1.1. After acquiring the power of writing and thinking, as described in the preceding book, and also of pleading extempore, if occasion demand, our next task will be to ensure that appropriateness of speech, which Cicero shows to be the fourth department of style, and which is, in my opinion, highly necessary.
1.1. parata, sicut superior libro continetur, facultate scribendi cogitandique et ex tempore etiam, cum res poscet, orandi, proxima est cura, ut dicamus apte; quam virtutem quartam elocutionis Cicero demonstrat, quaeque est meo quidem iudicio maxime necessaria.
1.2. For since the ornaments of style are varied and manifold and suited for different purposes, they will, unless adapted to the matter and the persons concerned, not merely fail to give our style distinction, but will even destroy its effect and produce a result quite the reverse of that which our matter should produce. For what profit is it that our words should be Latin, significant and graceful, and be further embellished with elaborate figures and rhythms, unless all these qualities are in harmony with the views to which we seek to lead the judge and mould his opinions?
1.2. cum sit ornatus orationis varius et multiplex conveniatque alius alii, nisi fuerit accommodatus rebus atque personis, non modo non illustrabit eam, sed etiam destruet et vim rerum in contrarium vertet. enim prodest, esse verba et Latina et significantia et nitida, figuris etiam numerisque elaborata, nisi cum iis, in quae iudicem duci formarique volumus, consentiant, si genus sublime dicendi parvis in causis, parvum limatumque grandibus, laetum tristibus, lene asperis, minax supplicibus, summissum concitatis, trux atque violentum iucundis adhibeamus?
1.3. What use is it if we employ a lofty tone in cases of trivial import, a slight and refined style in cases of great moment, a cheerful tone when our matter calls for sadness, a gentle tone when it demands vehemence, threatening language when supplication, and submissive when energy is required, or fierceness and violence when our theme is one that asks for charm? Such incongruities are as unbecoming as it is for men to wear necklaces and pearls and flowing raiment which are the natural adornments of women, or for women to robe themselves in the garb of triumph, than which there can be conceived no more majestic raiment. This topic is discussed by Cicero in the third book of the de Oratore, and, although he touches on it but lightly, he really covers the whole subject when he says, One single style of oratory is not suited to every case, nor to every audience, nor every speaker, nor every occasion. And he says the same at scarcely greater length in the Orator. But in the first of these works Lucius Crassus, since he is speaking in the presence of men distinguished alike for their learning and their eloquence, thinks it sufficient merely to indicate this topic to his audience for their recognition;
1.3. ut monilibus et margaritis ac veste longa, quae sunt ornamenta feminarum, deformentur viri, nec habitus triumphalis, quo nihil excogitari potest augustius, feminas deceat. locum Cicero breviter in tertio de Oratore libro perstringit, neque tamen videri potest quidquam omisisse dicendo, non omni causae neque auditori neque personae neque tempori congruere orationis unum genus. fere pluribus in Oratore eadem. illic L. Crassus, cum apud summos oratores hominesque eruditissimos dicat, satis habet partem hanc velut notare inter agnoscentes;
1.5. while in the latter work Cicero asserts that, as these facts are familiar to Brutus, to whom that treatise is addressed, they will be given briefer treatment, despite the fact that the subject is a wide one and is discussed at greater length by the philosophers. 1, on the other hand, have undertaken the education of an orator, and, consequently, am speaking not merely to those that know, but also to learners; I shall, therefore, have some claim to forgiveness if I discuss the topic in greater detail.
1.5. et hic Cicero adloquens Brutum testatur esse haec ei nota ideoque brevius a se dici, quanquam sit fusus locus tracteturque a philosophis latius. institutionem professi non solum scientibus ista, sed etiam discentibus tradimus, ideoque paulo pluribus verbis debet haberi venia.
1.6. For this reason, it is of the first importance that we should know what style is most suitable for conciliating, instructing or moving the judge, and what effects we should aim at in different parts of our speech. Thus we shall eschew antique, metaphorical and newly-coined words in our exordium, statement of facts and arguments, as we shall avoid flowing periods woven with elaborate grace, when the case has to be divided and distinguished under its various heads, while, on the other hand, we shall not employ mean or colloquial language, devoid of all artistic structure, in the peroration, nor, when the theme calls for compassion, attempt to dry the tears of our audience with jests.
1.6. notum sit nobis ante omnia, quid conciliando, docendo, movendo iudici conveniat, quid quaque parte orationis petamus. nec vetera aut translata aut ficta verba in incipiendo, narrando, argumentando tractabimus neque decurrentes contexto nitore circuitus, ubi dividenda erit causa et in partes suas digerenda, neque humile atque cotidianum sermonis genus et compositione ipsa dissolutum epilogis dabimus, nec iocis lacrimas, ubi opus erit miseratione, siccabimus.
1.7. For all ornament derives its effect not from its own qualities so much as from the circumstances in which it is applied, and the occasion chosen for saying anything is at least as important a consideration as what is actually said. But the whole of this question of appropriate language turns on something more than our choice of style, for it has much in common with invention. For if words can produce such an impression, how much greater must that be which is created by the facts themselves. But I have already laid down rules for the treatment of the latter in various portions of this work.
1.7. ornatus omnis non tam sua quam rei, cui adhibetur, condicione constat; nec plus refert, quid dicas quam quo loco. totum hoc apte dicere non elocutionis tantum genere constat, sed est cum inventione commune. si tantum habent etiam verba momentum, quanto res ipsae magis? quae esset observatio, suis locis subinde subiecimus.
1.8. Too much insistence cannot be laid upon the point that no one can be said to speak appropriately who has not considered not merely what it is expedient, but also what it is becoming to say. I am well aware that these two considerations generally go hand in hand. For whatever is becoming is, as a rule, useful, and there is nothing that does more to conciliate the good-will of the judge than the observance or to alienate it than the disregard of these considerations.
1.8. est diligentius docendum, eum demum dicere apte, qui non solum quid expediat, sed etiam quid deceat inspexerit. me fugit, plerumque haec esse coniuncta. quod decet, fere prodest, neque alio magis animi iudicum conciliari aut, si res in contrarium tulit, alienari solent.
1.9. Sometimes, however, the two are at variance. Now, whenever this occurs, expediency must yield to the demands of what is becoming. Who is there who does not realise that nothing would have contributed more to secure the acquittal of Socrates than if he had employed the ordinary forensic methods of defence and had conciliated the minds of his judges by adopting a submissive tone and had devoted his attention to refuting the actual charge against him?
1.9. tamen et haec dissentiunt. autem pugnabunt, ipsam utilitatem vincet quod decet. quis nescit, nihil magis profuturum ad absolutionem Socrati fuisse, quam si esset usus illo iudiciali genere defensionis et oratione summissa conciliasset iudicum animos sibi crimenque ipsum sollicite redarguisset?
1.10. But such a course would have been unworthy of his character, and, therefore, he pleaded as one who would account the penalty to which he might be sentenced as the highest of honours. The wisest of men preferred to sacrifice the remnant of his days rather than to cancel all his past life. And since he was but ill understood by the men of his own day, he reserved his case for the approval of posterity and at the cost of a few last declining years achieved through all the ages life everlasting.
1.10. id eum minime decebat; ideoque sic egit, ut qui poenam suam honoribus summis esset aestimaturus. enim vir sapientissimus, quod superesset ex vita, sibi perire, quam quod praeterisset. quando ab hominibus sui temporis parum intelligebatur, posteriorum se iudiciis reservavit, brevi detrimento iam ultimae senectutis aevum saeculorum omnium consecutus.
1.11. And so although Lysias, who was accounted the first orator of that time, offered him a written defence, he refused to make use of it, since, though he recognised its excellence, he regarded it as unbecoming to himself. This instance alone shows that the end which the orator must keep in view is not persuasion, but speaking well, since there are occasions when to persuade would be a blot upon his honour. The line adopted by Socrates was useless to secure his acquittal, but was of real service to him as a man; and that is by far the greater consideration.
1.11. quamvis Lysias, qui tum in dicendo praestantissimus habebatur, defensionem illi scriptam obtulisset, uti ea noluit, cum bonam quidem, sed parum sibi convenientem iudicavisset. vel solo patet non persuadendi sed bene dicendi finem in oratore servandum, cum interim persuadere deforme sit. fuit hoc utile absolutioni, sed, quod est maius, homini fuit.
1.12. In drawing this distinction between what is expedient and what is becoming, I have followed rather the usage of common speech than the strict law of truth; unless, indeed, the elder Africanus is to be regarded as having failed to consult his true interests, when he retired into exile sooner than wrangle over his own innocence with a contemptible tribune of the people, or unless it be alleged that Publius Rutilius was ignorant of his true advantage both on the occasion when he adopted a defence which may almost be compared with that of Socrates, and when he preferred to remain in exile rather than return at Sulla's bidding.
1.12. nos secundum communem potius loquendi consuetudinem quam ipsam veritatis regulam divisione hac utimur, ut ab eo, quod deceat, utilitatem separemus; nisi forte prior ille Africanus, qui patria cedere quam cum tribuno plebis humillimo contendere de innocentia sua maluit, inutiliter sibi videtur consuluisse; aut P. Rutilius, vel cum illo paene Socratico genere defensionis est usus, vel cum revocante eum P. Sulla manere in exilio maluit, quid sibi maxime conduceret, nesciebat.
1.13. No, these great men regarded all those trifles that the most abject natures regard as advantageous, as being contemptible if weighed in the balance with virtue, and for this reason they have their reward in the deathless praise of all generations. Let not us, then, be so poor spirited as to regard the acts, which we extol, as being inexpedient.
1.13. vero parva illa, quae abiectissimus quisque animus utilia credit, si cum virtute conferantur despicienda iudicaverunt, ideoque perpetua saeculorum admiratione celebrantur. nos simus tam humiles, ut quae laudamus inutilia credamus.
1.14. However, it is but rarely that this distinction, such as it is, is called into play. As I have said, the expedient and the becoming will, as a rule, be identical in every kind of case. Still, there are two things which will be becoming to all men at all times and in all places, namely, to act and speak as befits a man of honour, and it will never at any time beseem any man to speak or act dishonourably. On the other hand, things of minor importance and occupying something like a middle position between the two are generally of such a nature that they may be conceded to some, but not to others, while it will depend on the character of the speaker and the circumstances of time, place and motive whether we regard them as more or less excusable or reprehensible.
1.14. hoc qualecunque discrimen raro admodum eveniet: idem fere, ut dixi, in omni genere causarum et proderit et decebit. autem, quod omnes et semper et ubique deceat, facere ac dicere honeste, contraque neminem unquam ullo in loco turpiter. vero quaeque sunt ex mediis plerumque sunt talia, ut aliis sint concedenda, aliis non sint, aut pro persona, tempore, loco, causa magis ac minus vel excusata debeant videri vel reprehendenda.
1.15. When, however, we are speaking of our own affairs or those of others, we must distinguish between the expedient and the becoming, while recognising that the majority of the points which we have to consider will fall under neither head. In the first place, then, all kinds of boasting are a mistake, above all, it is an error for an orator to praise his own eloquence, and, further, not merely wearies, but in the majority of cases disgusts the audience.
1.15. dicamus autem de rebus aut alienis aut nostris, dividenda ratio est eorum, dum sciamus pleraque neutro loco convenire. primis igitur omnis vitiosa iactatio est, eloquentiae tamen in oratore praecipue, adfertque audientibus non fastidium modo, sed plerumque etiam odium.
1.16. For there is ever in the mind of man a certain element of lofty and unbending pride that will not brook superiority: and for this reason we take delight in raising the humble and submissive to their feet, since such an act gives us a consciousness of our superiority, and as soon as all sense of rivalry disappears, its place is taken by a feeling of humanity. But the man who exalts himself beyond reason is looked upon as depreciating and showing a contempt for others and as making them seem small rather than himself seem great.
1.16. enim mens nostra sublime quiddam et erectum et impatiens superioris; ideoque abiectos aut summittentes se libenter allevamus, quia hoc facere tanquam maiores videmur; et quotiens discessit aemulatio, succedit humanitas. qui se supra modum extollit, premere ac despicere creditur, nec tam se maiorem quam minores ceteros facere.
1.17. As a result, those who are beneath him feel a grudge against him (for those who are unwilling to yield and yet have not the strength to hold their own are always liable to this failing), while his superiors laugh at him and the good disapprove. Indeed, as a rule, you will find that arrogance implies a false self-esteem, whereas those who possess true merit find satisfaction enough in the consciousness of possession. Cicero has been severely censured in this connexion, although he was far more given to boasting of his political achievements than of his eloquence, at any rate, in his speeches.
1.17. invident humiliores, (hoc vitium est eorum, qui nec cedere volunt nec possunt contendere) rident superiores, improbant boni. vere deprehendas arrogantium falsum de se opinionem; sed in veris quoque sufficit conscientia. est in hac parte non mediocriter Cicero, quanquam is quidem rerum a se gestarum maior quam eloquentiae fuit in orationibus utique iactator.
1.18. And as a rule he had some sound reason for his self-praise. For he was either defending those who had assisted him to crush the conspiracy of Catiline, or was replying to attacks made upon him by those who envied his position; attacks which he was so far unable to withstand that he suffered exile as the penalty for having saved his country. Consequently, we may regard his frequent reference to the deeds accomplished in his consulship as being due quite as much to the necessities of defence as to the promptings of vainglory.
1.18. plerumque illud quoque non sine aliqua ratione fecit. enim tuebatur eos, quibus erat adiutoribus usus in opprimenda coniuratione, aut respondebat invidiae (cui tamen non fuit par, servatae patriae poenam passus exilium), ut illorum, quae egerat in consulatu, frequens commemoratio possit videri non gloriae magis quam defensioni data.
1.19. As regards his own eloquence, he never made immoderate claims for it in his pleading, while he always paid a handsome tribute to the eloquence of the advocate, who opposed him. For example, there are passages such as the following: “If there be aught of talent in me, and I am only too conscious how little it is,” and, “In default of talent, I turned to industry for aid.”
1.19. quidem, cum plenissimam diversae partis advocatis concederet, sibi nunquam in agendo immodice adrogauit. sunt enim: quid est ingenii in me, quod sentio quam sit exiguum, et, ingenio minus possum, subsidium mihi diligentia comparavi.
1.20. Again, in his speech against Caecilius on the selection of an accuser for Verres, despite the fact that the question as to which was the most capable pleader, was a factor of great importance, he rather depreciated his opponent's eloquence than exalted his own, and asserted that he had done all in his power to make himself an orator, though he knew he had not succeeded.
1.20. etiam contra Q. Caecilium de accusatore in Verrem constituendo, quamvis multum esset in hoc quoque momenti, uter ad agendum magis idoneus veniret, dicendi tamen facultatem magis illi detraxit quam adrogauit sibi, seque non consecutum, sed omnia fecisse, ut posset eam consequi, dixit.
1.21. In his letters to intimate friends, it is true, and occasionally in his dialogues, he tells the truth of his own eloquence, though in the latter case he is careful always to place the remarks in question in the mouth of some other character. And yet I am not sure that open boasting is not more tolerable, owing to its sheer straightforwardness, than that perverted form of self-praise, which makes the millionaire say that he is not a poor man, the man of mark describe himself as obscure, the powerful pose as weak, and the eloquent as unskilled and even inarticulate.
1.21. epistolis aliquando familiariter apud amicos, nonnunquam in dialogis aliena tamen persona verum de eloquentia sua dicit. aperte tamen gloriari nescio an sit magis tolerabile vel ipsa vitii huius simplicitate, quam illa iactatio perversa, si abundans opibus pauperem se neget, nobilis obscurum et potens infirmum et disertus imperitum plane et infantem vocet.
1.22. But the most ostentatious kind of boasting takes the form of actual self-derision. Let us therefore leave it to others to praise us. For it beseems us, as Demosthenes says, to blush even when we are praised by others. I do not mean to deny that there are occasions when an orator may speak of his own achievements, as Demosthenes himself does in his defence of Ctesiphon. But on that occasion he qualified his statements in such a way as to show that he was compelled by necessity to do so, and to throw the odium attaching to such a proceeding on the man who had forced him to it.
1.22. gloriandi genus est etiam deridere. aliis ergo laudemur; nam ipsos, ut Demosthenes ait, erubescere, etiam cum ab alis laudabimur, decet. hoc dico, non aliquando de rebus a se gestis oratori esse dicendum, sicut eidem Demostheni pro Ctesiphonte; quod tamen ita emendavit, ut necessitatem id faciendi ostenderet invidiamque omnem in eum regereret, qui hoc se coegisset.
1.23. Again, Cicero often speaks of his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, but either attributes his success to the courage shown by the senate or to the providence of the immortal gods. If he puts forward stronger claims to merit, it is generally when speaking against his enemies and detractors; for he was bound to defend his actions when they were denounced as discreditable.
1.23. M. Tullius saepe dicit de oppressa coniuratione Catilinae; sed modo id virtuti senatus, modo providentiae deorum immortalium adsignat. contra inimicos atque obtrectatores plus vindicat sibi. enim illa tuenda, cum obiicerentur.
1.24. One could only wish that he had shown greater restraint in his poems, which those who love him not are never weary of criticising. I refer to passages such as:Let arms before the peaceful toga yield,Laurels to eloquence resign the field,or“O happy Rome, born in my consulship!”together with that “Jupiter, by whom he is summoned to the assembly of the gods,” and the “Minerva that taught him her accomplishments”; extravagances which he permitted himself in imitation of certain precedents in Greek literature.
1.24. carminibus utinam pepercisset, quae non desierunt carpere maligni:arma togae, concedat laurea linguae;etO fortunatam natam me consule Romam;et Iovem illum, a quo in concilium deorum advocatur; et Minervam, quae artes eum edocuit; quae sibi ille secutus quaedam Graecorum exempla permiserat.
1.25. But while it is unseemly to make a boast of one's eloquence, it is, however, at times permissible to express confidence in it. Who, for instance, can blame the following? “What, then, am I to think? That I am held in contempt? I see nothing either in my past life, or my position, or such poor talents as I may possess, that Antony can afford to despise.” And a little later he speaks yet more openly:
1.25. eloquentiae ut indecora iactatio, ita nonnunquam concedenda fiducia est. quis reprehendat haec: putem? contemptumne me? video nec in vita nec in gratia nec in rebus gestis nec in hac mea mediocritate ingenii, quid despicere possit Antonius? paulo post apertius:
1.26. “Or did he wish to challenge me to a contest of eloquence? I could wish for nothing better. For what ampler or richer theme could I hope to find than to speak at once for myself and against Antony?”
1.26. decertare mecum voluit contentione dicendi? quidem est beneficium. enim plenius, quid uberius quam mihi et pro me et contra Antonium dicere?
1.27. Another form of arrogance is displayed by those who declare that they have come to a clear conviction of the justice of their cause, which they would not otherwise have undertaken. For the judges give but a reluctant hearing to such as presume to anticipate their verdict, and the orator cannot hope that his opponents will regard his ipse dixit with the veneration accorded by the Pythagoreans to that of their master. But this fault will vary in seriousness according to the character of the orator who uses such language.
1.27. et illi, qui se iudicasse de causa nec aliter adfuturos fuisse proponunt. et inviti iudices audiunt praesumentem partes suas, nec hoc oratori contingere inter aduersarios quod Pythagorae inter discipulos potest dixit. istud magis minusve vitiosum est pro personis dicentium.
1.28. For such assertions may to some extent be justified by the age, rank, and authority of the speaker. But scarcely any orator is possessed of these advantages to such an extent as to exempt him from the duty of tempering such assertions by a certain show of modesty, a remark which also applies to all passages in which the advocate draws any of his arguments from his own person. What could have been more presumptuous than if Cicero had asserted that the fact that a man was the son of a Roman knight should never be regarded as a serious charge, in a case in which he was appearing for the defence? But he succeeded in giving this very argument a favourable turn by associating his own rank with that of the judges, and saying, “The fact of a man being the son of a Roman knight should never have been put forward as a charge by the prosecution when these gentlemen were in the jury-box and I was appearing for the defendant.”
1.28. enim aliquatenus aetate, dignitate, auctoritate; quae tamen vix in ullo tanta fuerint, ut non hoc adfirmationis genus temperandum sit aliqua moderatione sicut omnia, in quibus patronus argumentum ex se ipso pete. fuisset tumidius, si accipiendum criminis loco negasset Cicero equitis Romani esse filium, se defendente? ille fecit hoc etiam fauorabile coniungendo cum iudicibus dignitatem suam: autem Romani esse filium, criminis loco poni ab accusatoribus, neque vobis iudicantibus oportuit neque defendentibus nobis.
1.29. An impudent, disorderly, or angry tone is always unseemly, no matter who it be that assumes it; and it becomes all the more reprehensible in proportion to the age, rank, and experience of the speaker. But we are familiar with the sight of certain brawling advocates who are restrained neither by respect for the court nor by the recognised methods and manners of pleading. The obvious inference from this attitude of mind is that they are utterly reckless both in undertaking cases and in pleading them.
1.29. , tumultuosa, iracunda actio omnibus indecora, sed ut quisque aetate, dignitate, usu praecedit, magis in ea reprehendendus. autem rixatores quosdam neque iudicum reverentia neque agendi more ac modo contineri, quo ipso mentis habitu manifestum sit, tam in suscipiendis quam in agendis causis nihil pensi habere.
1.30. For a man's character is generally revealed and the secrets of his heart are laid bare by his manner of speaking, and there is good ground for the Greek aphorism that, “as a man lives, so will he speak.” The following vices are of a meaner type: grovelling flattery, affected buffoonery, immodesty in dealing with things or words which are unseemly or obscene, and disregard of authority on all and every occasion. They are faults which, as a rule, are found in those who are over-anxious either to please or amuse.
1.30. enim mores plerumque oratio et animi secret detegit. sine causa Graeci prodiderunt, ut vivat, quemque etiam dicere. illa vitia: summissa adulatio, adfectata scurrilitas, in rebus ac verbis parum modestis ac pudicis vilis pudor, in omni negotio neglecta auctoritas; quae fere accidunt iis, qui nimium aut blandi esse aut ridiculi volunt.
1.31. Again, different kinds of eloquence suit different speakers. For example, a full, haughty, bold and florid style would be less becoming to an old man than that restrained, mild and precise style to which Cicero refers, when he says that his style is beginning to grow grey-haired. It is the same with their style as their clothes; purple and scarlet raiment goes ill with grey hairs.
1.31. etiam eloquentiae genus alios aliud decet. neque tam plenum et erectum et audax et praecultum senibus convenerit quam pressum et mite et limatum et quale intelligi vult Cicero, cum dicit, orationem suam coepisse canescere; sicut vestibus quoque non purpura coccoque fulgentibus illa aetas satis apta sit.
1.32. In the young, however, we can endure a rich and even, perhaps, a risky style. On the other hand, a dry, careful and compressed style is unpleasing in the young as suggesting the affectation of severity, since even the authority of character that goes with age is considered as premature in young men. Soldiers are best suited by a simple style.
1.32. iuvenibus etiam uberiora paulo et paene periclitantia feruntur. in iisdem siccum et sollicitum et contractum dicendi propositum plerumque adfectatione ipsa severitatis invisum est, quando etiam morum senilis auctoritas immatura in adolescentibus creditur. militares decent.
1.33. Those, again, who make ostentatious profession, as some do, of being philosophers, would do well to avoid most of the ornaments of oratory, more especially those which consist in appeals to the passions, which they regard as moral blemishes. So, too, the employment of rare words and of rhythmical structure are incongruous with their profession.
1.33. ex professo, ut quidam faciunt, ostentantibus parum decori sunt plerique orationis ornatus maximeque ex adfectibus, quos illi vitia dicunt. quoque exquisitiora et compositio numerosa tali proposito diversa.
1.34. For their beards and gloomy brows are ill-suited not merely to luxuriance of style, such as we find in Cicero's “Rocks and solitudes answer to the voice,” but even to full-blooded passages as, “For on you I call, ye hills and groves of Alba; I call you to bear me witness, and ye, too, fallen altars of the Albans, that were once the peers and equals of the holy places of Rome.”
1.34. enim sola illa laetiora, qualia a Cicerone dicuntur, atque solitudines voci respondent; sed etiam illa, quanquam plena sanguinis, enim iam, Albani tumuli atque luci, vos, inquam, imploro atque testor, mosque, Albanorum obrutae arae, sacrorum populi Romani sociae et aequales, non conveniant barbae illi atque tristitiae.
1.35. But the public man, who is truly wise and devotes himself not to idle disputations, but to the administration of the state, from which those who call themselves philosophers have withdrawn themselves afar, will gladly employ every method that may contribute to the end which he seeks to gain by his eloquence, although he will first form a clear conception in his mind as to what aims are honourable and what are not.
1.35. vir civilis vereque sapiens, qui se non otiosis disputationibus, sed administrationi rei publicae dediderit, a qua longissime isti, qui philosophi vocantur, recesserunt, omnia, quae ad efficiendum oratione quod proposuerit valent, libenter adhibebit, cum prius quid honestum sit efficere in animo suo constituerit.
1.36. There is a form of eloquence which is becoming in the greatest men, but inadmissible in others. For example, the methods of eloquence employed by commanders and conquerors in their hour of triumph are to a great extent to be regarded as in a class apart. The comparison of the eloquence of Plompey and Cato the younger, who slew himself in the civil war, will illustrate my meaning. The former was extraordinarily eloquent in the description of his own exploits, while the latter's powers were displayed in debates in the senate.
1.36. quod principes deceat, aliis non concesseris. ac triumphalium separata est aliqua ex parte ratio eloquentiae, sicut Pompeius abunde disertus rerum suarum narrator, et hic, qui bello civili se interfecit, Cato eloquens senator fuit.
1.37. Again, the same remark will seem freedom of speech in one's mouth, madness in another's, and arrogance in a third. We laugh at the words used by Thersites to Agamemnon; but put them in the mouth of Diomede or some other of his peers, and they will seem the expression of a great spirit. “Shall I regard you as consul,” said Lucius Crassus to Phililppus, “when you refuse to regard me as a senator?” That was honourable freedom of speech, and yet we should not tolerate such words from everybody's lips.
1.37. dictum saepe in alio liberum, in alio furiosum, in alio superbum est. adversus Agamemnonem a Thersite habita ridentur; da illa Diomedi aliive cui pari: magnum animum ferre prae se videbuntur. te consulem putem, inquit L. Crassus Philippo, cum tu me non putes senatorem? uox honestissimae libertatis; non tamen ferres quemcumque dicentem.
1.38. One of the poets says that he does not care whether Caesar be white or black. That is madness. But reverse the case. Suppose that Caesar said it of the poet? That would be arrogance. The tragic and comic poets pay special attention to character, since they introduce a great number and variety of persons. Those who wrote speeches for others paid a like attention to these points, and so do the declaimers; for we do not always speak as advocates, but frequently as actual parties to the suit.
1.38. se magni facere aliquis poetarum, utrum Caesar ater an albus homo sit, insania; verte, ut idem Caesar de illo dixerit, arrogantia est. in personis observatio est apud tragicos comicosque, multis enim utuntur et variis. et eorum, qui orationes aliis scribebant, fuit ratio et declamantium est; non enim semper ut advocati sed plerumque ut litigatores dicimus.
1.39. But even in these cases in which we appear as advocates, differences of character require careful observation. For we introduce fictitious personages and speak through other's lips, and we must therefore allot the appropriate character to those to whom we lend a voice. For example, Publius Clodius will be represented in one way, Appius Caecus in another, while Caecilius makes the father in his comedy speak in quite a different manner from the father in the comedy of Terence.
1.39. etiam in iis causis, quibus advocamur, eadem differentia diligenter est custodienda. enim fictione personarum et velut ore alieno loquimur, dandique sunt iis, quibus vocem accommodamus, sui mores. enim P. Clodius, aliter Appius Caecus, aliter Caecilianus ille, aliter Terentianus pater fingitur. asperius lictore Verris: adeas, tantum dabis?
1.40. What can be more brutal than the words of Verres' lictor, “To see him you will pay so much”? or braver than those of the man from whom the scourge could wring but one cry, “I am a Roman citizen!” Again, read the words which Cicero places in the mouth of Milo in his peroration: are they not worthy of the man who to save the state had so oft repressed a seditious citizen, and had triumphed by his valour over the ambush that was laid for him?
1.40. fortius illo, cuius inter ipsa verberum supplicia una vox audiebatur: Romanus sum? dignae Milonis in peroratione ipsa voces eo viro, qui pro re publica seditiosum civem totiens compescuisset quique insidias virtute superasset?
1.41. Further, it is not merely true that the variety required in impersonation will be in proportion to the variety presented by the case, for impersonation demands even greater variety, since it involves the portrayal of the emotions of children, women, nations, and even of voiceless things, all of which require to be represented in character.
1.41. non modo quot in causa totidem in prosopopoeia sunt varietates, sed hoc etiam plures, quod in his puerorum, feminarum, populorum, mutarum etiam rerum assimulamus adfectus, quibus omnibus debetur suus decor.
1.42. The same points have to be observed with respect to those for whom we plead: for our tone will vary with the character of our client, according as he is distinguished, or of humble position, popular or the reverse, while we must also take into account the differences in their principles and their past life. As regards the orator himself, the qualities which will most commend him are courtesy, kindliness, moderation and benevolence. But, on the other hand, the opposite of these qualities will sometimes be becoming to a good man. He may hate the bad, be moved to passion in the public interest, seek to avenge crime and wrong, and, in fine, as I said at the beginning, may follow the promptings of every honourable emotion.
1.42. in iis, pro quibus agemus, observanda sunt; aliter enim pro alio saepe dicendum est, ut quisque honestus, humilis, invidiosus, favorabilis erit, adiecta propositorum quoque et anteactae vitae differentia. vero in oratore humanitas, facilitas, moderatio, benivolentia. illa quoque diversa bonum virum decent: malos odisse, publica vice commoveri, ultum ire scelera et iniurias, et omnia, ut initio dixi, honesta.
1.43. The character of the speaker and of the person on whose behalf he speaks are, however, not the only points which it is important to take into account: the character of those before whom we have to speak calls for serious consideration. Their power and rank will make no small difference; we shall employ different methods according as we are speaking before the emperor, a magistrate, a senator, a private citizen, or merely a free man, while a different tone is demanded by trials in the public courts, and in cases submitted to arbitration.
1.43. tantum, quis et pro quo sed etiam apud quem dicas, interest. enim et fortuna discrimen et potestas, nec eadem apud principem, magistratum, senatorem, privatum, tantum liberum ratio est, nec eodem sono publica iudicia et arbitrorum disceptationes aguntur.
1.44. For while a display of care and anxiety, and the employment of every device available for the amplification of our style are becoming when we are pleading for a client accused on a capital charge, it would be useless to employ the same methods in cases and trials of minor importance, and the speaker who, when speaking from his chair before an arbitrator on some trivial question, should make an admission like that made by Cicero, to the effect that it was not merely his soul that was in a state of commotion, but that his whole body was convulsed with shuddering, would meet with well-deserved ridicule.
1.44. ut orantem pro capite sollicitudo deceat et cura et omnes ad amplificandam orationem quasi machinae, ita in parvis rebus iudiciisque vana sint eadem, rideaturque merito, qui apud disceptatorem de re levissima sedens dicturus utatur illa Ciceronis confessione, non modo se animo commoveri, sed etiam corpore ipso perhorrescere.
1.45. Again, who does not know what different styles of eloquence are required when speaking before the grave assembly of the senate and before the fickle populace, since even when we are pleading before single judges the same style will not be suitable for use before one of weighty character and another of a more frivolous disposition, while a learned judge must not be addressed in the same tone that we should employ before a soldier or a rustic, and our style must at times be lowered and simplified, for fear that he may be unable to take it in or to understand it.
1.45. vero nesciat, quanto aliud dicendi genus poscat gravitas senatoria, aliud aura popularis? cum etiam singulis iudicantibus non idem apud graves viros quod leviores, non idem apud eruditum quod militarem ac rusticum deceat, sitque nonnunquam summittenda et contrahenda oratio, ne iudex eam vel intelligere vel capere non possit.
1.46. Again, circumstances of time and place demand special consideration. The occasion may be one for sorrow or for rejoicing, the time at our disposal may be ample or restricted, and the orator must adapt himself to all these circumstances.
1.46. quoque ac locus egent observatione propria. et tempus tum triste, tum laetum, tum liberum, tum angustum est, atque ad haec omnia componendus orator;
1.47. It, likewise, makes no small difference whether we are speaking in public or in private, before a crowded audience or in comparative seclusion, in another city or our own, in the camp or in the forum: each of these places will require its own style and peculiar form of oratory, since even in other spheres of life the same actions are not equally suited to the forum, the senate-house, the Campus Martius, the theatre or one's own house, and there is much that is not in itself reprehensible, and may at times be absolutely necessary, which will be regarded as unseemly if done in some place where it is not sanctioned by custom.
1.47. et loco publico privatone, celebri an secreto, aliena civitate an tua, in castris denique an foro dicas, interest plurimum, ac suam quidque formam et proprium quendam modum eloquentiae poscit: cum etiam in ceteris actibus vitae non idem in foro, curia, campo, theatro, domi facere conveniat; et pleraque, quae natura non sunt reprehendenda atque adeo interim sunt necessaria, alibi quam mos permiserit turpia habeantur.
1.48. I have already pointed out how much more elegance and ornament is allowed by the topics of demonstrative oratory, whose main object is the delectation of the audience, than is permitted by deliberative or forensic themes which are concerned with action and argument. To this must be added the fact that certain qualities, which are in themselves merits of a high order, may be rendered unbecoming by the special circumstances of the case.
1.48. iam diximus, quanto plus nitoris et cultus demonstrativae materiae, ut ad delectationem audientium compositae, quam, quae sunt in actu et contentione, suasoriae iudicialesque permittant. adhuc adiiciendum aliquas etiam, quae sunt egregiae dicendi virtutes, quo minus deceant, effici condicione causarum.
1.49. For example, when a man is accused on a capital charge, and, above all, if he is defending himself before his conqueror or his sovereign, it would be quite intolerable for him to indulge in frequent metaphors, antique or newlycoined words, rhythms as far removed as possible from the practice of every-day speech, rounded periods, florid commonplaces and ornate reflexions. Would not all these devices destroy the impression of anxiety which should be created by a man in such peril, and rob him of the succour of pity, on which even the innocent are forced to rely?
1.49. quisquam tulerit reum in discrimine capitis, praecipueque si apud victorem et principem pro se ipse dicat, frequenti translatione, fictis aut repetitis ex vetustate verbis, compositione quae sit maxime a vulgari usu remote, decurrentibus periodis, quam laetissimis locis sententiisque dicentem? perdant haec omnia necessarium periclitanti sollicitudinis colorem, petendumque etiam innocentibus misericordiae auxilium?
1.50. Would any man be moved by the sad plight of one who revealed himself as a vainglorious boaster, and ostentatiously flaunted the airs and graces of his eloquence at a moment when his fate hung in suspense? Would he not rather hate the man who, despite his position as accused, hunted for fine words, showed himself concerned for his reputation as a clever speaker, and found time at such a moment to display his eloquence?
1.50. quisquam eius fortuna, quem tumidum ac sui iactantem et ambitiosum institorem eloquentiae in ancipiti sorte videat? immo oderit reum verba aucupantem et anxium de fama ingenii, et cui esse diserto vacet?
1.51. I consider that Marcus Caelius, in the speech in which he defended himself against a charge of breach of the peace, showed a wonderful grasp of these facts, when he said: “I trust that none of you gentlemen, or of all those who have come to plead against me, will find offence in my mien or insolence in my voice, or, though that is a comparative trifle, any trace of arrogance in my gesture.”
1.51. mire M. Caelius in defensione causae, qua reus de vi fuit, comprehendisse videtur mihi: cui vestrum atque etiam omnium, qui ad rem agendam adsunt, meus aut vultus molestior aut vox immoderatior aliqua aut denique, quod minimum est, iactantior gestus fuisse videatur.
1.52. But there are some cases where the success of the pleader depends on apology, entreaties for mercy, or confession of error. Can sorrow be expressed in epigram? Or will enthymemes or epiphonemata avail to win the judge's mercy? Will not all embellishment of pure emotion merely impair its force and dispel compassion by such a display of apparent unconcern?
1.52. sunt quaedam actiones in satisfactione, deprecatione, confessione positae: sententiolisne flendum erit? epiphonemata aut enthymemata exorabunt?, quidquid meris adiicietur adfectibus, omnes eorum diluet vires et miserationem securitate laxabit?
1.53. Or, suppose that a father has to speak of his son's death, or of some wrong that is worse than death, will he, in making his statement of facts, seek to achieve that grace in exposition which is secured by purity and lucidity of language, and content himself with setting forth his case in due order with brevity and meaning? Or will he count over the heads of his argument upon his fingers, aim at niceties of division and proposition, and speak without the least energy of feeling as is usual in such portions of a speech?
1.53. , si de morte filii sui vel iniuria, quae morte sit gravior, dicendum patri fuerit, aut in narrando gratiam illam expositionis, quae continget ex sermone puro atque dilucido, quaeret, breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse contentus, aut argumenta diducet in digitos et propositionum ac partitionum captabit leporem et, ut plerumque in hoc genere moris est, intentione omni remissa loquetur?
1.54. Whither will his grief have fled while he is thus engaged? Where has the fountain of his tears been stayed? How came this callous attention to the rules of text-books to obtrude itself? Will he not rather, from his opening words to the very last he utters, maintain a continuous voice of lamentation and a mien of unvaried woe, if he desires to transplant his grief to the hearts of his audience? For if he once remits aught of his passion of grief, he will never be able to recall it to the hearts of them that hear him.
1.54. fugerit interim dolor ille? ubi lacrimae substiterint? unde se in medium tam secura observatio artium miserit? ab exordio usque ad ultimam vocem continues quidam gemitus et idem tristitiae vultus servabitur, si quidem volet dolorem suum etiam in audientes transfundere? quem si usquam remiserit, in animum iudicantium non reducet.
1.55. This is a point which declaimers, above all, must be careful to bear in mind: I mention this because I have no compunction in referring to a branch of the art which was once also my own, or in reverting to the consideration of the youthful students such as once were in my charge: the declaimer, I repeat, must bear this in mind, since in the schools we often feign emotions that affect us not as advocates, but as the actual sufferers.
1.55. praecipue declamantibus (neque enim me paenitet ad hoc quoque opus meum et curam susceptorum semel adolescentium respicere) custodiendum est, quo plures in schola finguntur adfectus, quos non ut advocati, sed ut passi subimus.
1.56. For example, we even imagine cases where persons, either because of some overwhelming misfortune or repentance for some sin, demand from the senate the right to make an end of their lives; and in these cases it is obviously unbecoming not merely to adopt a chanting intonation, a fault which has also become almost universal, or to use extravagant language, but even to argue without an admixture of emotional appeal, so managed as to be even more prominent than the proof which is advanced. For the man who can lay aside his grief for a moment while he is pleading, seems capable even of laying it aside altogether I am not sure, however, that it is not in our attitude towards our opponents that this care for decorum, which we are now discussing, should be most rigorously maintained.
1.56. etiam hoc genus simulari litium soleat, cum ius mortis a senatu quidam ob aliquam magnam infelicitatem vel etiam paenitentiam petunt, in quibus non solum cantare, quod vitium pervasit, aut lascivire, sed ne argumentari quidem nisi mixtis, et quidem ita ut ipsa probatione magis emineant, adfectibus decet. qui intermittere in agendo dolorem potest, videtur posse etiam deponere.
1.57. For there can be no doubt, that in all accusations our first aim should be to give the impression that it is only with the greatest reluctance that we have consented to undertake the role of accuser. Consequently, I strongly disapprove of such remarks as the following which was made by Cassius Severus: “Thank Heaven, I am still alive; and that I may find some savour in life, I see Asprenas arraigned for his crimes.” For, after this, it is impossible to suppose that he had just or necessary reasons for accusing Asprenas, and we cannot help suspecting that his motive was sheer delight in accusation.
1.57. tamen an huius, de quo loquimur, decoris custodia maxime circa eos, contra quos dicimus, examinanda sit. sine dubio in omnibus statim accusationibus hoc agendum est, ne ad eas libenter descendisse videamur. mihi illud Cassii Severi non mediocriter displicet: boni, vico; et, quo me vivere iuvet, Asprenatem reum video. enim iusta ex causa vel necessaria videri potest postulasse eum, sed quadam accusandi voluptate.
1.58. But, beside this consideration, which applies to all cases, there is the further point that certain cases demand special moderation. Therefore, a man who demands the appointment of a curator for his father's property, should express his grief at his father's affliction; and, however grave be the charges that a father may be going to bring against his son, he should emphasize the painful nature of the necessity that is imposed upon him. And this he should do not merely in a few brief words, but his emotion should colour his whole speech, so that it may be felt not merely that he is speaking, but that he is speaking the truth.
1.58. hoc tamen, quod est commune, propriam moderationem quaedam causae desiderant. et, qui curationem bonorum patris postulabit, doleat eius valetudinem; et quamlibet gravia filio pater obiecturus miserrimam sibi ostendat esse hanc ipsam necessitatem, nec hoc paucis modo verbis, sed toto colore actionis, ut id eum non dicere modo, sed etiam vere dicere appareat.
1.59. Again, if a ward make allegations against his guardian, the latter must never give way to such anger that no trace is left of his former love or of a certain reverent regard for the memory of his opponent's father. I have already spoken, in the seventh book, I think, of the way in which a case should be pleaded against a father who disinherits his son, or a wife who brings a charge of illtreatment against her husband, while the fourth book, in which I prescribed certain rules for the exordium, contains my instructions as to when it is becoming that the parties should speak themselves, and when they should employ an advocate to speak for them.
1.59. causanti pupillo sic tutor irascatur unquam, ut non remaneant amoris vestigia et sacra quaedam patris eius memoria. quomodo contra abdicantem patrem, querentem uxorem, agi causam oporteret, in libro, ut arbitror, septimo dixi. etiam ipsos loqui, quando advocati voce uti deceat, quartus liber, in quo prooemii praecepta sunt, continet.
1.60. It will be readily admitted by everyone that words may be becoming or offensive in themselves. There is therefore a further point, which presents the most serious difficulty, that requires notice in this connexion: we must consider by what means things which are naturally unseemly and which, had we been given the choice, we should have preferred not to say, may be uttered without indecorum.
1.60. et in verbis quod deceat aut turpe sit, nemini dubium est. iam igitur huic loco, quod est sane summae difficultatis, adiciendum videtur, quibus modis ea, quae sunt natura parum speciosa quaeque non dicere, si utrumlibet esset liberum, maluissemus, non tamen sint indecora dicentibus.
1.61. What at first sight can be more unpleasing and what more revolting to the ears of men than a case in which a son or his advocate has to speak against his mother? And yet sometimes it is absolutely necessary, as, for example, in the case of Cluentius Habitus. But it is not always desirable to employ the method adopted by Cicero against Sasia, not because he did not make most admirable use of it, but because in such cases it makes the greatest difference what the point may be and what the manner in which the mother seeks to injure her son.
1.61. asperiorem habere frontem potest aut quid aures hominum magis respuunt, quam cum est filio filiive advocatis in matrem perorandum? tamen necesse est, ut in causa Cluentii Habiti. non semper illa via, qua contra Sasiam Cicero usus est; non quia non ille optime, sed quia plurimum refert, qua in re et quo modo laedat.
1.62. In the case of Sasia she hat openly sought to procure the destruction of her son, and consequently vigorous methods were justified against her. But there were two points, the only points which remained to be dealt with, that were handled by Cicero with consummate skill: in the first place, he does not forget the reverence that is due to parents, and in the second, after a thorough investigation of the history of the crime, he makes it clear that it was not merely right, but a positive necessity that he should say what he proposed to say against the mother.
1.62. illa, cum filii caput palam impugnaret, fortiter fuit repellenda. tamen, quae sola supererant, divine Cicero servavit, primum, ne oblivisceretur reverentiae, quae parentibus debetur; deinde ut, repetitis altius causis, diligentissime ostenderet, quam id, quod erat in matrem dicturus, non oporteret modo fieri, sed etiam necesse esset.
1.63. And he placed this explantation in the forefront of his case, although it had really nothing to do with the actual question at issue; a fact which shows that his first consideration in that difficult and complicated case was the consideration of what was becoming for him to say. He therefore made the name of mother cast odium not on the son, but on her who was the object of his denunciations.
1.63. haec expositio fuit, quanquam ad praesentem quaestionem nihil pertinebat. in causa difficili atque perplexa nihil prius intuendum credidit quam quid deceret. itaque nomen parentis non filio invidiosum, sed ipsi in quam dicebatur.
1.64. It is, however, always possible that a mother may be her son's opponent in a case of less serious import, or at any rate in a way which involves less deadly hostility. Under such circumstances the orator must adopt a gentler and more restrained tone. For example, we may offer apology for the line which we take, and thus lessen the odium which we incur or even transfer it to a different quarter, while if it be obvious that the son is deeply grieved by the situation, it will be believed that he is blameless in the matter and he will even become an object of pity.
1.64. tamen aliquando mater et in re leviore aut minus infeste contra filium stare; tum lenior atque summissior decebit oratio. et satisfaciendo aut nostram minuemus invidiam aut etiam in diversum eam transferemus; et si graviter dolere filium palam fuerit, credetur abesse ab eo culpam fietque ultro miserabilis.
1.65. It will also be desirable to throw the blame on others, so that it may be believed that the mother's action was instigated by their malice, and to assert that we will put up with every form of provocation, and will say nothing harsh in reply, so that, even although strong language may be absolutely necessary on our part, we may seem to be driven to use it against our will. Nay, if some charge has to be made against the mother, it will be the advocate's task to make it seem that he does so against the desire of the son and from a sense of duty to his client. Thus both son and advocate will win legitimate praise.
1.65. quoque in alios crimen decet, ut fraude aliquorum concita credatur, et omnia nos passuros, nihil aspere dicturos testandum, ut, etiamsi non possumus non conviciari, nolle videamur., si quid obiciendum erit, officium est patroni, ut id filio invito, sed fide cogente facere credatur. poterit uterque laudari.