10.72. Similarly from the growth of a situation we may infer either its beginning or its end, not only in questions of fact but as regards points of equity, such as whether the conclusion is referable to the beginning, that is, “Should the man that began the quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with which it ended?” Arguments are also drawn from similarities:
10.72. ex incremento in utramque partem ducitur rei ratio cum in coniectura tum etiam in tractatu aequitatis, an ad initium summa referenda sit, id est, an ei caedes imputanda sit, a quo iurgium coepit.
10.73. “If self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue.” “If a guardian should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent.” To this class belongs the type of argument called ἐπαγωγή by the Greeks, induction by Cicero. Or arguments may be drawn from unlikes: “It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing”: “It does not follow that what applies to the case of a woman applies also to the case of a ward.” Or from contraries: “Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing”: “If war is the cause of ill, peace will prove a remedy”: “If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward.”
10.73. argumentorum locus ex similibus: si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia; fidem debet tutor, et procurator. est ex eo genere, quod ἐπαγωγήν Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem. dissimilibus:, si laetitia bonum, et voluptas; Non, quod mulieri, idem pupillo. contrariis: bonum, luxuria enim malum; Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax; Si veniam meretur, qui inprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium, qui imprudens profuit.
10.74. Or from contradictions: “He who is wise is not a fool.” Or from consequences necessary or probable: “If justice is a good thing, we must give right judgment ”: “If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive.” And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong: “A man has not lost what he never had”: “A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves”: “If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection.” However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications.
10.74. pugnantibus: est sapiens, stultus non est. consequentibus sive adiunctis: bonum iustitia, est recte iudicandum; si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. retro. sunt his dissimilia ideoque huic loco subiicienda, cum et ipsa naturaliter congruant: quis non habuit, non perdidit; Quem quis amat, sciens non laedit; Quem quis heredem suum esse voluit, carum habuit, habet, habebit. cum sint indubitata, vim habent paene signorum immutabilium.
10.75. These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things.
10.75. haec consequentia dico, ἀκόλουθα; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas; illa insequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura. sum de nominibus anxius; vocet enim, ut voluerit quisque, dum vis rerum ipsa manifesta sit, appareatque hoc temporis, illud esse natura.
10.76. I have therefore no hesitation in calling the following forms of argument also consequential, although they argue from the past to the future: some however divide them into two classes, those concerned with action, as in the pro Oppio, “How could he detain against their will those whom he was unable to take to the province against their will?” and those concerned with time, as in the Verrines, “If the first of January puts an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why should the commencement of its authority not likewise date from the first of January?”
10.76. non dubito haec quoque vocare consequentia, quamvis ex prioribus dent argumentum ad ea quae sequuntur, quorum duas quidam species esse voluerunt: actionis, ut pro Oppio, educere inuitos in provinciam non potuit, eos invitos retinere qui potuit? temporis, in Verrem, Si finem praetoris edicto adferunt Kalendae Ian., cur non initium quoque edicti nascatur a Kalendis Ian.?
10.77. Both these instances are of such a nature that the argument is reversible. For it is a necessary consequence that those who could not be taken to the province against their will could not be retained against their will.
10.77. utrumque exemplum tale est, ut idem in diversum, si retro agas, valeat. enim est, eos, qui inviti duci non potuerint, invitos non potuisse retineri.
10.78. So too I feel clear that we should rank as consequential arguments those derived from facts which lend each other mutual support and are by some regarded as forming a separate kind of argument, which they call ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, arguments from things mutually related, while Cicero styles them arguments drawn from things to which the same line of reasoning applies; take the following example: “If it is honourable for the Rhodians to let out their harbour dues, it is honourable likewise for Hermocreon to take the contract,” or “What it is honourable to learn, it is also honourable to teach.” Such also is the fine sentence of Domitius Afer, which has the same effect, though it is not identical in form: “I accused, you condemned.”
10.78. quoque, quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volant et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim: portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est, et Hermocreonti conducere, et discere honestum, et docere.
10.79. Arguments which prove the same thing from opposites are also mutually consequential; for instance, we may argue that he who says that the world was created thereby implies that it is suffering decay, since this is the property of all created things.
10.79. illa non hac ratione dicta sed efficiens idem Domitii Afri sententia est pulchra: Ego accusavi, vos damnastis. invicem consequens et quod ex diversis idem ostendit; ut, qui mundum nasci dicit, per hoc ipsum et deficere significet, quia deficit omne quod nascitur.
10.80. There is another very similar form of argument, which consists in the inference of facts from their efficient causes or the reverse, a process known as argument from causes. The conclusion is sometimes necessary, sometimes generally without being necessarily true. For instance, a body casts a shadow in the light, and the shadow wherever it falls indicates the presence of a body.
10.80. est his argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vocant. interim necessario fiunt, interim plerumque sed non necessario. corpus in lumine utique umbram facit, et umbra, ubicunque est, ibi esse corpus ostendit.
10.81. There are other conclusions which, as I have said, are not necessary, whether as regards both cause and effect or only one of the two. For instance, “the sun colours the skin, but not everyone that is coloured receives that colour from the sun; a journey makes the traveller dusty, but every journey does not produce dust, nor is everyone that is dusty just come from a journey.”
10.81. sunt, ut dixi, non necessaria, vel utrinque vel ex altera parte: colorat; non utique, qui est coloratus, a sole est. pulverulentum facit; sed neque omne iter pulverem movet nec, quisquis est pulverulentus, ex itinere est.
10.82. As examples of necessary conclusions on the other hand I may cite the following: “If wisdom makes a man good, a good man must needs be wise”; and again, “It is the part of a good man to act honourably, of a bad man to act dishonourably,” or “Those who act honourably are considered good, those who act dishonourably are considered bad men.” In these cases the conclusion is correct. On the other hand, “though exercise generally makes the body robust, not everyone who is robust is given to exercise, nor is everyone that is addicted to exercise robust. Nor again, because courage prevents our fearing death, is every man who has no fear of death to be regarded as a brave man; nor is the sun useless to man because it sometimes gives him a headache.”
10.82. utique fiunt, talia sunt: sapientia bonum virum facit, bonus vir est utique sapiens; itemque est honeste facere, mali turpiter; et honeste faciunt, boni, qui turpiter, mali iudicantur; recte., plerumque robustum corpus facit; sed non quisquis est robustus exercitatus, nec quisquis exercitatus robustus; nec, quia fortitudo praestat ne mortem timeamus, quisquis mortem non timuerit, vir fortis erit existimandus; nec, si capitis dolorem facit, inutilis hominibus sol est.
10.83. Arguments such as the following belong in the main to the hortative department of oratory:— “Virtue brings renown, therefore it should be pursued; but the pursuit of pleasure brings ill-repute, therefore it should be shunned.” But the warning that we should not necessarily search for the originating cause is just: an example of such error is provided by the speech of Medea beginning “Ah!
10.83. ad hortativum maxime genus pertinent: facit laudem, sequenda igitur; at voluptas infamiam, fugienda igitur. autem monemur, causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas, ut Medea, ne in nemore Pelio;
10.84. would that never there in Pelion's grove,” as though her misery or guilt were due to the fact that there“The beams of fir had fallen to the ground”;or I might cite the words addressed by Philoctetes to Paris,Hadst thou been other than thou art, then IHad ne'er been plunged in woe.By tracing back causes on lines such as these we may arrive anywhere.
10.84. quasi vero id eam fecerit miseram aut nocentem, quod illic ceciderint abiegnae ad terram trabes; et Philocteta Paridi, Si impar esses tibi, ego nunc non essem miser; quo modo pervenire quolibet retro causas legentibus licet. his adiicere ridiculum putarem, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant, ut eos, qui rem iustam faciunt, iuste facere (quod certe non eget probatione), quod compascuum est, compascere licere.
10.85. But for the fact that Cicero has done so, I should regard it as absurd to add to these what is styled the conjugate argument, such as “Those who perform a just act, act justly,” a self-evident fact requiring no proof; or again, “Every man has a common right to send his cattle to graze in a common pasture.”
10.85. haec, quae vel ex causis vel ex efficientibus diximus, alieno nomine uocant ἐκβάσεις id est exitus.
10.86. Some call these arguments derived from causes or efficients by the Greek name ἐκβάσεις that is, results; for in such cases the only point considered is how one thing results from another. Those arguments which prove the lesser from the greater or the greater from the less or equals from equals are styled apposite or comparative.
10.86. nec hic aliud tractatur quam quid ex quoque eveniat. vel comparativa dicuntur, quae minora ex maioribus, maiora ex minoribus, paria ex paribus probant.
10.87. A conjecture as to a fact is confirmed by argument from something greater in the following sentence: “If a man commit sacrilege, he will also commit theft”; from something less, in a sentence such as “He who lies easily and openly will commit perjury”; from something equal in a sentence such as “He who has taken a bribe to give a false verdict will take a bribe to give false witness.”
10.87. coniectura ex maiore, quis sacrilegium facit, faciet et furtum; ex minore, facile ac palam mentitur, peierabit; ex pari, ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepit, et ob dicendum falsum testimonium accipiet.
10.88. Points of law may be proved in a similar manner; from something greater, as in the sentence “If it is lawful to kill an adulterer, it is lawful to scourge him”; from something less, “If it is lawful to kill a man attempting theft by night, how much more lawful is it to kill one who attempts robbery with violence ”; from something equal, “The penalty which is just in the case of parricide is also just in the case of matricide.” In all these cases we follow the syllogistic method.
10.88. confirmatio huiusmodi est: ex maiore, adulterum occidere licet, et loris caedere; ex minore, furem nocturnum occidere licet, quid latronem? ex pari, poena adversus interfectorem patris iusta est, eadem adversus matris; quorum omnium tractatus versatur in syllogismis.
10.89. The following type of argument on the other hand is more serviceable in questions turning on definition or quality. “If strength is good for the body, health is no less good.” “If theft is a crime, sacrilege is a greater crime.” “If abstinence is a virtue, so is self-control.” “If the world is governed by providence, the state also requires a government.” “If a house cannot be built without a plan, what of a whole city?” “If naval stores require careful supervision, so also do arms.”
10.89. magis finitionibus aut qualitatibus prosunt, robur corporibus bonum est, non minus sanitas; Si furtum scelus, magis sacrilegium; Si abstinentia virus, et continentia; Si mundus providentia regitur, administranda respublica; Si domus aedificari sine ratione non potest, quid urbs agenda? agenda est navalium cura, et armorum. mihi quidem sufficeret hoc genus, sed in species secatur.
10.90. I am content to treat this type of argument as a genus without going further; others however divide it into species. For we may argue from several things to one or from one thing to several; hence arguments such as “What has happened once may happen often.” We may also argue from a part to a whole, from genus to species, from that which contains to that which is contained, from the difficult to the easy, from the remote to the near, and similarly from the opposites of all these to their opposites.
10.90. ex pluribus ad unum et ex uno ad plura (unde est semel, et saepius ),et ex parte ad totum et ex genere ad speciem, et ex eo quod continet ad id quod continetur, aut ex difficilioribus ad faciliora et ex longe positis ad propiora et ad omnia, quae contra haec sunt, eadem ratione argumenta ducuntur.
10.91. Now all these arguments deal with the greater or the less or else with things that are equal, and if we follow up such fine distinctions, there will be no limit to our division into species. For the comparison of things is infinite; things may be more pleasant, more serious, more necessary, more honourable, more useful. I say no more for fear of falling into that very garrulity which I deprecate.
10.91. enim et haec maiora et minora aut certe vim similem obtinent, quae si persequamur, nullus erit ea concidendi modus. est enim rerum comparatio, iucundiora, graviora, magis necessaria, honestiora, utiliora. mittamus plura, ne in eam ipsam, quam vito, loquacitatem incidam.
10.92. The number of examples of these arguments which I might quote is likewise infinite, but I will only deal with a very few. As an example of argument from something greater take the following example from the pro Caecina “Shall we suppose that that which alarms whole armies caused no alarm to a peaceful company of lawyers?” As an instance of argument from something easier, take this passage from the speech against Clodius and Curio: “Consider whether it would have been easy for you to secure the praetorship, when he in whose favour you withdrew failed to secure election?”
10.92. quoque ad haec infinitus est numerus, sed paucissima attingam. maiore pro Caecina, exercitus armatos movet, id advocationem togatorum non videbitur movisse? faciliore in Clodium et Curionem, vide, an facile fieri tu potueris, cum is factus non sit, cui tu concessisti.
10.93. The following provides an example of argument from something more difficult: “I beg you, Tubero, to remark that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my own deed, venture to speak of that performed by Ligarius ”; and again, “Has not Ligarius reason for hope, when I am permitted to intercede with you for another?” For an argument drawn from something less take this passage from the pro Caecinaa: “Really! Is the knowledge that the men were armed sufficient to prove that violence was offered, and the fact that he fell into their hands insufficient?” Well, then, to give a brief summary of the whole question, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, place and time (which latter we have divided into preceding, contemporary and subsequent), from resources (under which we include instruments), from manner (that is, how a thing has been done), from definition, genus, species, difference, property, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, likes, unlikes, contradictions, consequents, efficients, effects, results, and comparison, which is subdivided into several species.
10.93. difficiliore, quaeso, Tubero, ut, qui de meo facto non dubitem, de Ligarii audeam dicere. ibi, sperandi Ligario casa non sit, cum mihi apud te locus sit etiam pro altero deprecandi? minore pro Caecina, scire esse armatos sat est, ut vim factam probes; in manus eorum incidere non est satis?, ut breviter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis, causis, locis, tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, praecedens, coniunctum, insequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est, ut quidque sit factum), finitione, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incrementis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, comparatione, quae in plures diducitur species.
10.95. I think I should also add that arguments are drawn not merely from admitted facts, but from fictitious suppositions, which the Greeks style καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν and that this latter type of argument falls into all the same divisions as those which I have mentioned above, since there may be as many species of fictitious arguments as there are of true arguments.
10.95. adiiciendum videtur, duci argumenta non a confessis tantum sed etiam a fictione, quod Graeci καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν vocant; et quidem ex omnibus iisdem locis, quibus superiora, quia totidem species esse possunt fictae quot verae.
10.96. When I speak of fictitious arguments I mean the proposition of something which, if true, would either solve a problem or contribute to its solution, and secondly the demonstration of the similarity of our hypothesis to the case under consideration. To make this the more readily intelligible to youths who have not yet left school, I will first of all illustrate it by examples of a kind familiar to the young.
10.96. fingere hoc loco hoc est proponere aliquid, quod, si verum sit, aut solvat quaestionem aut adiuvet; deinde id, de quo quaeritur, facere illi simile. quo facilius accipiant iuvenes nondum scholam egressi, primo familiaribus magis ci aetati exemplis ostendam.
10.97. There is a law to the effect that “the man who refuses to support his parents is liable to imprisonment.” A certain man fails to support his parents and none the less objects to going to prison. He advances the hypothesis that he would be exempt from such a penalty if he were a soldier, an infant. or if he were absent from home on the service of the state. Again in the case where a hero is allowed to choose his reward we might introduce the hypotheses of his desiring to make himself a tyrant or to overthrow the temples of the gods.
10.97. : parentes non aluerit, vinciatur. alit aliquis, et vincula nihilominus recusat. fictione, si miles, si infans sit, si reipublicae causa absit. illa contra optionem fortium, si tyrannidem petas, si templorum eversionem.
10.98. Such arguments are specially useful when we are arguing against the letter of the law, and are thus employed by Cicero in the pro Caecina: “[The interdict contains the words,] ' whence you or your household or your agent had driven him.' If your steward alone had driven me out, [it would not, I suppose, be your household but a member of your household that had driven me out].... If indeed you owned no slave except the one who drove me out, [you would cry, 'If I possess a household at all, I admit that my household drove you out'].” Many other examples might be quoted from the same work.
10.98. ea res virium habet contra scriptum. his Cicero pro Caecina, unde tu aut familia aut procurator tuus. me villicus tuus solus deiecisset — vero ne habeas quidem servum praeter eum, qui me deiecerit, et alia in eodem libro plurima.
10.99. But fictitious suppositions are also exceedingly useful when we are concerned with the quality of an act: “If Catiline could try this case assisted by a jury composed of those scoundrels whom he led out with him he would condemn Lucius Murena.” It is useful also for amplification: “If this had happened to you during dinner in the midst of your deep potations”; or again, “If the state could speak.”
10.99. eadem fictio valet et ad qualitates: Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum, quos secum eduxit hoc de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam; et ad amplificationem: hoc tibi inter cenam in illis immanibus poculis tuis accidisset. et, respublica vocem haberet.
10.100. Such in the main are the usual topics of proof as specified by teachers of rhetoric, but it is not sufficient to classify them generically in our instructions, since from each of them there arises an infinite number of arguments, while it is in the very nature of things impossible to deal with all their individual species. Those who have attempted to perform this latter task have exposed themselves in equal degree to two disadvantages, saying too much and yet failing to cover the whole ground.
10.100. fere sedes accepimus probationum in universum, quas neque generatim tradere sat est, cum ex qualibet earum innumerabilis argumentorum copia oriatur, neque per singulas species exsequi patitur natura rerum, quod qui sunt facere conati, duo pariter subierunt incommoda, ut et nimium dicerent nec tamen totum.
10.101. Consequently the majority of students, finding themselves lost in an inextricable maze, have abandoned all individual effort, including even that which their own wits might have placed within their power, as though they were fettered by certain rigid laws, and keeping their eyes fixed upon their master have ceased to follow the guidance of nature.
10.101. plurimi, cum in hos inexplicabiles laqueos inciderunt, omnem, etiam quem ex ingenio suo poterant habere, conatum velut adstricti certis legum vinculis perdiderunt, et magistrum respicientes naturam ducem sequi desierunt.
10.102. But as it is not in itself sufficient to know that all proofs are drawn either from persons or things, because each of these groups is subdivided into a number of different heads so he who has learned that arguments must be drawn from antecedent, contemporary or subsequent facts will not be sufficiently instructed in the knowledge of the method of handling arguments to understand what arguments are to be drawn from the circumstances of each particular case;
10.102. ut per se non sufficiet scire, omnes probationes aut a personis aut a rebus peti, quia utrumque in plura dividitur, ita ex antecedentibus et iunctis et insequentibus trahenda esse argumenta qui acceperit, num protinus in hoc sit instructus ut, quid in quaque casa ducendum sit ex his, sciat?
10.103. especially as the majority of proofs are to be found in the special circumstances of individual cases and have no connexion with any other dispute, and therefore while they are the strongest, are also the least obvious, since, whereas we derive what is common to all cases from general rules, we have to discover for ourselves whatever is peculiar to the case which we have in hand.
10.103. praesertim, cum plurimae probationes in ipso causarum complexu reperiantur, ita ut sint cum alia lite nulla communes, eaeque sint et potentissimae et minime obviae, quia communia ex praeceptis accepimus, propria invenienda sunt.
10.104. This type of argument may reasonably be described as drawn from circumstances, there being no other word to express the Greek περίστασις or from those things which are peculiar to any given case. For instance, in the case of the priest who having committed adultery desired to save his own life by means of the law which gave him the power of saving one life, the appropriate argument to employ against him would run as follows: “You would save more than one guilty person, since, if you were discharged, it would not be lawful to put the adulteress to death.” For such an argument follows from the law forbidding the execution of the adulteress apart from the adulterer.
10.104. genus argumentorum sane dicamus ex circumstantia, quia περίστασιν dicere aliter non possumus, vel ex iis quae cuiusque causae propria sunt: ut in illo adultero sacerdote, qui lege, qua unius servandi potestatem habebat, se ipse servare voluit, proprium controversiae est dicere, unum nocentem servabas, quia te dimisso adulteram occidere non licebat. enim argumentum lex facit, quae prohibet adulteram sine adultero occidere.
10.105. Again, take the case falling under the law which lays down that bankers may pay only half of what they owe, while permitted to recover the whole of what they are owed. One banker requires payment of the whole sum owed him by another banker. The appropriate argument supplied by the subject to the creditor is that there was special reason for the insertion of the clause sanctioning the recovery of the whole of a debt by a banker, since there was no need of such a law as against others, inasmuch as all have the right to recover the whole of a debt from any save a banker.
10.105. illa, in qua lata lex est, ut argentarii dimidium ex eo quod debebant solverent, creditum suum totum exigerent. ab argentario solidum petit. ex materia est argumentum creditoris, idcirco adiectum esse in lege, ut argentarius totum exigeret; adversus alios enim non opus fuisse lege, cum omnes praeterquam ab argentariis totum exigendi ius haberent.
10.106. But while some fresh considerations are bound to present themselves in every kind of subject, this is more especially the case in questions turning on the letter of the law, since not merely individual words, but still more whole phrases are frequently ambiguous.
10.106. multa autem novantur in omni genere materiae tum praecipue in iis quaestionibus, quae scripto constant, quia vocum est in singulis ambiguitas frequens et adhuc in coniunctis magis.
10.107. And these considerations must vary according to the complexity of laws and other documents, whether they are in agreement or contradictory, since fact throws light on fact and law on law as in the following argument: “I owed you no money: you never summoned me for debt, you took no interest from me, nay, you actually borrowed money from me.” It is laid down by law that he who refuses to defend his father when accused of treason thereby loses his right to inherit. A son denies that he is liable to this penalty unless his father is acquitted. How does he support this contention? There is another law to the effect that a man found guilty of treason shall be banished and his advocate with him.
10.107. haec ipsa plurium legum aliorumve scriptorum vel congruentium vel repugnantium complexu varientur necesse est, cum res rei aut ius iuris quasi signum est. debui tibi pecuniam; nunquam me appellasti, usuram non accepisti, ultro a me mutuatus es. est, patri proditionis reo non adfuerit, exheres sit. filius, nisi si pater absolutus sit. signi? altera, damnatus cum advocato exulet.
10.108. Cicero in the pro Cluentio says that Publius Popilius and Tiberius Gutta were not condemned for receiving bribes to give a false verdict, but for attempting to bribe the jury. What is his argument in support of this view? That their accusers, who were themselves found guilty of bribing the jury, were restored in accordance with law after winning their case.
10.108. Cicero pro Cluentio Publium Popilium et Tiberium Guttam dicit non iudicii corrupti sed ambitus esse damnatos. signi? quod accusatores eorum, qui erant ipsi ambitus damnati, e lege sint post hanc victoriam restituti.
10.109. But the consideration as to what argument should be put forward requires no less care than the consideration of the manner in which we are to prove that which we have put forward. Indeed in this connexion invention, if not the most important, is certainly the first consideration. For, just as weapons are superfluous for one who does not know what his target is, so too arguments are useless, unless you see in advance to what they are to be applied. This is a task for which no formal rules can be laid down.
10.109. minus in hoc curae debet adhiberi, quid proponendum quam quomodo sit quod proposuerimus probandum. immo vis inventionis, si non maior, certe prior. ut tela supervacua sunt nescienti, quid petat, sic argumenta, nisi provideris cui rei adhibenda sint. est, quod comprehendi arte non possit.
10.110. Consequently, though a number of orators, who have studied the same rules, will use similar kinds of arguments, one will discover a greater number of arguments to suit his case than another. Let us take as an example a controversial theme involving problems that have little in common with other cases.
10.110. Ideoque, cum plures eadem didicerint, generibus argumentorum similibus utentur; alius alio plura, quibus utatur, inveniet. exempli gratia proposita controversia, quae communes minime cum aliis quaestiones habet:
10.111. “When Alexander destroyed Thebes, he found documents showing that the Thebans had lent a hundred talents to the Thessalians. These documents he presented to the Thessalians as a reward for the assistance they had given him in the campaign. Subsequently the Thebans, after the restoration of their city by Cassander, demanded that the Thessalians should repay the money.” The case is tried before the Amphictyonic council. It is admitted that the Thebans lent the money and were not repaid.
10.111. Thebas evertisset Alexander, inuenit tabulas, quibus centum talenta mutua Thessalis dedisse 'Thebanos continebatur., quia erat usus commilitio Thessalorum, donavit his ultro; postea restituti a Cassandro Thebani reposcunt Thessalos. Amphictyonas agitur. talenta et credidisse eos constat et non recepisse.
10.112. The whole dispute turns on the allegation that Alexander had excused the Thessalians from payment of the debt. It is also admitted that the Thessalians had received no money from Alexander. The question is therefore whether his gift is equivalent to his having given them money.
10.112. omnis ex eo, quod Alexander ea Thessalis donasse dicitur, pendet. illud quoque, non esse iis ab Alexandro pecuniam data; quaeritur ergo, an proinde sit, quod datum est, ac si pecuniam dederit?
10.113. What use will formal topics of argument be in such a case, unless I first convince myself that the gift of Alexander made no difference, that he had not the power to make it, and that he did not make it? The opening of the Thebans' plea presents no difficulty and is likely to win the approval of the judges, since they are seeking to recover by right what was taken from them by force. But out of this point arises a violent controversy as to the right of war, since the Thessalians urge that kingdoms and peoples and the frontiers of nations and cities depend upon these rights.
10.113. proderunt argumentorum loci, nisi haec prius videro, nihil eum egisse donando, non potuisse donare, non donasse? prima quidem actio facilis ac favorabilis repetentium iure quod vi sit ablatum; sed hinc aspera et uehemens quaestio exoritur de iure belli, dicentibus Thessalis, hoc regna, populos, fines gentium atque urbium contineri.
10.114. To meet this argument it is necessary to discover in what respect this case differs from others which are concerned with property that has fallen into the hands of the victor: the difficulty moreover lies not so much in the proof as in the way it should be put forward. We may begin by stating that the rights of war do not hold good in any matter which can be brought before a court of justice, and that what is taken by force of arms can only be retained by force of arms, and consequently, wherever the rights of war hold good, there is no room for the functions of a judge, while on the contrary where the functions of the judge come into play, the rights of war cease to have any force.
10.114. contra est, quo distet haec causa a ceteris, quae in potestatem victoris venirent; nec circa probationem res haeret, sed circa propositionem. inprimis: in eo, quod in iudicium deduci potest, nihil valere ius belli nec armis erepta nisi armis posse retineri; itaque, ubi illa valeant, non esse iudicem; ubi iudex sit, illa nihil valere.
10.115. The reason why it is necessary to discover this principle is to enable us to bring the following argument into play: that prisoners of war are free on returning to their native land just because the gains of war cannot be retained except by the exercise of the same violence by which they were acquired. Another peculiar feature of the case is that it is tried before the Amphictyonic council, and you will remember that we have to employ different methods in pleading a case before the centumviral court and before an arbitrator, though the problems of the cases may be identical.
10.115. inveniendum est, ut adhiberi possit argumentum: ideo captivos, si in patriam suam redierint, liberos esse, quia bello parta non nisi eadem vi possideantur. est et illud causae, quod Amphictyones iudicant (ut alia apud centumviros, alia apud privatum iudicem in iisdem quaestionibus ratio);
10.116. Secondly we may urge that the right to refuse payment could not have been conferred by the victor because he possesses only what he holds, but a right, being incorporeal, cannot be grasped by the hand. It is more difficult to discover this principle than, once discovered, to defend it with arguments such as that the position of an heir and a conqueror are fundamentally different, since right passes to the one and property to the other.
10.116. tum secundo gradu, non potuisse donari a victore ius, quia id demum sit eius, quod teneat; ius, quod sit incorporate, adprehendi manu non posse. reperire est difficilius quam, cum inveneris, argumentis adiuvare, ut alia sit condicio heredis, alia victoris, quia ad illum ius, ad hunc res transeat.
10.117. It is further an argument peculiar to the subject matter of the case that the right over a public debt could not have passed to the victor, because the repayment of a sum of money lent by a whole people is due to them all, and as long as any single one of them survives, he is creditor for the whole amount: but the Thebans were never all of them to a man in Alexander's power.
10.117. deinde materiae, ius publici crediti transire ad victorem non potuisse, quia, quod populus crediderit, omnibus debeatur, et, quamdiu quilibet unus superfuerit, esse eum totius summae creditorem, Thebanos autem non omnes in Alexandri manu fuisse.
10.118. The force of this argument resides in the fact that it is not based on any external support, but holds good in itself. Proceeding to the third line of argument we may note that the first portion of it is of a more ordinary type, namely that the right to repayment is not based on the actual document, a plea which can be supported by many arguments. Doubt may also be thrown on Alexander's purpose: did he intend to honour them or to trick them? Another argument peculiar to the subject (indeed it practically introduces a new discussion) is that the Thebans may be regarded as having in virtue of their restoration recovered the right even though it be admitted that they had lost it. Again Cassander's purpose may be discussed, but, as the case is being pleaded before the Amphictyonic council, we shall find that the most powerful plea that can be urged is that of equity.
10.118. non extrinsecus probatur, quae vis est argumenti, sed ipsum per se valet. loci pars prior magis vulgaris, non in tabulis esse ius; itaque multis argumentis defendi potest. quoque Alexandri duci debet in dubium, honorarit eos an deceperit. iam rursus proprium materiae et velut novae controversiae, quia restitutione recepisse ius, etiamsi quod amiserint, Thebani videntur. et, quid Cassander velit, quaeritur: sed vel potentissima apud Amphictyonas aequi tractatio est.
10.119. I make these remarks, not because I think that a knowledge of the “places” from which arguments may be derived is useless (had I thought so, I should have passed them by)but to prevent those who have learnt these rules from neglecting other considerations and regarding themselves as having a perfect and absolute knowledge of the whole subject, and to make them realise that, unless they acquire a thorough knowledge of the remaining points which I am about to discuss, they will be the possessors of what I can only call a dumb science.
10.119. non idcirco dico, quod inutilem horum locorum, ex quibus argumenta ducuntur, cognitionem putem, alioqui nec tradidissem; sed ne se, qui cognoverint ista, si cetera negligant, perfectos protinus atque consummatos putent et, nisi in ceteris, quae mox praecipienda sunt, elaboraverint, mutam quandam scientiam consecutos intelligant.
10.120. For the discovery of arguments was not the result of the publication of text-books, but every kind of argument was put forward before any rules were laid down, and it was only later that writers of rhetoric noted them and collected them for publication. A proof of this is the fact that the examples which they use are old and quoted from the orators, while they themselves discover nothing new or that has not been said before.
10.120. enim artibus editis factum est, ut argumenta inveniremus, sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam praeciperentur, mox ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt. rei probatio est, quod exemplis eorum veteribus utuntur et ab oratoribus ilia repetunt, ipsi nullum novum et quod dictum non sit inveniunt.
10.121. The creators of the art were therefore the orators, though we owe a debt of gratitude also to those who have given us a short cut to knowledge. For thanks to them the arguments discovered by the genius of earlier orators have not got to be hunted out and noted down in detail. But this does not suffice to make an orator any more than it suffices to learn the art of gymnastic in school: the body must be assisted by continual practice, self control, diet and above all by nature; on the other hand none of these are sufficient in themselves without the aid of art.
10.121. ergo illi qui dixerunt; sed habenda his quoque gratia est, per quos labor nobis est detractus., quae priores beneficio ingenii singula invenerunt, nobis et non sunt requirenda et notata sunt omnia. non magis hoc sat est quam palaestram didicisse, nisi corpus exercitatione, continentia, cibis, ante omnia natura iuvatur, sicut contra ne illa quidem satis sine arte profuerint.
10.122. I would also have students of oratory consider that all the forms of argument which I have just set forth cannot be found in every case, and that when the subject on which we have to speak has been propounded, it is no use considering each separate type of argument and knocking at the door of each with a view to discovering whether they may chance to serve to prove our point, except while we are in the position of mere learners without any knowledge of actual practice.
10.122. quoque studiosi eloquentiae cogitent, neque omnibus in causis, quae demonstravimus, cuncta posse reperiri; neque, cum proposita fuerit materia dicendi, scrutanda singula et velut ostiatim pulsandum, ut sciant, an ad probandum id, quod intendimus, forte respondeant, nisi cum discunt et adhuc usu carent.
10.123. Such a proceeding merely retards the process of speaking to an incalculable extent, if it is always necessary for us to try each single argument and thus learn by experiment what is apt and suitable to our case. In fact I am not sure that it will not be an actual obstacle to progress unless a certain innate penetration and a power of rapid divination seconded by study lead us straight to the arguments which suit our case. For just as the melody of the voice is most pleasing when accompanied by the lyre, yet if the musician's hand be slow and, unless he first look at the strings and take their measure, hesitate as to which strings match the several notes of the voice, it would be better that he should content himself with the natural music of the voice unaccompanied by any instrument; even so our theory of speaking must be adapted and, like the lyre, attuned to such rules as these.
10.123. enim faciat ista res dicendi tarditatem, si semper necesse sit, ut temptantes unumquodque eorum, quod sit aptum atque conveniens, experiendo noscamus; nescio an etiam impedimento futura sint, nisi et animi quaedam ingenita natura et studio exercitata velocitas recta nos ad ea, quae conveniunt causae, ferant., ut cantus vocis plurimum iuvat sociata nervorum concordia, si tamen tardior manus nisi inspectis demensisque singulis, quibus quaeque vox fidibus iungenda sit, dubitet, potius fuerit esse contentum eo, quod simplex canendi natura tulerit, ita huiusmodi praeceptis debet quidem aptata esse et citharae modo intenta ratio doctrinae;
10.125. But it is only by constant practice that we can secure that, just as the hands of the musician, even though his eyes be turned elsewhere, produce bass, treble or intermediate notes by force of habit, so the thought of the orator should suffer no delay owing to the variety and number of possible arguments, but that the latter should present themselves uncalled and, just as letters and syllables require no thought on the part of a writer, so arguments should spontaneously follow the thought of the orator.
10.125. sed hoc exercitatione multa consequendum, ut, quemadmodum illorum artificum, etiamsi alio spectant, manus tamen ipsa consuetudine ad graves, acutos, medios nervorum sonos fertur, sic oratoris cognitionem nihil moretur haec varietas argumentorum et copia, sed quasi offerat se et occurrat, et, ut litterae syllabaeque scribentium cogitationem non exigunt, sic rationem sponte quadam sequantur.
11.1. The third kind of proof, which is drawn into the service of the case from without, is styled a παράδειγμα by the Greeks, who apply the term to all comparisons of like with like, but more especially to historical parallels. Roman writers have for the most part preferred to give the name of comparison to that which the Greeks style παραβολή, while they translate παράδειγμα by example, although this latter involves comparison, while the former is of the nature of an example.
11.1. genus ex iis, quae extrinsecus adducuntur in causam, Graeci vacant παράδειγμα, quo nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium adpositione et specialiter in iis, quae rerum gestarum auctoritate nituntur. fere similitudinem vocari maluerunt, quod ab illis παραβολὴ dicitur, alterum exemplum, quanquam et hoc simile est et illud exemplum.
11.2. For my own part, I prefer with a view to making my purpose easier of apprehension to regard both as παραδείγματα and to call them examples. Nor am I afraid of being thought to disagree with Cicero, although he does separate comparison from example. For he divides all arguments into two classes, induction and ratiocination, just as most Greeks divide it into παραδείγματα and ἐπιχειρήματα, explaining παράδειγμα as a rhetorical induction.
11.2. , quo facilius propositum explicemus, utrumque παράδειγμα esse credamus, et ipsi appellemus exemplum. vereor, ne videar repugnare Ciceroni, quanquam collationem separat ab exemplo. idem omnem argumentationem dividit in duas partes, inductionem et ratiocinationem, ut plerique Graecorum in παραδείγματα et ἐπιχειρήματα dixeruntque παράδειγμα ῥητορικὴν ἐπαγωγήν.
11.3. The method of argument chiefly used by Socrates was of this nature: when he had asked a number of questions to which his adversary could only agree, he finally inferred the conclusion of the problem under discussion from its resemblance to the points already conceded. This method is known as induction, and though it cannot be used in a set speech, it is usual in a speech to assume that which takes the form of a question in dialogue.
11.3. illa, qua plurimum est Socrates usus, hanc habuit viam, ut cum plura interrogasset, quae fateri adversario necesse esset, novissime id, de quo quaerebatur, inferret, ut simile concessis. Id est inductio. in oratione fieri non potest; sed, quod illic interrogatur, hic fere sumitur.
11.4. For instance take the following question: “What is the finest form of fruit? Is it not that which is best?” This will be admitted. “What of the horse? What is the finest? Is it not that which is the best?” Several more questions of the same kind follow. Last comes the question for the sake of which all the others were put: “What of man? Is not he the finest type who is best?” The answer can only be in the affirmative.
11.4. igitur illa interrogatio talis: est pomum generosissimum? nonne quod optimum? concedetur. equus? qui generosissimus? qui optimus? et plura in eundem modum., cuius rei gratia rogatum est, homo? is generosissimus, qui optimus? fatendum erit.
11.5. Such a procedure is most valuable in the examination of witnesses, but is differently employed in a set speech. For there the orator either answers his own questions or makes an assumption of that which in dialogue takes the form of a question. “What is the finest fruit? The best, I should imagine. What is the finest horse? The swiftest. So too the finest type of man is not he that is noblest of birth, but he that is most excellent in virtue.” All arguments of this kind, therefore, must be from things like or unlike or contrary. Similes are, it is true, sometimes employed for the embellishment of the speech as well, but I will deal with them in their proper place; at present I am concerned with the use of similitude in proof.
11.5. in testium interrogatione valet plurimum, in oratione perpetua dissimile est; aut enim sibi ipse respondet orator aut quod illic interrogatur, hic fere sumitur. pomum generosissimum? puto, quod optimum; et equus? qui velocissimus: ita hominum, non qui claritate nascendi sed qui uirtute maxime excellet. igitur ex hoc genere sumpta necesse est aut similia esse aut dissimilia aut contraria. adsumitur interim et ad orationis ornatum; sed illa, cum res exiget, nunc ea, quae ad probationem pertinent, exsequar.
11.6. The most important of proofs of this class is that which is most properly styled example, that is to say the adducing of some past action real or assumed which may serve to persuade the audience of the truth of the point which we are trying to make. We must therefore consider whether the parallel is complete or only partial, that we may know whether to use it in its entirety or merely to select those portions which are serviceable. We argue from the like when we say, “Saturninus was justly killed, as were the Gracchi”; from the unlike when we say, “Brutus killed his sons for plotting against the state, while Manlius condemned his son to death for his valoulr ”; from the contrary when we say, “Marcellus restored the works of art which had been taken from the Syracusans who were our enemies, while Verres took the same works of art from our allies.”
11.6. autem est inter ea quae sunt huius generis, quod proprie vocamus exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio. igitur est, totum simile sit an ex parte, ut aut omnia ex eo sumamus aut quae utilia sunt. est, iure occisus est Saturninus sicut Gracchi., Brutus occidit liberos proditionem molientes;
11.7. The same divisions apply also to such forms of proof in panegyric or denunciation. It will also be found useful when we are speaking of what is likely to happen to refer to historical parallels: for instance if the orator asserts that Dionysius is asking for a bodyguard that with their armed assistance he may establish himself as tyrant, he may adduce the parallel case of Pisistratus who secured the supreme power by similar means.
11.7. Manlius virtutem filii morte multavit., Marcellus ornamenta Syracusanis hostibus restituit; Verres eadem sociis abstulit. probandorum et culpandorum ex iis confirmatio eosdem gradus habet. in iis, quae futura dicemus, utilis similium admonitio est, ut si quis dicens, Dionysium idcirco petere custodes salutis suae, ut eorum adiutus armis tyrannidem occupet, hoc referat exemplum, eadem ratione Pisistratum ad dominationem pervenisse.
11.9. But while examples may at times, as in the last instance, apply in their entirety, at times we shall argue from the greater to the less or from the less to the greater. “Cities have been overthrown by the violation of the marriage bond. What punishment then will meet the case of adultery?” “Fluteplayers have been recalled by the state to the city which they had left. How much more then is it just that leading citizens who have rendered good service to their country should be recalled from that exile to which they have been driven by envy.”
11.9. ut sunt exempla interim tota similia ut hoc proximum, sic interim ex maioribus ad minora, ex minoribus ad maiora ducuntur. violata propter matrimonia eversae sunt; quid fieri adultero par est?, cum ab urbe discessissent, publice revocati sunt; quanto magis principes civitatis viri et bene de republica meriti, cum invidiae cesserint, ab exilio reducendi?
11.10. Arguments from unlikes are most useful in exhortation. Courage is more remarkable in a woman than in a man. Therefore, if we wish to kindle someone's ambition to the performance of heroic deeds, we shall find that parallels drawn from the cases of Horatius and Torquatus will carry less weight than that of the woman by whose hand Pyrrhus was slain, and if we wish to urge a man to meet death, the cases of Cato and Scipio will carry less weight than that of Lucretia. These are however arguments from the greater to the less.
11.10. exhortationem vero praecipue valent imparia. in femina quam in viro virtus., si ad fortiter faciendum accendatur aliquis, non tantum adferent momenti Horatius et Torquatus quantum illa mulier cuius manu Pyrrhus est interfectus, et ad moriendum non tam Cato et Scipio quam Lucretia; quod ipsum est ex maioribus ad minora.
11.11. Let me then give you separate examples of these classes of argument from the pages of Cicero; for where should I find better? The following passage from the pro Murena is an instance of argument from the like: “For it happened that I myself when a candidate had two patricians as competitors, the one a man of the most unscrupulous and reckless character, the other a most excellent and respectable citizen. Yet I defeated Catiline by force of merit and Galba by my popularity.”
11.11. igitur horum generum ex Cicerone (nam unde potius?) exempla ponamus. est hoc pro Murena, mihi ipsi accidit, it cum duobus patriciis, altero improbissimo et audacissimo altero modestissimo atque optimo viro, peterem; superavi tamen dignitate Catilinam, gratia Galbam.
11.12. The pro Milone will give us an example of argument from the greater to the less: “They say that he who confesses to having killed a man is not fit to look upon the light of day. Where is the city in which men are such fools as to argue thus? It is Rome itself, the city whose first trial on a capital charge was that of Marcus Horatius, the bravest of men, who, though the city had not yet attained its freedom, was none the less acquitted by the assembly of the Roman people, in spite of the fact that he confessed that he had slain his sister with his own hand.” The following is an example of argument from the less to the greater: “I killed, not Spurius Maelius, who by lowering the price of corn and sacrificing his private fortune fell under the suspicion of desiring to make himself king, because it seemed that he was courting popularity with the common people overmuch,” and so on till we come to, “No, the man I killed (for my client would not shrink from the avowal, since his deed had saved his country) was he who committed abominable adultery even in the shrines of the gods ”; then follows the whole invective against Clodius.
11.12. minoris, pro Milone, intueri lucem esse fas ei qui a se hominem occisum esse fateatur. qua tandem urbe hoc homines stultissimi disputant? nempe in ea quae primum iudicium de capite vidit M. Horatii, fortissimi viri, qui nondum libera civitate tamen populi Romani comitiis liberatus est, cum sua mann sororem esse interfectam fateretur. maioris:, occidi, non Spurium Maelium, qui annona levanda iacturisque rei familiaris, quia nimis amplecti plebem videbatur, in suspicionem incidit regni adfectandi, et cetera, deinde, eum (auderet enim dicere, cum patriam periculo liberasset ) cuius nefandum adulterium in pulvinaribus, et totus in Clodium locus.
11.13. Arguments from unlikes present great variety, for they may turn on kind, manner, time, place, etcetera, almost every one of which Cicero employs to overthrow the previous decisions that seemed to apply to the case of Cluentius, while he makes use of argument from contraries when lie minimises the importance of the censorial stigma by praising Scipio Africanus, who in his capacity of censor allowed one whom he openly asserted to have committed deliberate perjury to retain his horse, because no one had appeared as evidence against him, though he promised to come forward himself to bear witness to his guilt, if any should be found to accuse him. I have paraphrased this passage because it is too long to quote.
11.13. plures causas habet, fit enim genere, modo, tempore, loco, ceteris, per quae fere omnia Cicero praeiudicia, quae de Cluentio videbantur facta, subvertit; contrario vero exemplo censoriam notam laudando censorem Africanum, qui eum, quem peierasse conceptis verbis palam dixisset, testimonium etiam pollicitus, si quis contra diceret, nullo accusante, traducere equum passus esset; quae, quia erant longiora, non suis verbis exposui.
11.14. A brief example of a similar argument is to be found in Virgil,But he, whom falsely thou dost call thy father,Even Achilles, in far other wiseDealt with old Priam, and Priam was his foe.
11.14. autem apud Vergilium contrarii exemplum est:non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achillesin hoste fuit Priamo.
11.15. Historical parallels may however sometimes be related in full, as in the pro Milone: “When a military tribune serving in the army of Gaius Marius, to whom he was related, made an assault upon the honour of a common soldier, the latter killed him; for the virtuous youth preferred to risk his life by slaying him to suffering such dishonour. And yet the great Marius acquitted him of all crime and let him go scot free.”
11.15. autem ex iis, quae gesta sunt, tota narrabimus, ut Cicero pro Milone: cum eriperet militi tribunus militaris in exercitu C. Marii, propinquus eius imperatoris, interfectus ab eo est, cui vim adferebat. enim probus adolescens periculose quam perpeti turpiter maluit; atque hunc ille summus vir scelere solutum periculo liberavit.
11.16. On the other hand in certain cases it will be sufficient merely to allude to the parallel, as Cicero does in the same speech: “For neither the famous Servilius Ahala nor Publius Nasica nor Lucius Opimius nor the Senate during my consulship could be cleared of serious guilt, if it were a crime to put wicked men to death.” Such parallels will be adduced at greater or less length according as they are familiar or as the interests or adornment of our case may demand.
11.16. significare satis erit, ut idem ac pro eodem: enim posset Ahala ille Servilius aut P. Nasica aut L. Opimius aut me consule senatus non nefarius haberi, si sceleratos interfici nefas esset. ita dicentur, prout nota erunt vel utilitas causae aut decor postulabit.
11.17. A similar method is to be pursued in quoting from the fictions of the poets, though we must remember that they will be of less force as proofs. The same supreme authority, the great master of eloquence, shows us how we should employ such quotations.
11.17. ratio est eorum, quae ex poeticis fabulis ducuntur, nisi quod iis minus adfirmationis adhibetur; cuius usus qualis esse deberet, idem optimus auctor ac magister eloquentiae ostendit.
11.18. For an example of this type will be found in the same speech: “And it is therefore, gentlemen of' the jury, that men of the greatest learning have recorded in their fictitious narratives that one who had killed his mother to avenge his father was acquitted, when the opinion of men was divided as to his guilt, not merely by the decision of a deity, but by the vote of the wisest of goddesses.”
11.18. huius quoque generis in eadem oratione reperietur exemplum hoc, iudices, non sine causa etiam fictis fabulis doctissimi homines memoriae prodiderunt, eum, qui patris ulciscendi causa matrem necauisset, variatis hominum sententiis, non solum divina sed sapientissimae deae sententia liberatum.
11.19. Again those fables which, although they did not originate with Aesop (for Hesiod seems to have been the first to write them), are best known by Aesop's name, are specially attractive to rude and uneducated minds, which are less suspicious than others in their reception of fictions and, when pleased, readily agree with the arguments from which their pleasure is derived. Thus Menenius Agrippa is said to have reconciled the plebs to the patricians by his fable of the limbs' quarrel with the belly. Horace also did not regard the employment of fables as beneath the dignity even of poetry; witness his lines that narrate “What the shrewd fox to the sick lion told.”
11.19. quoque fabellae, quae, etiamsi originem non ab Aesopo acceperunt (nam uidetur earum primus auctor Hesiodus), nomine tamen Aesopi maxime celebrantur, ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius, quae ficta sunt, audiunt, et capti voluptate facile iis quibus delectantur consentiunt: siquidem et Menenius Agrippa plebem cum patribus in gratiam traditur reduxisse nota ilia de membris humanis adversus ventrem discordantibus fabula.
11.20. The Greeks call such fables αἶνοι (tales) and, as I have already remarked, Aesopean or Libyan stories, while some Roman writers term them “apologues,” though the name has not found general acceptance.
11.20. Horatius ne in poemate quidem humilem generis huius usum putavit in illis versibus, Quod dixit uulpes aegroto cauta leoni. Αἶνον Graeci vocant et αἰσωπείους ut dixi, λόγους et λιβυκούς; nostrorum quidam, non sane recepto in usum nomine, apologationem.