1.66. What I have said about mothers will apply to either parent; for I have known of litigation taking place between fathers and sons as well, after the emancipation of the son. And when other relationships are concerned, we must take care to create the impression that we have spoken with reluctance and under stress of necessity and that we have been forbearing in our language; but the importance of so doing will vary according to the respect due to the persons concerned. The same courtesy should be observed in speaking on behalf of freedmen against their patrons. In fact, to sum up, it will never become us to plead against such persons in a tone which we ourselves should have resented in the mouth of men of like condition.
1.66. de matre dixi, de utroque parente accipiendum est; nam inter patres etiam filiosque, cum intervenisset emancipatio, litigatum scio. aliis quoque propinquitatibus custodiendum est, ut inviti et necessario et parce iudicemur dixisse, magis autem aut minus, ut cuique personae debetur reverentia. pro libertis adversus patronos observantia. ut semel plura complectar, nunquam decebit sic adversus tales agere personas, quomodo contra nos agi ab hominibus condicionis eiusdem iniquo animo tulissemus.
1.67. The same respect is on occasion due to persons of high rank, and it may be necessary to offer justification for our freedom of speech to avoid giving the impression that we have shown ourselves insolent or ostentatious in our attack upon such persons. Consequently Cicero, although he intended to speak against Cotta with the utmost vehemence, and indeed the case of Publius Oppius was such that he could not do otherwise, prefaced his attack by pleading at some length the necessity imposed upon him by his duty to his client.
1.67. hoc aliquando etiam dignationibus, ut libertatis nostrae ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut petulantes in laedendis eis aut etiam ambitiosos putet. Cicero, quanquam erat in Cottam gravissime dicturus, neque aliter agi P. Oppii causa poterat, longa tamen praefatione excusavit officii sui necessitatem.
1.68. Sometimes, again, it will beseem us to spare or seem to spare our inferiors, more especially if they be young. Cicero gives an example of such moderation in the way in which he deals with Atratinus in his defence of Caelius: he does not lash him like an enemy, but admonishes him almost like a father. For Atratinus was of noble birth and young, and the grievance which led him to bring the accusation was not unreasonable. But the task is comparatively easy in those cases in which it is to the judge, or even, it may be, to our audience that we have to indicate the reason for our moderation. The real difficulty arises when we are afraid of offending those against whom we are speaking.
1.68. etiam inferioribus praecipueque adolescentulis parcere aut videri decet. hac moderatione Cicero pro Caelio contra Atratinum, ut eum non inimice corripere, sed paene patrie monere videatur. et nobilis et iuvenis et non iniusto dolore venerat ad accusandum. in his quidem, in quibus vel iudici vel etiam adsistentibus ratio nostrae moderationis probari debet, minor est labor; illic plus difficultatis, ubi ipsos, contra quos dicimus, veremur offendere.
1.69. The difficulties of Cicero when defending Murena were increased by the fact that he was opposed by two persons of this character, namely Marcus Cato and Servius Sulpicius. And yet in what courteous language, after allowing Sulpicius all the virtues, he refuses to admit that he has any idea of the way to conduct a candidature for the consulship. What else was there in which a man of high birth and a distinguished lawyer would sooner admit his inferiority? With what skill he sets forth his reasons for undertaking the defence of Murena, when he says that he supported Sulpicius' candidature as opposed to that of Murena, but did not regard that preference as reason why he should support him in bringing a capital charge against his rival!
1.69. simul huiusmodi personae Ciceroni pro Murena dicenti obstiterunt, M. Catonis Serviique Sulpicii. decenter tamen Sulpicio, cum omnes concessisset virtutes, scientiam petendi consulatus ademit? enim aliud esset, quo se victum homo nobilis et iuris antistes magis ferret? vero rationem defensionis suae reddidit, cum se studuisse petitioni Sulpicii contra honorem Murenae, non idem debere accusationi contra caput diceret!
1.70. And with what a light touch he deals with Cato! He has the highest admiration for his character and desires to show that the fact that in certain respects it has become severe and callous is due not to any personal fault, but to the influence of the Stoic school of philosophy; in fact you would imagine that they were engaged not in a forensic dispute, but merely in some philosophical discussion.
1.70. molli autem articulo tractavit Catonem Cuius natura summe admiratus non ipsius vitio, sed Stoicae sectae quibusdam in rebus factam duriorem videri volebat; ut inter eos non forensem contentionem, sed studiosam disputationem crederes incidisse.
1.71. This is undoubtedly the right method, and the safest rule in such cases will be to follow the practice of Cicero, namely, that, when we desire to disparage a man without giving offence, we should allow him to be the possessor of all other virtues and point out that it is only in this one respect that he falls short of his high standard, while we should, if possible, add some reason why this should be so, such, for example, as his being too obstinate or credulous or quick to anger, or acting under the influence of others.
1.71. est profecto ratio et certissimum praeceptorum genus illius viri observatio, ut, cum aliquid detrahere salva gratia velis, concedas alia omnia: in hoc solo vel minus peritum quam in ceteris, adiecta, si poterit fieri, etiam causa, cur id ita sit, vel paulo pertinaciorem vel credulum vel iratum vel impulsum ab aliis.
1.72. (For we may generally find a way out of such embarrassments by making it clear throughout our whole speech that we not merely honour the object of our criticism, but even regard him with affection.) Further, we should have good cause for speaking thus and must do so not merely with moderation, but also give the impression that our action is due to the necessities of the case.
1.72. enim commune remedium est, si in tota actione aequaliter appareat non honor modo eius, sed etiam caritas. causa sit nobis iusta sic dicendi, neque id moderate tantum faciamus, sed etiam necessario.
1.73. A different situation arises, but an easier one, when we have to praise the actions of men who are otherwise disreputable or hateful to ourselves: for it is only right that we should award praise where it is deserved, whatever the character of the person praised may be. Cicero spoke in defence of Gabinius and Publius Vatinius, both of them his deadly enemies and men against whom he had previously spoken and even published his speeches: but he justifies himself by declaring that he does so not because he is anxious for his reputation as an accomplished speaker, but because he is concerned for his honour.
1.73. ab hoc sed facilius, cum hominum aut alioqui turpium aut nobis invisorum quaedam facta laudanda sunt. enim rem ipsam probare in qualicunque persona. Cicero pro Gabinio et P. Vatinio, inimicissimis antea sibi hominibus et in quos orationes etiam scripserat, uerum ait, ut sit iusta causa sic faciendi, non se de ingenii fama, sed de fide esse sollicitum.
1.74. He had a more difficult task in his defence of Cluentius, as it was necessary for him to denounce Scamander's guilt, although he had previously appeared for him. But he excuses his action with the utmost grace, alleging the importunity of those persons who had brought Scamander to him, and his own youth at the time, whereas it would have been a serious blot on his reputation, especially in connexion with a case of the most dubious character, if he had admitted that he was one who was ready to undertake the defence of guilty persons without asking awkward questions.
1.74. ei ratio in iudicio Cluentiano fuit, cum Scamandrum necesse haberet dicere nocentem, cuius egerat causam. id elegantissime cum eorum, a quibus ad se perductus esset, precibus, tum etiam adolescentia sua excusat, detracturus alioqui plurimum auctoritatis sibi, in causa praesertim suspecta, si eum se esse, qui temere nocentes reos susciperet, fateretur.
1.75. On the other hand, when we are pleading before a judge, who has special reasons for being hostile to us or is for some personal motive ill-disposed to the cause which we have undertaken, although it may be difficult to persuade him, the method which we should adopt in speaking is simple enough: we shall pretend that our confidence in his integrity and in the justice of our cause is such that we have no fears. We must play upon his vanity by pointing out that the less he indulges his own personal enmity or interest, the greater will be the reputation for conscientious rectitude that will accrue to him from his verdict.
1.75. iudicem vero, qui aut erit inimicus aut propter aliquod commodum a causa, quam nos susceperimus, aversus, ut persuadendi ardua ratio, ita dicendi expeditissima. enim iustitiae eius et nostrae causae nihil nos timere simulabimus. erit gloria inflandus, ut tanto clarior eius futura sit fides ac religio in pronuntiando, quanto minus vel offensae vel utilitati suae indulserit.
1.76. The same method may be adopted if our case should chance to be sent back to the same judges from whom we have appealed: but we may further, if the case should permit, plead that we were forced to take the action which we did or were led to it by error or suspicion. The safest course will therefore be to express our regret, apologise for our fault and employ every means to induce the judge to feel compunction for his anger.
1.76. et apud eos, a quibus appellatum erit, si forte ad eosdem remittemur; adiicienda ratio vel necessitatis alicuius, si id causa concedit, vel erroris vel suspicionis. ergo paenitentiae confessio et satisfactio culpae, perducendusque omni modo iudex ad irae pudorem.
1.77. It will also sometimes happen that a judge may have to try the same case on which he has previously given judgment. In such circumstances the method commonly adopted is to say that we should not have ventured to dispute his sentence before any other judge, since he alone would be justified in revising it: but (and in this we must be guided by the circumstances of the case) we may allege that certain facts were not known on the previous occasion or certain witnesses were unavailable, or, though this must be advanced with the utmost caution and only in the last resort, that our clients' advocates were unequal to their task.
1.77. etiam nonnunquam ut eadem de causa, de qua pronuntiarit, cognoscat iterum. illud quidem commune: apud alium nos iudicem disputaturos de illius sententia non fuisse, neque enim emendari ab alio quam ipso fas esse; ceterum ex causa, ut quaeque permittet, aut ignorata quaedam aut defuisse testes aut (quod timidissime et, si nihil aliud plane fuerit, dicendum est) patronos non suffecisse succurret.
1.78. And even if we have to plead a case afresh before different judges, as may occur in a second trial of a claim to freedom or in cases in the centumviral courts, which are divided between two different panels, it will be most seemly, if we have lost our case before the first panel, to say nothing against the judges who tried the case on that occasion. But this is a subject with which I dealt at some length in the passage where I discussed proofs. It may happen that we have to censure actions in others, of which we have been guilty ourselves, as, for example, when Tubero charges Ligarius with having been in Africa.
1.78. , si apud alios iudices agetur, ut in secunda adsertione aut in centumviralibus iudiciis duplicibus, parte victa decentius erit, quotiens contigerit, servare iudicum pudorem; de qua re latius probationum loco dictum est. evenire, ut in aliis reprehendenda sint, quae ipsi fecerimus, ut obiicit Tubero Ligario, quod in Africa fuerit.
1.79. Again, there have been cases where persons condemned for bribery have indicted others for the same offence with a view to recovering their lost position: for this the schools provide a parallel in the theme where a luxurious youth accuses his father of the same offence. I do not see how this can be done with decorum unless we succeed in discovering some difference between the two cases, such as character, age, motives, circumstances of time and place or intention.
1.79. ambitus quidam damnati recuperandae dignitatis gratia reos eiusdem criminis detulerunt, ut in scholis luxuriantem patrem luxuriosus ipse iuvenis accusat. quomodo decenter fieri possit, equidem non invenio, nisi aliquid reperitur, quod intersit, persona, actas, tempus, causa, locus, animus.
1.80. Tubero, for example, alleges that he was a young man at the time and went thither in the company of his father, who had been sent by the senate not to take part in the war, but to purchase corn, and further that he left the party as soon as he could, whereas Ligarius clung to the party and gave his support, not to Gnaeus Pompeius, who was engaged with Caesar in a struggle for the supreme power, though both wished to preserve the state, but to Juba and the Africans who were the sworn enemies of Rome.
1.80. Tubero, iuvenem se patri haesisse, illum a senatu missum non ad bellum, sed ad frumentum coemendum ait, ut primum licuerit, a partibus recessisse; Ligarium et perseverasse et non pro Cn. Pompeio, inter quem et Caesarem dignitatis fuerit contentio, cum salvam uterque rem publicam vellet, sed pro iuba atque Afris inimicissimis populo Romano stetisse.
1.81. The easiest course, however, is to denounce another's guilt, while admitting our own in the same connexion. However, that is the part of an informer, not of a pleader. But if there is no excuse available, penitence is our only hope. For the man who is converted to the hatred of his own errors, may perhaps be regarded as sufficiently reformed.
1.81. vel facillimum est, ibi alienam culpam incusare, ubi fateris tuam. id iam indicis est, non actoris. nulla contingit excusatio, sola colorem habet paenitentia. enim videri satis emendatus, qui in odium eorum, in quibus erraverat, ipse conversus est.
1.82. For there are occasionally circumstances which from the very nature of the case may make such an attitude not unbecoming, as, for example, in the case where the father disinherits a son born of a harlot because that son has married a harlot, a case which, although it forms a scholastic theme, might actually arise in a court of law. There are a number of pleas which the father may put forward with becoming effect.
1.82. enim casus quidam, qui hoc natura ipsa rei non indecens faciant: ut cum pater ex meretrice natum, quod duxerit meretricem in matrimonium, abdicat; scholastica materia sed non quae in foro non possit accidere. igitur multa non deformiter dicet: vel quod omnium sit votum parentum, ut honestiores quam sint ipsi liberos habeant, (nam et si filia nata, meretrix eam mater pudicam esse voluisset) vel quod humilior ipse fuerit, (licet enim huic ducere) vel quod non habuerit patrem qui moneret;
1.83. He will say that it is the prayer of all parents that their sons should be better men than themselves (for example, if a daughter also had been born to him, the harlot, her mother, would have wished her to be chaste), or that he himself was in a humbler position (for a man in such a position is permitted to marry a harlot), or that he had no father to warn him; and further that there was an additional reason against his son's conduct, namely, that he should not revive the old family scandal nor reproach his father with his marriage and his mother with the hard necessity of her former life, nor give a bad example to his own children in their turn. We may also plausibly suggest that there is some particularly shameful feature in the character of the harlot married by the son, which the father cannot under existing circumstances tolerate. There are other possible arguments which I pass by: for I am not now engaged in declamation, but am merely pointing out that there are occasions when the speaker may turn his own drawbacks to good account.
1.83. quin eo minus id faciendum filio fuisse, ne renovaret domus pudorem et exprobraret patri nuptias, matri prioris vitae necessitatem, ne denique legem quandam suis quoque rursum liberis daret. erit etiam propria quaedam in illa meretrice turpitudo, quam nunc hic pater ferre non possit. praetereo; neque enim nunc declamamus, sed ostendimus nonnunquam posse dicentem ipsis incommodis bene uti.
1.84. More arduous difficulties confront us when we have to deal with a complaint of some shameful act such as rape, more especially when this is of an unnatural kind. I do not refer to cases when the victim himself is speaking. For what should he do but groan and weep and curse his existence, so that the judge will understand his grief rather than hear it articulately expressed? But the victim's advocate will have to exhibit similar emotions, since the admission of such wrongs cause more shame to the sufferer than the criminal.
1.84. maior aestus, ubi quis pudenda queritur, ut stuprum, praecipue in maribus, aut os profanatum. dico, si loquatur ipse; nam quid aliud ei quam gemitus ac fletus et exsecratio vitae conveniat, ut iudex intelligat potius dolorem illum quam audiat? patrono quoque per similes adfectus eundum erit, quia hoc iniuriae genus verecundius est fateri passis quam ausis.
1.85. In many cases it is desirable to soften the harshness of our language by the infusion of a more conciliatory tone, as, for example, Cicero did in his speech dealing with the children of the proscribed. What fate could be more cruel than that the children of men of good birth and the descendants of distinguished ancestors should be excluded from participation in public life? For this reason that supreme artist in playing on the minds of men admits that it is hard, but asserts that the constitution is so essentially dependent on the laws of Sulla, that their repeal would inevitably involve its destruction. Thus he succeeded in creating the impression that lie was doing something on behalf of those very persons against whom he spoke.
1.85. est in plerisque alio colore asperitas orationis, ut Cicero de proscriptorum liberis fecit. enim crudelius quam homines honestis parentibus ac maioribus natos a re publica summoveri? durum id esse summus ille tractandorum animorum artifex confitetur, sed ita legibus Sullae cohaerere statum civitatis adfirmat, ut iis solutis stare ipsa non possit. itaque est, ut aliquid eorum quoque causa videretur facere contra quos diceret.
1.86. I have already pointed out, in dealing with the subject of jests, how unseemly it is to take the position in life of individuals as the target for our gibes, and also have urged that we should refrain from insulting whole classes, races or communities. But at times our duty toward our client will force us to say something on the general character of a whole class of people, such as freedmen, soldiers, tax farmers or the like.
1.86. etiam in iocis monui, quam turpis esset fortunae insectatio, et ne in totos ordines aut gentes aut populos petulantia incurreret. interim fides patrocinii cogit quaedam de universo genere aliquorum hominum dicere, libertinorum vel militum vel publicanorum vel similiter aliorum.
1.87. In all these cases the usual remedy is to create the impression that it is with reluctance that we introduce topics which must give pain, while further we shall avoid attacking everything, and even while using the language of reproof with regard to the essential point of attack, shall make up for our censure by praising our victims in some other connexion.
1.87. quibus omnibus commune remedium est, ut ea, quae laedunt, non libenter tractare videaris nec in omnia impetum facias, sed in id quod expugnandum est, et reprehendens alia laude compenses:
1.88. For example, if we charge soldiers with rapacity, we shall qualify our statement by saying that the fact is not surprising, as they think that they are entitled to some special reward for the perils they have faced and the wounds they have sustained. Or, if we censure them for insolence, we shall add that this quality is due to the fact that they are more accustomed to war than to peace. In the case of freedmen we should disparage their influence: but we may also give them credit for the industry which secured their emancipation.
1.88. si cupidos milites dicas, sed non mirum, quod periculorum ac sanguinis maiora sibi deberi praemia putent; eosdem petulantes, sed hoc fieri, quod bellis magis quam paci consuerint. detrahenda est auctoritas; licet iis testimonium reddere industriae, per quam exierint de servitute.
1.89. With regard to foreign nations, Cicero's practice varies. When he intends to disparage the credibility of Greek witnesses he admits their distinction in learning and literature and professes his admiration for their nation. On the other hand, he has nothing but contempt for the Sardinians and attacks the Allobroges as the enemies of Rome. In all these cases none of his remarks, at the time they were made, were inconsistent with or adverse to the claims of decorum.
1.89. ad nationes exteras pertinet, Cicero varie: detracturus Graecis testibus fidem, doctrinam iis concedit ac litteras, seque eius gentis amatorem esse profitetur, Sardos contemnit, Allobrogas ut hostes insectatur; quorum nihil tunc, cum diceretur, parum aptum aut remotum cura decoris fuit.
1.90. If there be anything offensive in the subject on which we have to speak, it may be toned down by a studied moderation in our language; for example, we may describe a brutal character as being unduly severe, an unjust man as led astray by prejudice, an obstinate man as unreasonably tenacious of his opinion. And there are a large number of cases where we should attempt to defeat our opponents by reasoning, which forms the gentlest of all methods of attack.
1.90. etiam moderatione detrahi solet, si qua est rei invidia: si asperum dicas nimium severum, iniustum persuasione labi, pertinacem ultra modum tenacem esse propositi; plerumque velut ipsos coneris ratione vincere, quod est mollissimum.
1.91. To these remarks I would add that all extravagance of any kind is indecorous, and consequently statements which are in sufficient harmony with the facts will none the less lose all their grace unless they are modified by a certain restraint. It is hard to give rules as to the exact method in which this precept should be observed, but the problem will easily be solved by following the dictates of our own judgement, which will tell us what it is sufficient to say and how much the ears of our audience will tolerate. We cannot weigh or measure our words by fixed standards: they are like foods, some of which are more satisfying than others.
1.91. est super haec omne nimium, ideoque etiam quod natura rei satis aptum est, nisi modo quoque temperatur, gratiam perdit. rei observatio iudicio magis quodam sentiri quam praeceptis tradi potest, quantum satis sit et quantum recipiant aures. habet res mensuram et quasi pondus, quia ut in cibis alia aliis magis complent.
1.92. I think I should also add a few brief words to the effect that not only very different rhetorical virtues have their special admirers, but that they are often praised by the same persons. For instance, there is one passage in Cicero where he writes that the best style is that which we think we can easily acquire by imitation, but which we find is really beyond our powers. But in another passage he says that his aim was not to speak in such a manner that everyone should be confident that he could do the same, but rather in a style that should be the despair of all.
1.92. etiam breviter videtur, quod fit ut dicendi virtutes diversissimae non solum suos amatores habeant, sed ab eisdem saepe laudentur. Cicero quodam loco scribit, id esse optimum, quod, cum te facile credideris consequi imitatione, non possis. vero, non id egisse, ut ita diceret, quomodo se quilibet posse confideret, sed quomodo nemo.
1.93. These two statements may seem to be inconsistent, but as a matter of fact both alike deserve the praise which they receive. The difference is due to the fact that cases differ in character. Those of minor importance are admirably suited by the simplicity and negligence of unaffected language, whereas cases of greater moment are best suited by the grand style. Cicero is pre-eminent in both. Now while eminence in one of these styles may seem to the inexperienced to be within their grasp, those who understand know that they are capable of eminence in neither.
1.93. potest pugnare inter se videri. utrumque ac merito laudatur; causarum enim modo distat, quia simplicitas illa et velut securitas inadfectatae orationis mire tenues causas decet, maioribus illud admirabile dicendi genus magis convenit. utroque eminet Cicero; ex quibus alterum imperiti se posse consequi credent, neutrum, qui intelligunt.
2.1. II. Some regard memory as being no more than one of nature's gifts; and this view is no doubt true to a great extent; but, like everything else, memory may be improved by cultivation. And all the labour of which I have so far spoken will be in vain unless all the other departments be co-ordinated by the animating principle of memory. For our whole education depends upon memory, and we shall receive instruction all in vain if all we hear slips from us, while it is the power of memory alone that brings before us all the store of precedents, laws, rulings, sayings and facts which the orator must possess in abundance and which he must always hold ready for immediate use. Indeed it is not without good reason that memory has been called the treasure-house of eloquence.
2.1. quidam naturae modo esse munus existimaverunt, estque in ea non dubie plurimum, sed ipsa excolendo sicut alia omnia augetur; et totus, de quo diximus adhuc, inanis est labor, nisi ceterae partes hoc velut spiritu continentur. et omnis disciplina memoria constat, frustraque docemur, si quidquid audimus praeterfluat; et exemplorum, legum, responsorum, dictorum denique factorumque velut quasdam copias, quibus abundare quasque in promptu semper habere debet orator, eadem illa vis praesentat. immerito thesaurus hic eloquentiae dicitur.
2.2. But pleaders need not only to be able to retain a number of facts in their minds, but also to be quick to take them in; it is not enough to learn what you have written by dint of repeated reading; it is just as necessary to follow the order both of matter and words when you have merely thought out what you are going to say, while you must also remember what has been said by your opponents, and must not be content merely with refuting their arguments in the order in which they were advanced, but must be in a position to deal with each in its appropriate place.
2.2. non firme tantum continere, verum etiam cito percipere multa acturos oportet, nec quae scripseris modo iterata lectione complecti, sed in cogitatis quoque rerum ac verborum contextum sequi, et quae sint ab adversa parte dicta meminisse, nec utique ea, quo dicta sunt ordine, refutare, sed opportunis locis ponere.
2.3. Nay, even extempore eloquence, in my opinion, depends on no mental activity so much as memory. For while we are saying one thing, we must be considering something else that we are going to say: consequently, since the mind is always looking ahead, it is continually in search of something which is more remote: on the other hand, whatever it discovers, it deposits by some mysterious process in the safe-keeping of memory, which acts as a transmitting agent and hands on to the delivery what it has received from the imagination.
2.3. ? extemporalis oratio non alio mihi videtur mentis vigore constare. dum alia dicimus, quae dicturi sumus intuenda sunt., cum semper cogitatio ultra eat, id quod est longius quaerit, quidquid autem repperit quodam modo apud memoriam deponit; quod illa quasi media quaedam manus acceptum ab inventione tradit elocutioni.
2.4. I do not conceive, however, that I need dwell upon the question of the precise function of memory, although many hold the view that certain impressions are made upon the mind, analogous to those which a signet-ring makes on wax. Nor, again, shall I be so credulous, in view of the fact that the retentiveness or slowness of the memory depends upon our physical condition, as to venture to allot a special art to memory.
2.4. arbitror autem mihi in hoc immorandum, quid sit quod memoriam faciat, quanquam plerique imprimi quaedam vestigia animo, velut in ceris anulorum signa serventur, existimant. ero tam credulus, ut, qui habitu tardiorem firmioremque memoriam fieri videam, ei artem quoque audeam impertire.
2.5. My inclination is rather to marvel at its powers of reproducing and presenting a number of remote facts after so long an interval, and, what is more, of so doing not merely when we seek for such facts, but even at times of its own accord, and not only in our waking moments, but even when we are sunk in sleep.
2.5. admirari naturam subit, tot res vetustas tanto ex intervallo repetitas reddere se et offerre, nec tantum requirentibus sed etiam sponte interim, nec vigilantibus sed etiam quiete compositis:
2.6. And my wonder is increased by the fact that even beasts, which seem to be devoid of reason, yet remember and recognise things, and will return to their old home, however far they have been taken from it. Again, is it not an extraordinary inconsistency that we forget recent and remember distant events, that we cannot recall what happened yesterday and yet retain a vivid impression of the acts of our childhood?
2.6. eo magis, quod illa quoque animalia, quae carere intellectu videntur, meminerunt et agnoscunt et quamlibet longo itinere deducta ad adsuetas sibi sedes revertuntur.? non haec varietas mira est, excidere proxima, vetera inhaerere? hesternorum immemores acta pueritiae recordari?
2.7. And what, again, shall we say of the fact that the things we search for frequently refuse to present themselves and then occur to us by chance, or that memory does not always remain with us, but will even sometimes return to us after it has been lost? But we should never have realised the fullness of its power nor its supernatural capacities, but for the fact that it is memory which has brought oratory to its present position of glory.
2.7. quod quaedam requisita se occultant et eadem forte succurrunt? nec manet semper memoria, sed aliquando etiam redit? tamen, quanta vis esset eius, quanta divinitas illa, nisi in hoc lumen vim orandi extulisset.
2.8. For it provides the orator not merely with the order of his thoughts, but even of his words, nor is its power limited to stringing merely a few words together; its capacity for endurance is inexhaustible, and even in the longest pleadings the patience of the audience flags long before the memory of the speaker.
2.8. enim rerum modo sed etiam verborum ordinem praestat, nec ea pauca contexit, sed durat prope in infinitum, et in longissimis actionibus prius audiendi patientia quam memoriae fides deficit.
2.9. This fact may even be advanced as an argument that there must be some art of memory and that the natural gift can be helped by reason, since training enables us to do things which we cannot do before we have had any training or practice. On the other hand, I find that Plato asserts that the use of written characters is a hindrance to memory, on the ground, that is, that once we have committed a thing to writing, we cease to guard it in our memory and lose it out of sheer carelessness.
2.9. et ipsum argumentum est subesse artem aliquam iuvarique ratione naturae, cum idem docti facere illud, indocti inexercitatique non possimus. invenio apud Platonem obstare memoriae usum litterarum, videlicet quoniam illa, quae scriptis reposuimus, velut custodire desinimus et ipsa securitate dimittimus.
2.10. And there can be no doubt that concentration of mind is of the utmost importance in this connexion; it is, in fact, like the eyesight, which turns to, and not away from, the objects which it contemplates. Thus it results that after writing for several days with a view to acquiring by heart what we have written, we find that our mental effort has of itself imprinted it on our memory.
2.10. dubium est quin plurimum in hac parte valeat mentis intentio et velut acies luminum a prospectu rerum, quas intuetur, non aversa. accidit, ut quae per plures dies scribimus ediscendi causa, cogitatione ipsa contineamus.
2.11. The first person to discover an art of memory is said to have been Simonides, of whom the following well-known story is told. He had written an ode of the kind usually composed in honour of victorious athletes, to celebrate the achievement of one who had gained the crown for boxing. Part of the sum for which he had contracted was refused him on the ground that, following the common practice of poets, he had introduced a digression in praise of Castor and Pollux, and he was told that, in view of what he had done, he had best ask for the rest of the sum due from those whose deeds he had extolled. And according to the story they paid their debt.
2.11. autem memoriae primus ostendisse dicitur Simonides. vulgata fabula est: cum pugili coronato carmen, quale componi victoribus solet, mercede pacta scripsisset, abnegatam ei pecuniae partem, quod more poetis frequentissimo digressus in laudes Castoris ac Pollucis exierat. partem ab iis petere, quorum facta celebrasset, iubebatur.
2.12. For when a great banquet was given in honour of the boxer's success, Simonides was summoned forth from the feast, to which he had been invited, by a message to the effect that two youths who had ridden to the door urgently desired his presence. He found no trace of them, but what followed proved to him that the gods had shown their gratitude.
2.12. persolverunt, ut traditum est. cum esset grande convivium in honorem eiusdem victoriae atque adhibitus ei cenae Simonides, nuntio est excitus, quod eum duo iuvenes equis advecti desiderare maiorem in modum dicebantur. illos quidem non invenit, fuisse tamen gratos erga se deos exitu comperit.
2.13. For he had scarcely crossed the threshold on his way out, when the banqueting hall fell in upon the heads of the guests and wrought such havoc among them that the relatives of the dead who came to seek the bodies for burial were unable to distinguish not merely the faces but even the limbs of the dead. Then it is said, Simonides, who remembered the order in which the guests had been sitting, succeeded in restoring to each man his own dead.
2.13. vix eo ultra limen egresso, triclinium illud supra convivas corruit atque ita confudit, ut non ora modo oppressorum, sed membra etiam omnia requirentes ad sepulturam propinqui nulla nota possent discernere. Simonides dicitur memor ordinis, quo quisque discubuerat, corpora suis reddidisse.
2.14. There is, however, great disagreement among our authorities as to whether this ode was written in honour of Glaucus of Carystus, Leocrates, Agatharcus or Scopas, and whether the house was at Pharsalus, as Simonides himself seems to indicate in a certain passage, and as is recorded by Apollodorus, Eratosthenes, Euphorion and Eurypylus of Larissa, or at Crannon, as is stated by Apollas Callimachus, who is followed by Cicero, to whom the wide circulation of this story is due.
2.14. autem magna inter auctores dissensio, Glaucone Carystio an Leocrati an Agatharcho an Scopae scriptum sit id carmen; et Pharsali fuerit haec domus, ut ipse quodam loco significare Simonides videtur utque Apollodorus et Eratosthenes et Euphorion et Larissaeus Eurypylus tradiderunt, an Crannone, ut Apollas Callimachus, quam secutus Cicero hanc famam latius fudit.
2.15. It is agreed that Scopas, a Thessalian noble, perished at this banquet, and it is also said that his sister's son perished with him, while it is thought that a number of descendants of an elder Scopas met their death at the same time.
2.15. nobilem Thessalum periisse in eo convivio constat; adiicitur sororis eius filius; putant et ortos plerosque ab alio Scopa, qui maior aetate fuerit.
2.16. For my own part, however, I regard the portion of the story which concerns Castor and Pollux as being purely fictitious, since the poet himself has nowhere mentioned the occurrence; and he would scarcely have kept silence on an affair which was so much to his credit.
2.16. mihi totum de Tyndaridis fabulosum videtur, neque omnino huius rei meminit usquam poeta ipse, profecto non taciturus de tanta sua gloria.
2.17. This achievement of Simonides appears to have given rise to the observation that it is an assistance to the memory if localities are sharply impressed upon the mind, a view the truth of which everyone may realise by practical experiment. For when we return to a place after considerable absence, we not merely recognise the place itself, but remember things that we did there, and recall the persons whom we met and even the unuttered thoughts which passed through our minds when we were there before.
2.17. hoc Simonidis facto notatum videtur, iuvari memoriam signatis animo sedibus, idque credere suo quisque experimento potest. Nam cum in loca aliqua post tempus reversi sumus, non ipsa agnoscimus tantum, sed etiam, quae in his fecerimus, reminiscimur personaeque subeunt, nonnunquam tacitae quoque cogitationes in mentem revertuntur. est igitur, ut in plerisque, ars ab experimento. deligunt quam maxime spatiosa, multa varietate signata, domum forte magnam et in multos diductam recessus.
2.18. Thus, as in most cases, art originates in experiment. Some place is chosen of the largest possible extent and characterised by the utmost possible variety, such as a spacious house divided into a number of rooms. Everything of note therein is carefully committed to the memory, in order that the thought may be enabled to run through all the details without let or hindrance. And undoubtedly the first task is to secure that there shall be no delay in finding any single detail, since an idea which is to lead by association to some other idea requires to be fixed in the mind with more than ordinary certitude.
2.18. ea quidquid notabile est, animo diligenter adfigunt, ut sine cunctatione ac mora partes eius omnes cogitatio possit percurrere. primus hic labor est non haerere in occursu; plus enim quam firma debet esse memoria, quae aliam memoriam adiuvet.
2.19. The next step is to distinguish something which has been written down or merely thought of by some particular symbol which will serve to jog the memory; this symbol may have reference to the subject as a whole, it may, for example, be drawn from navigation, warfare, etc., or it may, on the other hand, be found in some particular word. (For even in cases of forgetfulness one single word will serve to restore the memory.) However, let us suppose that the symbol is drawn from navigation, as, for instance, an anchor; or from warfare, as, for example, some weapon. These symbols are then arranged as follows.
2.19. , quae scripserunt vel cogitatione complexi sunt, aliquo signo, quo moneantur, notant; quod esse vel ex re tota potest, ut de navigatione, militia, vel ex verbo aliquo; nam etiam excidentes unius admonitione verbi in memoriam reponuntur. Sit autem signum navigationis ut ancora, militiae ut aliquid ex armis.
2.20. The first though is placed, as it were, in the forecourt; the second, let us say, in the living-room; the remainder are placed in due order all round the impluvium and entrusted not merely to bedrooms and parlours, but even to the care of statues and the like. This done, as soon as the memory of the facts requires to be revived, all these places are visited in turn and the various deposits are demanded from their custodians, as the sight of each recalls the respective details. Consequently, however large the number of these which it is required to remember, all are linked one to the other like dancers hand in hand, and there can be no mistake since they join what precedes to what follows, no trouble being required except the preliminary labour of committing the various points to memory.
2.20. ita digerunt. sensum vestibulo quasi adsignant, secundum, puta, atrio, tum impluvia circumeunt, nec cubiculis modo aut exedris, sed statuis etiam similibusque per ordinem committunt. facto, cum est repetenda memoria, incipiunt ab initio loca haec recensere, et quod cuique crediderunt reposcunt, ut eorum imagine admonentur., quamlibet multa sint, quorum meminisse oporteat, fiunt singula conexa quodam choro, nec errant coniungentes prioribus consequentia solo ediscendi labore.
2.21. What I have spoken of as being done in a house, can equally well be done in connexion with public buildings, a long journey, the ramparts of a city, or even pictures. Or we may even imagine such places to ourselves. We require, therefore, places, real or imaginary, and images or symbols, which we must, of course, invent for ourselves. By images I mean the words by which we distinguish the things which we have to learn by heart: in fact, as Cicero says, we use “places like wax tablets and symbols in lieu of letters.”
2.21. de domo dixi, et in operibus publicis et in itinere longo et urbium ambitu et picturis fieri potest. fingere sibi has imagines licet. est ergo locis, quae vel finguntur vel sumuntur, et imaginibus vel simulacris, quae utique fingenda sunt. voces sunt, quibus ea quae ediscenda sunt notamus, ut, quomodo Cicero dicit, locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris utamur.
2.22. It will be best to give his words verbatim: “We must for this purpose employ a number of remarkable places, clearly envisaged and separated by short intervals: the images which we use must be active, sharply-cut and distinctive, such as may occur to the mind and strike it with rapidity.” This makes me wonder all the more, how Metrodorus should have found three hundred and sixty different localities in the twelve signs of the Zodiac through which the sun passes. It was doubtless due to the vanity and boastfulness of a man who was inclined to vaunt his memory as being the result of art rather than of natural gifts.
2.22. quoque ad verbum ponere optimum fuerit: est utendum multis, inlustribus, explicatis, modicis intervallis, imaginibus autem agentibus, acribus, insignitis, quae occurrere celeriterque percutere animum possint. magis miror, quomodo Metrodorus in XII signis, per quae sol meat, trecenos et sexagenos invenerit locos. nimirum fuit atque iactatio circa memoriam sua potius arte quam natura gloriantis.
2.23. I am far from denying that those devices may be useful for certain purposes, as, for example, if we have to reproduce a number of names in the order in which we heard them. For those who use such aids place the things which have to be remembered in localities which they have previously fixed in the memory; they put a table, for instance, in the forecourt, a platform in the hall and so on with the rest, and then, when they retrace their steps, they find the objects where they had placed them.
2.23. haec ad quaedam prodesse non negaverim, ut si rerum nomina multa per ordinem audita reddenda sint. in iis quae didicerunt locis ponunt res illas: mensam, ut hoc utar, in vestibulo et pulpitum in atrio et sic cetera, deinde relegentes inveniunt, ubi posuerunt.
2.24. Such a practice may perhaps have been of use to those who, after an auction, have succeeded in stating what object they had sold to each buyer, their statements being checked by the books of the money takers; a feat which it is alleged was performed by Hortensius. It will, however, be of less service in learning the various parts of a set speech. For thoughts do not call up the same images as material things, and a symbol requires to be specially invented for them, although even here a particular place may serve to remind us, as, for example, of some conversation that may have been held there. But how can such a method grasp a whole series of connected words?
2.24. forsitan hoc sunt adiuti qui, auctione dimissa, quid cuique vendidissent testibus argentariorum tabulis reddiderunt; quod praestitisse Hortensium dicunt. idem proderit in ediscendis, quae orationis perpetuae erunt. et sensus non eandem imaginem quam res habent, cum alterum fingendum sit, et horum tamen utcunque commonet locus, sicut sermonis alicuius habiti. verborum contextus eadem arte quomodo comprehendetur?
2.25. I pass by the fact that there are certain things which it is impossible to represent by symbols, as, for example, conjunctions. We may, it is true, like shorthand writers, have definite symbols for everything, and may select an infinite number of places to recall all the words contained in the five books of the second pleading against Verres, and we may even remember them all as if they were deposits placed in safe-keeping. But will not the flow of our speech inevitably be impeded by the double task imposed upon our memory?
2.25. quod quaedam nullis simulacris significari possunt, ut certe coniunctiones. enim sane, ut qui notis scribunt, certas imagines omnium et loca scilicet infinita, per quae verba, quot sunt in quinque contra Verrem secundae actionis libris, explicentur, meminerimus etiam omnium quasi depositorum: nonne impediri quoque dicendi cursum necesse est duplici memoriae cura?
2.26. For how can our words be expected to flow in connected speech, if we have to look back at separate symbols for each individual word? Therefore the experts mentioned by Cicero as having trained their memory by methods of this kind, namely Charmadas, and Metrodorus of Scepsis, to whom I have just referred, may keep their systems for their own use. My precepts on the subject shall be of a simpler kind.
2.26. quomodo poterunt copulata fluere, si propter singula verba ad singulas formas respiciendum erit? et Charmadas et Scepsius, de quo modo dixi, Metrodorus, quos Cicero dicit usos hac exercitatione, sibi habeant sua; nos simpliciora tradamus.
2.27. If a speech of some length has to be committed to memory, it will be well to learn it piecemeal, since there is nothing so bad for the memory as being overburdened. But the sections into which we divide it for this purpose should not be very short: otherwise they will be too many in number, and will break up and distract the memory. I am not, however, prepared to recommend any definite length; it will depend on the natural limits of the passage concerned, unless, indeed, it be so long as itself to require subdivision.
2.27. longior complectenda memoria fuerit oratio, proderit per partes ediscere; laborat enim maxime onere; et hae partes non sint perexiguae, alioqui rursus multae erunt et eam distinguent atque concident. utique certum imperaverim modum, sed maxime ut quisque finietur locus, ni forte tam numerosus, ut ipse quoque dividi debeat.
2.28. But some limits must be fixed to enable us, by dint of frequent and continuous practice, to connect the words in their proper order, which is a task of no small difficulty, and subsequently to unite the various sections into a whole when we go over them in order. If certain portions prove especially difficult to remember, it will be found advantageous to indicate them by certain marks, the remembrance of which will refresh and stimulate the memory.
2.28. sunt certi quidam termini, ut contextum verborum, qui est difficillimus, continua et crebra meditatio, partes deinceps ipsas repetitus ordo coniungat. est inutile, iis quae difficillimus haereant aliquas apponere notas, quarum recordatio commoneat et quasi excitet memoriam;
2.29. For there can be but few whose memory is so barren that they will fail to recognise the symbols with which they have marked different passages. But if anyone is slow to recognise his own signs, he should employ the following additional remedy, which, though drawn from the mnemonic system discussed above, is not without its uses: he will adapt his symbols to the nature of the thoughts which tend to slip from his memory, using an anchor, as I suggested above, if he has to speak of a ship, or a spear, if he has to speak of a battle.
2.29. nemo etiam fere tam infelix, ut, quod cuique loco signum destinaverit, nesciat., si tardus ad hoc, eo quoque adhuc remedio utetur ut ipsae notae (hoc enim est ex illa arte non inutile) aptentur ad eos qui excidunt sensus: ancora ut supra pro posui, si de nave dicendum est, spiculum, si de proelio.
2.30. For symbols are highly efficacious, and one idea suggests another: for example, if we change a ring from one finger to another or tie a thread round it, it will serve to remind us of our reason for so doing. Specially effective are those devices which lead the memory from one thing to another similar thing which we have got to remember; for example, in the case of names, if we desire to remember the name Fabius, we should think of the famous Cunctator, whom we are certain not to forget, or of some friend bearing the same name.
2.30. enim signa faciunt, et ex alia memoria venit alia: ut cum translatus anulus vel alligatus commoneat nos, cur id fecerimus. magis adhuc adstringunt, qui memoriam ab aliquo simili transferunt ad id quod continendum est: ut in nominibus, si Fabius forte sit tenendus, referamus ad illum Cunctatorem, qui excidere non potest, aut ad aliquem amicum, qui idem vocetur.
2.31. This is specially easy with names such as Aper, Ursus, Naso, or Crispus, since in these cases we can fix their origin in our memory. Origin again may assist us to a better remembrance of derivative names, such as Cicero, Verrius, or Aurelius. However, I will say no more on this point.
2.31. est facilius in Apris et in Ursis et Nasone aut Crispo, ut id memoriae adfigatur unde sunt nomina. quoque aliquando declinatorum tenendi magis causa est, ut in Cicerone, Verrio, Aurelio. hoc miserim.
2.32. There is one thing which will be of assistance to everyone, namely, to learn a passage by heart from the same tablets on which he has committed it to writing. For he will have certain tracks to guide him in his pursuit of memory, and the mind's eye will be fixed not merely on the pages on which the words were written, but on individual lines, and at times he will speak as though he were reading aloud. Further, if the writing should be interrupted by some erasure, addition or alteration, there are certain symbols available, the sight of which will prevent us from wandering from the track.
2.32. neminem non iuvabit, iisdem quibus scripserit ceris ediscere. enim vestigiis quibusdam memoriam, et velut oculis intuetur non paginas modo, sed versus prope ipsos, estque cum dicit similis legenti. vero si litura aut adiectio aliqua atque mutatio interveniat, signa sunt quaedam, quae intuentes deerrare non possumus.
2.33. This device bears some resemblance to the mnemonic system which I mentioned above, but if my experience is worth anything, is at once more expeditious and more effective. The question has been raised as to whether we should learn by heart in silence; it would be best to do so, save for the fact that under such circumstances the mind is apt to become indolent, with the result that other thoughts break in. For this reason the mind should be kept alert by the sound of the voice, so that the memory may derive assistance from the double effort of speaking and listening. But our voice should be subdued, rising scarcely above a murmur.
2.33. ratio, ut est illi, de qua primum locutus sum, arti non dissimilis, ita, si quid me experimenta docuerunt, et expeditior et potentior. tacite (nam id quoque est quaesitum) erat optimum, si non subirent velut otiosum animum plerumque aliae cogitationes; propter quas excitandus est voce, ut duplici motu iuvetur memoria dicendi et audiendi. haec vox sit modica et magis murmur.
2.34. On the other hand, if we attempt to learn by heart from another reading aloud, we shall find that there is both loss and gain; on the one hand, the process of learning will be slower, because the perception of the eye is quicker than that of the ear, while, on the other hand, when we have heard a passage once or twice, we shall be in a position to test our memory and match it against the voice of the reader. It is, indeed, important for other reasons to test ourselves thus from time to time, since continuous reading has this drawback, that it passes over the passages which we find hard to remember at the same speed as those which we find less difficulty in retaining.
2.34. autem legente alio ediscit, in parte tardatur, quod acrior est oculorum quam aurium sensus; in parte iuvari potest, quod, cum semel aut bis audierit, continuo illi memoriam suam experiri licet et cum legente contendere. et alioqui id maxime faciendum est, ut nos subinde temptemus, quia continua lectio et quae magis et quae minus haerent aequaliter transit.
2.35. By testing ourselves to see whether we remember a passage, we develop greater concentration without waste of time over the repetition of passages which we already know by heart. Thus, only those passages which tend to slip from the memory are repeated with a view to fixing them in the mind by frequent rehearsal, although as a rule the mere fact that they once slipped our memory makes us ultimately remember them with special accuracy. Both learning by heart and writing have this feature in common: namely, that good health, sound digestion, and freedom from other preoccupations of mind contribute largely to the success of both.
2.35. experiendo teneasne, et maior intentio est et nihil supervacui temporis perit, quo etiam quae tenemus repeti solent; ita sola, quae exciderunt, retractantur, ut crebra iteratione firmentur, quanquam solent hoc ipso maxime haerere, quod exciderunt. ediscendo scribendoque commune est, utrique plurimum conferre bonam valetudinem, digestum cibum, animum cogitationibus alis liberum.
2.36. But for the purpose of getting a real grasp of what we have written under the various heads, division and artistic structure will be found of great value, while, with the exception of practice, which is the most powerful aid of all, they are practically the only means of ensuring an accurate remembrance of what we have merely thought out. For correct division will be an absolute safeguard against error in the order of our speech, since there are certain points not merely in the distribution of the various questions in our speech, but also in their development (provided we speak as we ought), which naturally come first, second, and third, and so on, while the connexion will be so perfect that nothing can be omitted or inserted without the fact of the omission or insertion being obvious.
2.36. et in iis quae scripsimus complectendis multum valent, et in iis quae cogitamus continendis prope solae (excepta, quae potentissima est, exercitatione) divisio et compositio. qui recte diviserit, nunquam poterit in rerum ordine errare. sunt enim non solum in digerendis quaestionibus, sed etiam in exsequendis, si modo recte dicimus, prima ac secunda et deinceps; cohaeretque omnis rerum copulatio, ut ei nihil neque subtrahi sine manifesto intellectu neque inseri possit.