Whether hope is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above (Q 25, A 2). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause.
Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Q 32, A 3). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
I–II · Q. 40, Art. 8: Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q 37, A 3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov. 13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action.
Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (A 4). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions.
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above (Q 32, A 3), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above (Q 33, A 4). Therefore hope is conducive to action.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above (Q 32, A 3, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe.
I–II · Question 41: Of Fear, in Itself (four Articles)
OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.