licet aut decorum est; quin etiam in qua quidque civitate quaeratur interest, moribus enim et legibus distant.
10.41. Further arguments drawn from place may serve to secure approval or the reverse. Ajax for instance in Ovid says:—What! do we plead our cause before the ships?And is Ulysses there preferred to me?Again one of the many charges brought against Milo was that he killed Clodius on the monument of his ancestors.
10.41. commendationem quoque et invidiam valet. et Aiax apud Ovidium: rates, inquit, agimus causam, et mecum confertur Ulixes? Miloni inter cetera obiectum est, quod Clodius in monumentis ab eo maiorum suorum esset occisus.
10.42. Such arguments may also carry weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn from time, which I shall now proceed to discuss. Time may, as I have said elsewhere, be understood in two different senses, general and special. The first sense is seen in words and phrases such as “now,” “formerly,” “in the reign of Alexander,” “in the days of the siege of Troy,” and whenever we speak of past, present or future. The second sense occurs when we speak either of definite periods of time such as “in summer,” “in winter,” “by night,” “by day,” or of fortuitous periods such as “in time of pestilence,” “in time of war,” “during a banquet.”
10.42. suadendi momenta idem valet, sicut tempus, cuius tractatum subiungam. autem, ut alio loco iam dixi, duplex significatio est; generaliter enim et specialiter accipitur. illud est:—nunc, olim, sub Alexandro, cum apud Ilium pugnatum est, denique praeteritum, instans, futurum. sequens habet et constituta discrimina:—aestate, hieme, noctu, interdiu; et fortuita:—in pestilentia, in bello, in convivio.
10.43. Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense “time,” and the special “times.” In both senses time is of importance in advisory speeches and demonstrative oratory, but not so frequently as in forensic.
10.43. Latinorum quidam satis significari putaverunt, si illud generale tempus, hoc speciale tempora vocarent. utrorumque ratio et in consiliis quidem et in illo demonstrativo genere versatur, sed in iudiciis frequentissima est.
10.44. For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable proofs, which may be illustrated by a case which I have already cited, when one of the signatories to a document has died before the day on which it was signed, or when a person is accused of the commission of some crime, although he was only an infant at the time or not yet born.
10.44. et iuris quaestiones facit et qualitatem distinguit et ad coniecturam plurimum confert: ut cum interim probationes inexpugnabiles adferat, quales sunt, si dicatur (ut supra posui) signator, qui ante diem tabularum decessit, aut commisisse aliquid, vel cum infans esset vel cum omnino natus non esset;
10.45. Further, all kinds of arguments may easily be drawn either from facts previous to a certain act, or contemporary or subsequent. As regards antecedent facts the following example will illustrate my meaning; “You threatened to kill him, you went out by night, you started before him.” Motives of actions may also belong to past time.
10.45. praeter id, quod omnia facile argumenta aut ex iis, quae ante rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei aut insequentibus ducuntur. antecedentibus: minatus es, noctu existi, proficiscentem antecessisti; causae quoque factorum praeteriti sunt temporis.
10.46. Some writers have shown themselves over-subtle in their classification of the second class of circumstances, making “a sound was heard” an example of circumstances combined with an act and “a shout was raised” an instance of circumstances attached to an act. As regards subsequent circumstances I may cite accusations such as “You hid yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared on the corpse.” The counsel for the defence will employ the same divisions of time to discredit the charge which is brought against him.
10.46. tempus subtilius quidam, quam necesse erat, diviserunt, ut esset iuncti auditus est; adhaerentis sublatus est. sunt illa, profugisti, livores et tumores apparuerunt. temporum gradibus defensor utetur ad detrahendam ei quod obiicitur fidem.
10.47. In these considerations are included everything in connexion with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. For some things are done because something else is like to follow, and others because something else has previously been done, as for instance, when the husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought her after she was found guilty of adultery, or when a debauched character is accused of parricide on the ground that he said to his father “You have rebuked me for the last time.” For in the former case the accused is not a procurer because he bought the woman, but bought her because he was a procurer, while in the latter the accused is not a parricide because he used these words, but used them because lie intended to kill his father.
10.47. his omnis factorum dictorumque ratio versatur, sed dupliciter. fiunt quaedam quia aliud postea futurum est, quaedam quia aliud ante factum est: ut, cum obiicitur reo lenocinii, speciosae marito, quod adulterii damnatam quondam emerit; aut parricidii reo luxurioso, quod dixerit patri, amplius me obiurgabis. et ille non quia emit leno est, sed quia leno erat emit; nec hic, quia sic erat locutus, occidit, sed, quia erat occisurus, sic locutus est.
10.48. With regard to accidental circumstances, which also provide matter for arguments, these clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distinguished by a certain special quality, as for instance if I should say, “Scipio was a better general than Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal”; “He was a good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked”; “He was a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests”; or referring to bad qualities, “He was a prodigal, for he squandered his patrimony”; “His life was disgraceful, for he was hated by all.”
10.48. autem, qui et ipse praestat argumentis locum, sine dubio est ex insequentibus, sed quadam proprietate distinguitur, ut si dicam: dux Scipio quam Hannibal; vicit Hannibalem. gubernator; nunquam fecit naufragium. agricola; magnos sustulit fructus. contra: fuit; patrimonium exhausit. vixit; omnibus invisus est.
10.49. We must also consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned, more especially when dealing with questions of fact; for it is more credible that a smaller number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while the converse arguments may be used to prove the opposite.
10.49. sunt praecipueque in coniecturis et facultates; credibilius est enim occisos a pluribus pauciores, a firmioribus imbecilliores, a vigilantibus dormientes, a praeparatis inopinantes;
10.50. Such considerations arise both in deliberative and forensic oratory: in the latter they occur in relation to two questions, namely, whether some given person had the will, and whether lie had the power to do the deed; for hope will often create the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in Cicero: “Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, while Milo was with a party of women; Clodius was mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, Milo hampered by a cloak.”
10.50. quorum contraria in diversum valent. et in deliberando intuemur, et in iudiciis ad duas res solemus referre, an voluerit quis, an potuerit; nam et voluntatem spes facit. illa apud Ciceronem coniectura, est Clodius Miloni, non Milo Clodio; ille cum servis robustis, hic cum mulierum comitatu, ille equis, hic in raeda, ille expeditus, hic paenula irretitus.
10.51. With resources we may couple instruments, which form part of resources and means. But sometimes instruments will provide us with indications as well, as for instance if we find a javelin sticking in a dead body.
10.51. autem licet instrumentum coniungere; sunt enim in parte facultatis et copiae. ex instrumento aliquando etiam signa nascuntur, ut spiculum in corpore inventum.
10.52. To these we may add manner, the Greek τρόπος, in regard to which we ask how a thing was done. Manner is concerned sometimes with quality and the letter of the law (we may for instance argue that it was unlawful to kill an adulterer by poison), sometimes with questions of fact, as for example if I argue that an act was committed with a good intent and therefore openly, or with a bad intent and therefore treacherously, by night, in a lonely place. In all cases, however, in which we enquire into the nature and meaning of an act, and which can be considered by themselves apart from all considerations of persons and all else that gives rise to the actual cause, there are clearly three points to which we must give attention, namely Whether it is, What it is and Of what kind it is. But as there are certain “places” of argument which are common to all three questions, this triple division is impracticable and we must therefore consider these questions rather in connexion with those “places” in which they most naturally arise.
10.52. adiicitur modus, quem τρόπον dicunt, quo quaeritur, quemadmodum quid sit factum. tum ad qualitatem scriptumque pertinet, ut si negemus adulterum veneno licuisse occidere, tum ad coniecturas quoque, ut si dicam bona mente factum, ideo palam; mala, ideo ex insidiis, nocte, in solitudine. rebus autem omnibus, de quarum vi ac natura quaeritur, quasque etiam citra complexum personarum ceterorumque ex quibus fit causa, per se intueri possumus, tria sine dubio rursus spectanda sunt, sit, Quid sit, Quale sit., quia sunt quidam loci argumentorum omnibus communes, dividi haec tria genera non possunt, ideoque locis potius, ut in quosque incurrent, subiicienda sunt.
10.54. Arguments, then, may be drawn from definition, sometimes called finitio and sometimes finis. Definition is of two kinds. We may ask whether a particular quality is a virtue or make a definition precede and ask what is the nature of a virtue. Such a definition is either stated in general terms, such as Rhetoric is the science of speaking well, or in detail, such as Rhetoric is the science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, coupled with a retentive memory and a dignified delivery. Further, we may define a word by giving its content as in the preceding instances, or by etymology: we may for instance explain assiduus by deriving it from as and do, locuples by deriving it from copia locorum, pecuniosus from copiapecorum.
10.54. ergo argumenta ex finitione seu fine; nam utroque modo traditur. duplex ratio est; aut enim simpliciter quaeritur, sitne hoc virtus; aut praecedente finitione, quid sit virtus. aut universum verbis complectimur, ut est bene dicendi scientia; aut per partes, ut est inveniendi recte et disponendi et eloquendi cum, firma memoria et cum dignitate actionis scientia.
10.55. Genus, species, difference and property seem more especially to afford scope for definition, for we derive arguments from all of these. Genus is of little use when we desire to prove a species, but of great value for its elimination. A tree is not necessarily a plane tree, but that which is not a tree is certainly not a plane tree; again, a virtue is not necessarily the virtue of justice, but that which is not a virtue is certainly not justice. We must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species; for example, to say that man is an animal will not suffice; for animal merely gives us the genus: nor yet will the addition of the words “subject to death” be adequate; for although this epithet gives us a species, it is common to other animals as well. If, however, we define man as a rational animal, we need nothing further to make our meaning clear.
10.55. finimus aut vi, sicut superiora, aut ἐτυμολογίᾳ, ut si assiduum ab asse dando, et locupletem a locorum, pecuniosum a pecorum copia. subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, differens, proprium; ex iis omnibus argumenta ducuntur. ad probandam speciem minimum valet, plurimum ad refellendam. non, quia est arbor, platanus est, at quod non est arbor, utique platanus non est; nec quod virtus est, utique iustitia est, at quod non est virtus, utique non potest esse iustitia. Itaque a genere perveniendum ad ultimam species: ut est animal non est satis, id enim genus est; mortale, etiamsi est species, cum aliis tamen communis finitio; rationale, nihil supererit ad demonstrandum id quod velis. species firmam probationem habet generis, infirmam refutationem., quod iustitia est, utique virtus est;
10.57. On the other hand species will give us clear proof of genus, but is of little service for its elimination. For example, justice is always a virtue, but that which is not justice may still be a virtue, such as fortitude, constancy or self-control. Genus therefore cannot be eliminated by species unless all the species included in the genus be eliminated, as for instance in the following sentence: That which is neither rational nor mortal nor an animal is not a man.
10.57. quod non est iustitia, potest esse virtus, si est fortitudo, constantia, continentia. itaque tolletur a specie genus, nisi ut omnes species, quae sunt generi subiectae, removeantur, hoc modo, nec rationale nec morale est neque animal, homo non est.
10.58. To these they add property and difference. Properties serve to establish definitions, differences to overthrow them. A property is that which happens to one particular object and that alone; speech and laughter for instance are properties of man. Or it may be something specially belonging to an object, but not to it alone; heating for instance is a property of fire. The same thing may also have a number of properties: light and heat are both properties of fire. Consequently, the omission of any property in a definition will impair it, but the introduction of a property, whatever it may be, will not necessarily establish a definition.
10.58. adiiciunt propria et differentia. confirmatur finitio, differentibus solvitur Proprium autem est aut quod soli accidit, ut homini sermo, risus; aut quidquid utique accidit sed non soli, ut igni calfacere. sunt eiusdem rei plura propria, ut ipsius ignis lucere, calere., quodcunque proprium deerit, solvit finitionem; non utique, quodcunque erit, confirmat.
10.59. We have, however, often to consider what is a property of some given object; for example, if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, that the peculiar property of a tyrannicide is to kill tyrants, we should deny it: for an executioner is not ipso facto a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or against his will.
10.59. autem, quid sit proprium cuiusque, quaeritur: ut, si per ἐτυμολογίαν dicatur, proprium est tyrannum, occidere, negemus; non enim, si traditum sibi eum carnifex occiderit, tyrannicida dicatur, nec si imprudens vel invitus.
10.60. What is not a property will be a difference: it is, for instance, one thing to be a slave, and another to be in a state of servitude; hence the distinction raised in connexion with persons assigned to their creditors for debt: A slave, if he is manumitted becomes a freedman, but this is not the case with one who is assigned. There are also other points of difference which are dealt with elsewhere.
10.60. autem proprium non erit, differens erit, ut aliud est servum esse aliud seruire; qualis esse in addictis quaestio solet: servus est, si manu mittatur, fit libertinus, non item addictus;
10.61. Again, the term difference is applied in cases when the genus is divided into species and one species is subdivided. Animal, for instance, is a genus, mortal a species, while terrestrial or biped is a difference: for they are not actually properties, but serve to show the difference between such animals and quadrupeds or creatures of the sea. This distinction, however, comes under the province not so much of argument as of exact definition. Cicero separates genus and species, which latter he calls form, from definition and includes them under relation.
10.61. et plura, de quibus alio loco. quoque differens vocant, cum, genere in species diducto, species ipsa discernitur. genus, morale species, terrenum vel bipes differens; nondum enim proprium est sed iam differt a marino vel quadripede; quod non tam ad argumentum pertinet quam ad diligentem finitionis comprehensionem.
10.62. For example, if a person to whom another man has left all his silver should claim all his silver money as well, he would base his claim upon genus; on the other hand if when a legacy has been left to a married woman holding the position of materfamilias, it should be maintained that the legacy is not due to a woman who never came into the power of her husband, the argument is based on species, since there are two kinds of marriage. Cicero further shows that definition is assisted by division, which he distinguishes from partition, making the latter the dissection of a whole into its parts and the former the division of a genus into its forms or species.
10.62. Cicero genus et speciem, quam eandem formam vocat, a finitione deducit et iis, quae ad aliquid sunt, subiicit: ut, si is, cui argentum omne legatum est, petat signatum quoque, utatur genere; at si quis, cum legatum sit ei, quae viro mater familias esset, neget deberi ei, quae in manum non convenerit, specie; quoniam duae formae sint matrimoniorum.
10.63. The number of parts he regards as being uncertain, as for instance the elements of which a state consists; the forms or species are, however, certain, as for instance the number of forms of government, which we are told are three, democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. It is true that he does not use these illustrations, since, as he was writing to Trebatius, he preferred to draw his examples from law.
10.63. autem adiuvari finitionem docet, eamque differre a partitione, quod haec sit totius in partes, illa generis in formas; partes incertas esse, ut Quibus constet respublica; formas certas, ut Quot sint species rerum publicarum, quas tris accepimus, quae populi, quae paucorum, quae unius potestate regerentur.
10.64. I have chosen my illustrations as being more obvious. Properties have relation to questions of fact as well; for instance, it is the property of a good man to act rightly, of an angry man to be violent in speech or action, and consequently we believe that such acts are committed by persons of the appropriate character, or not committed by persons of inappropriate character. For just as certain persons possess certain qualities, so certain others do not possess certain qualities, and the argument is of precisely the same nature, though from opposite premises.
10.64. ille quidem non iis exemplis utitur, quia scribens ad Trebatium ex iure ducere ea maluit; ego apertiora posui. vero ad coniecturae quoque pertinent partem: ut, quia proprium est boni recte facere, iracundi verbis aut manu male facere, facta haec ab ipsis esse credantur aut contra. ut quaedam in quibusdam utique sunt, ita quaedam in quibusdam utique non sunt: et ratio, quamvis sit ex diverso, eadem est.
10.65. In a similar way division is valuable both for proof and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to establish one thing. “To be a citizen, a man must either have been born or made such.” For refutation, both points must be disproved: “he was neither born nor made a citizen.”
10.65. et ad probandum simili via valet et ad refellendum. interim satis est unum habere, hoc modo, sit civis, aut natus sit oportet aut factus; utrumque tollendum est, natus nec factus est.
10.66. This may be done in many ways, and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, sometimes that only that which remains alter the process of elimination is true. An example of the first of these two cases would be: “You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him.”
10.66. hoc et multiplex, idque est argumentorum genus ex remotione, quo modo efficitur totum falsum, modo id, quod relinquitur, verum. falsum est hoc modo, credidisse te dicis; aut habuisti ipse aut ab aliquo accepisti aut invenisti aut surripuisti. neque domi habuisti neque ah aliquo accepisti aut cetera, non credidisti.
10.67. The residue after elimination is shown to be true as follows: “This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another.” By the elimination of the previous suppositions he is shown to belong to another. This form of argument is risky and must be employed with care; for if, in setting forth the alternatives, we chance to omit one, our whole case will fail, and our audience will be moved to laughter. It is safer to do what Cicero does in the pro Caecina, when he asks, “If this is not the point at issue, what is?”
10.67. fit verum sic, servus, quem tibi vindicas, aut vernn tuus est aut emptus aut donatus aut testamento relictus aut ex hoste captus aut alienus; deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus. et cum cura intuendum genus, quia, si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.
10.68. For thus all other points are eliminated at one swoop. Or again two contrary propositions may be advanced, either of which if established would suffice to prove the case. Take the following example from Cicero: “There can be no one so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing: if it be a fact that the verdict then given was the result of bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either from Habitus or Oppianicus: if I show that they did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they proceeded from Oppianicus: if I demonstrate that they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus.”
10.68. , quod Cicero pro Caecina facit, cum interrogat, haec actio non sit, quae sit? simul enim removentur omnia. cum duo ponentur inter se contraria, quorum tenuisse utrumlibet sufficiat, quale Ciceronis est, quidem certe, nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio, qui mihi non concedat; si constet corruptum illud esse indicium, aut ab Habito aut ab Oppianico esse corruptum; si doceo non ab Habito, vinco ab Oppianico; si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo Habitum.
10.69. Or we may give our opponent the choice between two alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, and as a result, whichever he chooses, lie will damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro Oppio: “Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide?” and in the pro Vareno: “You have a choice between two alternatives: either you must show that the choice of this route by Varenus was due to chance or that it was the result of this man's persuasion and inducement.” He then shows that either admission tells against his opponent. Sometimes again, two propositions are stated of such a character that the admission of either involves the same conclusion, as in the sentence, “We must philosophise, even though we ought not,” or as in the common dilemma, “What is the use of a figure, if its meaning is clear?
10.69. etiam ex duobus, quorum necesse est alterum verum, eligendi adversario potestas, efficiturque, ut, utrum elegerit, noceat. hoc Cicero pro Oppio:, cum Cottam appetisset, an cum ipse sese conaretur occidere, telum e manibus ereptum est? et pro Vareno: vobis datur, utrum velitis casu illo itinere Varenum usum esse an huius persuasu et inductu. utraque facit accusatori contraria.
10.70. And what is its use, if it is unintelligible?” or, “He who is capable of enduring pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who cannot endure pain.” As there are three divisions of time, so the order of events falls into three stages. For everything has a beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance a quarrel, blows, murder. Thus arise arguments which lend each other mutual support; for the conclusion is inferred from the beginnings, as in the following case: “I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when I see that the beginning of the web is black”; or the beginning may be inferred from the conclusion: for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictatorship is an argument that Sulla did not take up arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny.
10.70. duo ita proponuntur, ut utrumlibet electum idem efficiat, quale est, est, etiamsi non est philosophandum. illud vulgatum, schema, si intelligitur? quo, si non intelligitur?, in tormentis, qui dolorem pati potest; mentietur, qui non potest. sunt autem tria tempora, ita ordo rerum tribus momentis consertus est; habent enim omnia initium, incrementum, summam, ut iurgium deinde pugna, tum caedes. ergo hic quoque argumentorum locus invicem probantium. et ex initiis summa colligitur, quale est, possum togam praetextam sperare, cum exordium pullum videam; et contra, non dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpsisse,argumentum est dictatura deposita.