1. TIBERIUS a Roman Pro-consul fell into an ambuscade, and, after offering with his attendants a gallant resistance to the enemy, was killed. Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether it is right to blame or pardon the sufferers is by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall into these misfortunes, equally with those who do not scruple to transgress principles of right confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain from pronouncing an opinion: but should blame or condone this or that general, after a review of the necessities of the moment and the circumstances of the case. And my observation will be rendered evident by the following instances. Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, alarmed at the love of power which he observed in Cleomenes, fled from Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded to return, put himself in the power of the latter. The consequence was that he lost his kingdom and his life together, and left a character not to be defended before posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs remained in the same state, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes remained in exactly the same position, how could he expect to meet any other fate than he did, if he put himself in the hands of the very men from whom he had before barely escaped destruction by flight? Again Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character of the tyrant Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that every tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies, first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand forth as the champion of democracy, not only in Thebes, but in all Greece also; and then, being in Thessaly in arms, for the express purpose of destroying the absolute rule of Alexander, he yet twice ventured to undertake a mission to him. The consequence was that he fell into the hands of his enemies, did great damage to Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised confidence in the very last person in whom he ought to have done so. Very similar to these cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus Cornelius who fell in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted.
1. οὐκ ἀλλότριον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ὅλης ἡμῶν ἐπιβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχαῖς προθέσεως συνεπιστῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον τῆς ἑκατέρου τοῦ πολιτεύματος προαιρέσεως, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο πῶς τηλικοῦτον μὲν πόλεμον συνεσταμένοι περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πραγμάτων, οὐκ ἐλάττω δὲ τούτου περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἀκμὴν δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀδήλους μὲν ἔχοντες ἐπʼ ἴσον ἀμφότεροι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίδας, ἐφαμίλλους δὲ τοὺς κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐνεστῶτας κινδύνους, ὅμως οὐκ ἠρκοῦντο ταῖς προκειμέναις ἐπιβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ Σαρδόνος καὶ Σικελίας ἠμφισβήτουν· … καὶ πάντα περιελάμβανον, οὐ μόνον ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς χορηγίαις καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς; ὃ καὶ μάλιστʼ ἄν τις εἰς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐμβλέψας θαυμάσειε. δύο μὲν γὰρ Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν μετὰ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐντελῆ προεκάθητο στρατόπεδα, δύο δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πεζὸν Γνάϊος εἶχε, τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν Πόπλιος. οἰκείως δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι καὶ παρὰ Καρχηδονίοις. καὶ μὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόποις ἐφώρμει καὶ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τοῦ Φιλίππου στόλος, ἐφʼ οὗ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Μάρκος Οὐαλέριος, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Πόπλιος ἐπέπλει Σουλπίκιος. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις Ἄππιος μὲν ἑκατὸν πεντηρικοῖς σκάφεσι, Μάρκος δὲ Κλαύδιος πεζικὰς ἔχων δυνάμεις, ἐφήδρευε τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ Ἀμίλκας ἐποίει παρὰ Καρχηδονίοις.
2. The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves in the power of the enemy from want of proper precaution deserve blame; but those who use every practicable precaution not so: for to trust absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable action, taken after receiving adequate security, cannot be censured. Adequate securities are oaths, children, wives, and, strongest of all, a blameless past. To be betrayed and entrapped by such a security as any of these is a slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The first object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such are rare, the next best thing will be to take every reasonable precaution one’s self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we shall at least be acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on. And this has been the case with many before now: of which the most conspicuous example, and the one nearest to the times on which we are engaged, will be the fate of Achaeus. He omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety, but thought of everything that it was possible for human ingenuity to conceive: and yet he fell into the power of his enemies. In this instance his misfortune procured the pity and pardon of the outside world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for the successful perpetrators....
2. διʼ ὧν ὑπολαμβάνω τὸ πολλάκις ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἡμῖν τῆς πραγματείας εἰρημένον νῦν διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἀληθινὴν λαμβάνειν πίστιν. τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε διὰ τῶν τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίας γραφόντων συνθεάσασθαι τὴν τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίαν. πῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψιλῶς αὐτὰς καθʼ αὑτὰς ἀναγνόντα τὰς Σικελικὰς ἢ τὰς Ἰβηρικὰς πράξεις, γνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν γεγονότων ἢ τὸ συνέχον, τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας τὸ παραδοξότατον καθʼ ἡμᾶς ἔργον ἡ τύχη συνετέλεσε; τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι τὸ πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀγαγεῖν, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός. πῶς μὲν γὰρ εἷλον Συρακούσας Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ πῶς Ἰβηρίαν κατέσχον, οὐκ ἀδύνατον καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπὶ ποσὸν γνῶναι συντάξεων· πῶς δὲ τῆς ἁπάντων ἡγεμονίας καθίκοντο, καὶ τί πρὸς τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβολὰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀντέπραξε, καὶ τί πάλιν καὶ κατὰ τίνας καιροὺς συνήργησε, δυσχερὲς καταλαβεῖν ἄνευ τῆς καθόλου τῶν πράξεων ἱστορίας. οὐ μὴν τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἔργων οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ πολιτεύματος δύναμιν εὐμαρὲς κατανοῆσαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας. τὸ γὰρ ἀντιποιήσασθαι Ῥωμαίους Ἰβηρίας ἢ πάλιν Σικελίας, καὶ στρατεῦσαι πεζικαῖς καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν, αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ λεγόμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη θαυμαστόν. ἅμα δὲ τούτων συμβαινόντων καὶ πολλαπλασίων ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτελουμένων ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ πολιτείας, καὶ θεωρουμένων ὁμοῦ τούτοις τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν χώραν ὑπαρχουσῶν περιστάσεων καὶ πολέμων περὶ τοὺς ἅπαντα τὰ προειρημένα χειρίζοντας, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μόνως σαφῆ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν οὕτως τυγχάνοι τῆς ἁρμοζούσης ἐπιστάσεως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντας διὰ τῆς τῶν κατὰ μέρος συντάξεως ἐμπειρίαν ποιήσασθαι τῆς καθολικῆς καὶ κοινῆς ἱστορίας. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 102 εχξ. αντ. π. 196.] οὕτως οἱ πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ κουφότατον ἥκιστα φέρειν δύνανται, λέγω δὲ τὴν σιωπήν. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 102 μεδ. μαργο; ϝ. λιϝ. χχιϝ, 24, 2.]
3. It appears to me not to be alien to my general purpose, and the plan which I originally laid down, to recall the attention of my readers to the magnitude of the events, and the persistency of purpose displayed by the two States of Rome and Carthage. For who could think it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers, while engaged in so serious a war for the possession of Italy, and one no less serious for that of Iberia; and being still both of them equally balanced between uncertain hopes and fears for the future of these wars, and confronted at the very time with battles equally formidable to either, should yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise another controversy as to the possession of Sardinia and Sicily; and not content with merely hoping for all these things, should grasp at them with all the resources of their wealth and warlike forces? Indeed the more we examine into details the greater becomes our astonishment. The Romans had two complete armies under the two Consuls on active service in Italy; two in Iberia in which Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and naturally the same was the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman fleet was anchored off Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which first Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command. Along with all these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius with an army, were threatening Sicily; while Hamilcar was doing the same on the side of the Carthaginians.
3. ὅτε δὴ τὰς Συρακούσας Ἐπικύδης τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης κατέλαβον, ἑαυτούς τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν πολιτῶν τῆς Ῥωμαίων φιλίας ἀλλοτριώσαντες, οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσπεπτωκυίας αὐτοῖς ἤδη καὶ τῆς Ἱερωνύμου τοῦ Συρακοσίων τυράννου καταστροφῆς Ἄππιον Κλαύδιον ἀντιστράτηγον καταστήσαντες αὐτῷ μὲν τὴν πεζὴν συνέστησαν δύναμιν, τὸν δὲ νηΐτην αὐτοῖς στόλον ἐπετρόπευσε Μάρκος Κλαύδιος. οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τὴν στρατοπεδείαν ἐβάλοντο μικρὸν ἀποσχόντες τῆς πόλεως, τὰς δὲ προσβολὰς ἔκριναν ποιεῖσθαι τῇ μὲν πεζῇ δυνάμει κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑξαπύλων τόπους, τῇ δὲ ναυτικῇ τῆς Ἀχραδίνης κατὰ τὴν Σκυτικὴν προσαγορευομένην στοάν, καθʼ ἣν ἐπʼ αὐτῆς κεῖται τῆς κρηπῖδος τὸ τεῖχος παρὰ θάλατταν. ἑτοιμασάμενοι δὲ γέρρα καὶ βέλη καὶ τἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἐν ἡμέραις πέντε διὰ τὴν πολυχειρίαν ἤλπισαν καταταχήσειν τῇ παρασκευῇ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, οὐ λογισάμενοι τὴν Ἀρχιμήδους δύναμιν, οὐδὲ προϊδόμενοι διότι μία ψυχὴ τῆς ἁπάσης ἐστὶ πολυχειρίας ἐν ἐνίοις καιροῖς ἀνυστικωτέρα. πλὴν τότε διʼ αὐτῶν ἔγνωσαν τῶν ἔργων τὸ λεγόμενον. οὔσης γὰρ ὀχυρᾶς τῆς πόλεως διὰ τὸ κεῖσθαι κύκλῳ τὸ τεῖχος ἐπὶ τόπων ὑπερδεξίων καὶ προκειμένης ὀφρύος, πρὸς ἣν καὶ μηδενὸς κωλύοντος οὐκ ἂν εὐμαρῶς τις δύναιτο πελάσαι πλὴν κατά τινας τόπους ὡρισμένους, τοιαύτην ἡτοίμασε παρασκευὴν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπιπορευομένους, ὥστε μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ δεῖν ἀσχολεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀμυνομένους, πρὸς πᾶν δὲ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐξ ἑτοίμου ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν. πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ἄππιος ἔχων γέρρα καὶ κλίμακας ἐνεχείρει προσφέρειν ταῦτα τῷ συνάπτοντι τείχει τοῖς Ἑξαπύλοις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν.
4. By means of these facts I presume that what I more than once asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by actual experience to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my assertion, that it is impossible for historians of particular places to get a view of universal history. For how is it possible for a man who has only read a separate history of Sicilian or Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of the events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and under what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most surprising of all revolutions that have happened in our time, I mean the reduction of all known parts of the world under one rule and governance, a thing unprecedented in the history of mankind. In what manner the Romans took Syracuse or Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain extent by means of such particular histories; but how they arrived at universal supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to their success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in without the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to appreciate the greatness of their achievements except by the latter method. For the fact of the Romans having sought to gain Iberia, or at another time Sicily; or having gone on a campaign with military and naval forces, told by itself, would not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn that these were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost of one government and commonwealth; and if we see what dangers and wars in their own territory were, at the very time, encumbering the men who had all these things on hand: thus, and only thus, will the astonishing nature of the events fully dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode they have become acquainted with universal history.... and then took refuge in Leontini. Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore, took Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape, and by a mixture of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to force their way into Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the generals, and induce the excited mob, whom they had inspired with the utmost dread of being betrayed to Rome, to elect them sole generals ( ). The Romans at once ordered Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they were coming not to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them.
4. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος ἑξήκοντα σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς ἐποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχραδίνην, ὧν ἕκαστον πλῆρες ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἐχόντων τόξα καὶ σφενδόνας καὶ γρόσφους, διʼ ὧν ἔμελλον τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων μαχομένους ἀναστέλλειν. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις ὀκτὼ πεντήρεσι, παραλελυμέναις τοὺς ταρσούς, ταῖς μὲν τοὺς δεξιούς, ταῖς δὲ τοὺς εὐωνύμους, καὶ συνεζευγμέναις πρὸς ἀλλήλας σύνδυο κατὰ τοὺς ἐψιλωμένους τοίχους, προσῆγον πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς τοίχων εἰρεσίας τὰς λεγομένας σαμβύκας. τὸ δὲ γένος τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν εἰρημένων ὀργάνων ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο. κλίμακα τῷ πλάτει τετράπεδον ἑτοιμάσαντες, ὥστʼ ἐξ ἀποβάσεως ἰσοϋψῆ γενέσθαι τῷ τείχει, ταύτης ἑκατέραν τὴν πλευρὰν δρυφακτώσαντες καὶ σκεπάσαντες ὑπερπετέσι θωρακίοις, ἔθηκαν πλαγίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς συμψαύοντας τοίχους τῶν συνεζευγμένων νεῶν, πολὺ προπίπτουσαν τῶν ἐμβόλων. πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἱστοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἄνω μερῶν τροχιλίαι προσήρτηντο σὺν κάλοις. λοιπὸν ὅταν ἐγγίσωσι τῆς χρείας, ἐνδεδεμένων τῶν κάλων εἰς τὴν κορυφὴν τῆς κλίμακος, ἕλκουσι διὰ τῶν τροχιλιῶν τούτους ἑστῶτες ἐν ταῖς πρύμναις· ἕτεροι δὲ παραπλησίως ἐν ταῖς πρώρραις ἐξερείδοντες ταῖς ἀντηρίσιν ἀσφαλίζονται τὴν ἄρσιν τοῦ μηχανήματος. κἄπειτα διὰ τῆς εἰρεσίας τῆς ἀφʼ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἐκτὸς ταρσῶν ἐγγίσαντες τῇ γῇ τὰς ναῦς, πειράζουσι προσερείδειν τῷ τείχει τὸ προειρημένον ὄργανον. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κλίμακος ἄκρας ὑπάρχει πέτευρον ἠσφαλισμένον γέρροις τὰς τρεῖς ἐπιφανείας, ἐφʼ οὗ τέτταρες ἄνδρες ἐπιβεβηκότες ἀγωνίζονται, διαμαχόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς εἴργοντας ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων τὴν πρόσθεσιν τῆς σαμβύκης. ἐπὰν δὲ προσερείσαντες ὑπερδέξιοι γένωνται τοῦ τείχους, οὗτοι μὲν τὰ πλάγια τῶν γέρρων παραλύσαντες ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους ἐπιβαίνουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἢ τοὺς πύργους. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διὰ τῆς σαμβύκης ἕπονται τούτοις, ἀσφαλῶς τοῖς κάλοις βεβηκυίας τῆς κλίμακος εἰς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ναῦς. εἰκότως δὲ τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῆς προσηγορίας τέτευχε ταύτης· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐξαρθῇ, γίνεται τὸ σχῆμα τῆς νεὼς ταύτης καὶ τῆς κλίμακος ἑνοποιηθὲν παραπλήσιον σαμβύκῃ.
5. When Epicydes and Hippocrates had occupied Syracuse, and had alienated the rest of the citizens with themselves from the friendship of Rome, the Romans who had already been informed of the murder of Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius as Pro-praetor to command a land force, while Marcus Claudius Marcellus commanded the fleet. These officers took up a position not far from Syracuse, and determined to assault the town from the land at Hexapylus, and by sea at what was called Stoa Scytice in Achradina, where the wall has its foundation close down to the sea. Having prepared their wicker pent-houses, and darts, and other siege material, they felt confident that, with so many hands employed, they would in five days get their works in such an advanced state as to give them the advantage over the enemy. But in this they did not take into account the abilities of Archimedes; nor calculate on the truth that, in certain circumstances, the genius of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever. However they now learnt it by experience. The city was strong from the fact of its encircling wall lying along a chain of hills with overhanging brows, the ascent of which was no easy task, even with no one to hinder it, except at certain definite points. Taking advantage of this, Archimedes had constructed such defences both in the town, and at the places where an attack might be made by sea, that the garrison would have everything at hand which they might require at any moment, and be ready to meet without delay whatever the enemy might attempt against them.
5. πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διηρμοσμένοι προσάγειν διενοοῦντο τοῖς πύργοις· ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ἀνήρ, παρεσκευασμένος ὄργανα πρὸς ἅπαν ἐμβελὲς διάστημα, πόρρωθεν μὲν ἐπιπλέοντας τοῖς εὐτονωτέροις καὶ μείζοσι λιθοβόλοις καὶ βέλεσι τιτρώσκων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐνέβαλε καὶ δυσχρηστίαν, ὅτε δὲ ταῦθʼ ὑπερπετῆ γίνοιτο, τοῖς ἐλάττοσι κατὰ λόγον ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀπόστημα χρώμενος εἰς τοιαύτην ἤγαγε διατροπὴν ὥστε καθόλου κωλύειν αὐτῶν τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν, ἕως ὁ Μάρκος δυσθετούμενος ἠναγκάσθη λάθρᾳ νυκτὸς ἔτι ποιήσασθαι τὴν παραγωγήν. γενομένων δʼ αὐτῶν ἐντὸς βέλους πρὸς τῇ γῇ, πάλιν ἑτέραν ἡτοιμάκει παρασκευὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπομαχομένους ἐκ τῶν πλοίων. ἕως ἀνδρομήκους ὕψους κατεπύκνωσε τρήμασι τὸ τεῖχος ὡς παλαιστιαίοις τὸ μέγεθος κατὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς ἐπιφάνειαν· οἷς τοξότας καὶ σκορπίδια παραστήσας ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους, καὶ βάλλων διὰ τούτων, ἀχρήστους ἐποίει τοὺς ἐπιβάτας. ἐξ οὗ καὶ μακρὰν ἀφεστῶτας καὶ σύνεγγυς ὄντας τοὺς πολεμίους οὐ μόνον ἀπράκτους παρεσκεύαζε πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιβολάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διέφθειρε τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν. ὅτε δὲ τὰς σαμβύκας ἐγχειρήσαιεν ἐξαίρειν, ὄργανα παρʼ ὅλον τὸ τεῖχος ἡτοιμάκει, τὸν μὲν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀφανῆ, κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς χρείας καιρὸν ἐκ τῶν ἔσω μερῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τείχους ἀνιστάμενα καὶ προπίπτοντα πολὺ τῆς ἐπάλξεως ταῖς κεραίαις· ὧν τινὰ μὲν ἐβάσταζε λίθους οὐκ ἐλάττους δέκα ταλάντων, τινὰ δὲ σηκώματα μολίβδινα. λοιπὸν ὅτε συνεγγίζοιεν αἱ σαμβῦκαι, τότε περιαγόμεναι καρχησίῳ πρὸς τὸ δέον αἱ κεραῖαι διά τινος σχαστηρίας ἠφίεσαν εἰς τὸ κατασκεύασμα τὸν λίθον· ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ συνθραύεσθαι τοὔργανον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ναῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ κινδυνεύειν ὁλοσχερῶς.
6. The attack was begun by Appius bringing his penthouses, and scaling ladders, and attempting to fix the latter against that part of the wall which abuts on Hexapylus towards the east. At the same time Marcus Claudius Marcellus with sixty quinqueremes was making a descent upon Achradina. Each of these vessels were full of men armed with bows and slings and javelins, with which to dislodge those who fought on the battlements. As well as these vessels he had eight quinqueremes in pairs. Each pair had had their oars removed, one on the larboard and the other on the starboard side, and then had been lashed together on the sides thus left bare. On these double vessels, rowed by the outer oars of each of the pair, they brought up under the walls some engines called “Sambucae,” the construction of which was as follows:—A ladder was made four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of the wall from the place where its foot had to rest; each side of the ladder was protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house was added overhead. It was then placed so that its foot rested across the sides of the lashed-together vessels, which touched each other with its other extremity protruding a considerable way beyond the prows. On the tops of the masts pulleys were fixed with ropes: and when the engines were about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels drew the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others standing on the prows assisted the raising of the machine and kept it steady with long poles. Having then brought the ships close in shore by using the outer oars of both vessels they tried to let the machine down upon the wall. At the head of the ladder was fixed a wooden stage secured on three sides by wicker-shields, upon which stood four men who fought and struggled with those who tried to prevent the Sambuca from being made to rest on the battlements. But when they have fixed it and so got above the level of the top of the wall, the four men unfasten the wicker-shields from either side of the stage, and walk out upon the battlements or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their comrades coming up by the Sambuca, since the ladder’s foot is safely secured with ropes and stands upon both the ships. This construction has got the name of “Sambuca,” or “Harp,” for the natural reason, that when it is raised the combination of the ship and ladder has very much the appearance of such an instrument.
6. τινά τε τῶν μηχανημάτων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐφορμῶντας καὶ προβεβλημένους γέρρα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἠσφαλισμένους πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ τείχους φερομένων βελῶν, ἠφίει μὲν καὶ λίθους συμμέτρους πρὸς τὸ φεύγειν ἐκ τῆς πρώρρας τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ καθίει χεῖρα σιδηρᾶν ἐξ ἁλύσεως δεδεμένην, ᾗ δραξάμενος ὁ τὴν κεραίαν οἰακίζων ὅθεν ἐπιλάβοιτο τῆς πρώρρας, κατῆγε τὴν πτέρναν τῆς μηχανῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους. ὅτε δὲ κουφίζων τὴν πρῶρραν ὀρθὸν ποιήσειε τὸ σκάφος ἐπὶ πρύμναν, τὰς μὲν πτέρνας τῶν ὀργάνων εἰς ἀκίνητον καθῆπτε, τὴν δὲ χεῖρα καὶ τὴν ἅλυσιν ἐκ τῆς μηχανῆς ἐξέρραινε διά τινος σχαστηρίας. οὗ γινομένου τινὰ μὲν τῶν πλοίων πλάγια κατέπιπτε, τινὰ δὲ καὶ κατεστρέφετο, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῆς πρώρρας ἀφʼ ὕψους ῥιφθείσης βαπτιζόμενα πλήρη θαλάττης ἐγίνετο καὶ ταραχῆς. Μάρκος δὲ δυσχρηστούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπαντωμένοις ὑπʼ Ἀρχιμήδους, καὶ θεωρῶν μετὰ βλάβης καὶ χλευασμοῦ τοὺς ἔνδον ἀποτριβομένους αὑτοῦ τὰς ἐπιβολάς, δυσχερῶς μὲν ἔφερε τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅμως δʼ ἐπισκώπτων τὰς αὑτοῦ πράξεις ἔφη ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν αὐτοῦ κυαθίζειν ἐκ θαλάττης Ἀρχιμήδη, τὰς δὲ σαμβύκας ῥαπιζομένας ὥσπερ ἐκσπόνδους μετʼ αἰσχύνης ἐκπεπτωκέναι. καὶ τῆς μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν πολιορκίας τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη τὸ τέλος.
7. With such contrivances and preparations were the Romans intending to assault the towers. But Archimedes had constructed catapults to suit every range; and as the ships sailing up were still at a considerable distance, he so wounded the enemy with stones and darts, from the tighter wound and longer engines, as to harass and perplex them to the last degree; and when these began to carry over their heads, he used smaller engines graduated according to the range required from time to time, and by this means caused so much confusion among them as to altogether check their advance and attack; and finally Marcellus was reduced in despair to bringing up his ships under cover of night. But when they had come close to land, and so too near to be hit by the catapults, they found that Archimedes had prepared another contrivance against the soldiers who fought from the decks. He had pierced the wall as high as a man’s stature with numerous loop-holes, which, on the outside, were about as big as the palm of the hand. Inside the wall he stationed archers and cross-bows, or scorpions, and by the volleys discharged through these he made the marines useless. By these means he not only baffled the enemy, whether at a distance or close at hand, but also killed the greater number of them. As often, too, as they tried to work their Sambucae, he had engines ready all along the walls, not visible at other times, but which suddenly reared themselves above the wall from inside, when the moment for their use had come, and stretched their beams far over the battlements, some of them carrying stones weighing as much as ten talents, and others great masses of lead. So whenever the Sambucae were approaching, these beams swung round on their pivot the required distance, and by means of a rope running through a pulley dropped the stone upon the Sambucae, with the result that it not only smashed the machine itself to pieces, but put the ship also and all on board into the most serious danger.
7. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον εἰς παραπλησίους ἐμπεσόντες δυσχερείας ἀπέστησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. ἔτι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἐν ἀποστήματι τοῖς τε πετροβόλοις καὶ καταπέλταις τυπτόμενοι διεφθείροντο, διὰ τὸ θαυμάσιον εἶναι τὴν τῶν βελῶν κατασκευὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ὡς ἂν Ἱέρωνος μὲν χορηγοῦ γεγονότος, ἀρχιτέκτονος δὲ καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων Ἀρχιμήδους. συνεγγίζοντές γε μὴν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν οἱ μὲν ταῖς διὰ τοῦ τείχους τοξότισιν, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, κακούμενοι συνεχῶς εἴργοντο τῆς προσόδου· οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν γέρρων βιαζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν κατὰ κορυφὴν λίθων καὶ δοκῶν ἐμβολαῖς διεφθείροντο. οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ταῖς ἐκ τῶν μηχανῶν ἐκακοποίουν, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἶπα· σὺν αὐτοῖς γὰρ τοῖς ὅπλοις τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξαιροῦντες ἐρρίπτουν. τὸ δὲ πέρας, ἀναχωρήσαντες εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν καὶ συνεδρεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐβουλεύσαντο πάσης ἐλπίδος πεῖραν λαμβάνειν πλὴν τοῦ διὰ πολιορκίας ἑλεῖν τὰς Συρακούσας, ὡς καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν· ὀκτὼ γὰρ μῆνας τῇ πόλει προσκαθεζόμενοι τῶν μὲν ἄλλων στρατηγημάτων ἢ τολμημάτων οὐδενὸς ἀπέστησαν, τοῦ δὲ πολιορκεῖν οὐδέποτε πεῖραν ἔτι λαβεῖν ἐθάρρησαν. οὕτως εἷς ἀνὴρ καὶ μία ψυχὴ δεόντως ἡρμοσμένη πρὸς ἔνια τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα τι χρῆμα φαίνεται γίνεσθαι καὶ θαυμάσιον. ἐκεῖνοι γοῦν τηλικαύτας δυνάμεις ἔχοντες καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, εἰ μὲν ἀφέλοι τις πρεσβύτην ἕνα Συρακοσίων, παραχρῆμα τῆς πόλεως κυριεύσειν ἤλπιζον, τούτου δὲ συμπαρόντος οὐκ ἐθάρρουν οὐδʼ ἐπιβαλέσθαι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καθʼ ὃν ἀμύνασθαι δυνατὸς ἦν Ἀρχιμήδης. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες μάλιστʼ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς ἔνδον ὑποχειρίους σφίσι γενέσθαι, ταύτης ἀντείχοντο τῆς ἐλπίδος· καὶ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ τὰς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπικουρίας αὐτῶν ἐκώλυον, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι τὰς κατὰ γῆν. βουλόμενοι δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν ἄπρακτον τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ προσεδρεύουσι ταῖς Συρακούσαις, ἀλλʼ ἅμα τι καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς χρησίμων κατασκευάζεσθαι, διεῖλον οἱ στρατηγοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὥστε τὸν μὲν Ἄππιον ἔχοντα δύο μέρη προσκαθῆσθαι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἀναλαβόντα Μάρκον ἐπιπορεύεσθαι τοὺς τὰ Καρχηδονίων αἱρουμένους κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. [3, 1 — 6, 4 θαλάττης ἐγίνετο ετ 7, 6 τῶν μὲν ἄλλων — ἐθάρρησαν ξοδ. ωεσξηερι πολιορξéτιθυε δες γρεξς. παρις. 1867 π. 321 ετ ειυσδεμ φραγμεντς ινéδιτς δε πολψβε, παρις 1869 π. 9; 3, 2 κατὰ τὴν Σκυτικὴν — 7, 9 οὐκ ἐθάρρουν οὐδʼ ἐπιβαλέσθαι ηερο δε ρεπελλ. οβσιδ. π. 326 τηεϝενοτ; 4, 1 — 7, 12 κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 104 εχξ. αντ. π. 197.] καταλαβέσθαι … ἐγχειρήσας μετὰ τῆς Φιλίππου γνώμης τὴν τῶν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν εἰκῇ καὶ παραβόλως, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πράξεως καιρῷ διεφθάρη· περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὰ κατὰ μέρος, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ἔλθωμεν, διασαφήσομεν πολψβ. ιιι, 19, 11.
8. Other machines which he invented were directed against storming parties, who, advancing under the protection of penthouses, were secured by them from being hurt by missiles shot through the walls. Against these he either shot stones big enough to drive the marines from the prow; or let down an iron hand swung on a chain, by which the man who guided the crane, having fastened on some part of the prow where he could get a hold, pressed down the lever of the machine inside the wall; and when he had thus lifted the prow and made the vessel rest upright on its stern, he fastened the lever of his machine so that it could not be moved; and then suddenly slackened the hand and chain by means of a rope and pulley. The result was that many of the vessels heeled over and fell on their sides: some completely capsized; while the greater number, by their prows coming down suddenly from a height, dipped low in the sea, shipped a great quantity of water, and became a scene of the utmost confusion. Though reduced almost to despair by these baffling inventions of Archimedes, and though he saw that all his attempts were repulsed by the garrison with mockery on their part and loss to himself, Marcellus could not yet refrain from making a joke at his own expense, saying that “Archimedes was using his ships to ladle out the sea-water, but that his ‘harps’ not having been invited to the party were buffeted and turned out with disgrace.” Such was the end of the attempt at storming Syracuse by sea.
8. ὅτι Φίλιππος παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην ἔφθειρε τὴν χώραν δυσμενικῶς, θυμῷ τὸ πλεῖον ἢ λογισμῷ χρώμενος· ἤλπιζε γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, βλάπτων συνεχῶς οὐδέποτʼ ἀγανακτήσειν οὐδὲ μισήσειν αὐτὸν τοὺς κακῶς πάσχοντας. προήχθην δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ διὰ τῆς προτέρας βύβλου σαφέστερον ἐξηγήσασθαι περὶ τούτων οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς πρότερον ἡμῖν εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τῶν συγγραφέων τοὺς μὲν ὅλως παραλελοιπέναι τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, τοὺς δὲ καθόλου διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μονάρχους εὔνοιαν ἢ τἀναντία φόβον οὐχ οἷον ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ γεγονέναι τὴν εἰς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους ἀσέβειαν Φιλίππου καὶ παρανομίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐν ἐπαίνῳ καὶ κατορθώματι τὰ πεπραγμένα διασαφεῖν ἡμῖν. οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ Μεσσηνίους τοῦτο πεποιηκότας ἰδεῖν ἔστι τοὺς γράφοντας τοῦ Φιλίππου τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως. ἐξ ὧν ἱστορίας μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἔχειν αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει διάθεσιν τὰς συντάξεις, ἐγκωμίου δὲ μᾶλλον. ἐγὼ δʼ οὔτε λοιδορεῖν ψευδῶς φημι δεῖν τοὺς μονάρχους οὔτʼ ἐγκωμιάζειν, ὃ πολλοῖς ἤδη συμβέβηκε, τὸν ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν πρέποντα ταῖς ἑκάστων προαιρέσεσι λόγον ἐφαρμόζειν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν μὲν εὐμαρές, πρᾶξαι δὲ καὶ λίαν δυσχερὲς διὰ τὸ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας εἶναι διαθέσεις καὶ περιστάσεις, αἷς εἴκοντες ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὸν βίον οὔτε λέγειν οὔτε γράφειν δύνανται τὸ φαινόμενον. ὧν χάριν τισὶ μὲν αὐτῶν συγγνώμην δοτέον, ἐνίοις γε μὴν οὐ δοτέον.
9. Nor was Appius Claudius more successful. He, too, was compelled by similar difficulties to desist from the attempt; for while his men were still at a considerable distance from the wall, they began falling by the stones and shots from the engines and catapults. The volleys of missiles, indeed, were extraordinarily rapid and sharp, for their construction had been provided for by all the liberality of a Hiero, and had been planned and engineered by the skill of an Archimedes. Moreover, when they did at length get near the walls, they were prevented from making an assault by the unceasing fire through the loop-holes, which I mentioned before; or if they tried to carry the place under cover of pent-houses, they were killed by the stones and beams let down upon their heads. The garrison also did them no little damage with those hands at the end of their engines; for they used to lift the men, armour, and all, into the air, and then throw them down. At last Appius retired into the camp, and summoning the Tribunes to a council of war, decided to try every possible means of taking Syracuse except a storm. And this decision they carried out; for during the eight months of siege which followed, though there was no stratagem or measure of daring which they did not attempt, they never again ventured to attempt a storm. So true it is that one man and one intellect, properly qualified for the particular undertaking, is a host in itself and of extraordinary efficacy. In this instance, at any rate, we find the Romans confident that their forces by land and sea would enable them to become masters of the town, if only one old man could be got rid of; while as long as he remained there, they did not venture even to think of making the attempt, at least by any method which made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them. They believed, however, that their best chance of reducing the garrison was by a failure of provisions sufficient for so large a number as were within the town; they therefore relied upon this hope, and with their ships tried to cut off their supplies by sea, and with their army by land. But desiring that the time during which they were blockading Syracuse should not be entirely wasted, but that some addition should be made to their power in other parts of the country, the two commanders separated and divided the troops between them: Appius Claudius keeping two-thirds and continuing the blockade, while Marcus Marcellus with the remaining third went to attack the cities that sided with the Carthaginians....
9. μάλιστα δʼ ἄν τις ἐπιτιμήσειε περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος Θεοπόμπῳ, ὅς γʼ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς Φιλίππου συντάξεως διʼ αὐτὸ μάλιστα παρορμηθῆναι φήσας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς πραγματείας διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐνηνοχέναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα παράπαν οἷον τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον, μετὰ ταῦτα παρὰ πόδας, ἔν τε τῷ προοιμίῳ καὶ παρʼ ὅλην δὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν, ἀκρατέστατον μὲν αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσι πρὸς γυναῖκας, ὥστε καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον ἐσφαλκέναι τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὁρμὴν καὶ προστασίαν, ἀδικώτατον δὲ καὶ κακοπραγμονέστατον περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων κατασκευάς, πλείστας δὲ πόλεις ἐξηνδραποδισμένον καὶ πεπραξικοπηκότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας, ἐκπαθῆ δὲ γεγονότα καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀκρατοποσίας, ὥστε καὶ μεθʼ ἡμέραν πλεονάκις μεθύοντα καταφανῆ γενέσθαι τοῖς φίλοις. εἰ δέ τις ἀναγνῶναι βουληθείη τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐνάτης καὶ τετταρακοστῆς αὐτῷ βύβλου, παντάπασιν ἂν θαυμάσαι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ συγγραφέως, ὅς γε χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων τετόλμηκε καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν· αὐταῖς γὰρ λέξεσιν, αἷς ἐκεῖνος κέχρηται, κατατετάχαμεν· " εἰ γάρ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροισ" φησί "λάσταυρος ἢ θρασὺς τὸν τρόπον, οὗτοι πάντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἁθροιζόμενοι πρὸς Φίλιππον ἑταῖροι τοῦ βασιλέως προσηγορεύοντο. καθόλου γὰρ ὁ Φίλιππος τοὺς μὲν κοσμίους τοῖς ἤθεσι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων βίων ἐπιμελουμένους ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τοὺς δὲ πολυτελεῖς καὶ ζῶντας ἐν μέθαις καὶ κύβοις ἐτίμα καὶ προῆγε. τοιγαροῦν οὐ μόνον ταῦτʼ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς παρεσκεύαζεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀδικίας καὶ βδελυρίας ἀθλητὰς ἐποίησε. τί γὰρ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἢ δεινῶν αὐτοῖς οὐ προσῆν; ἢ τί τῶν καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων οὐκ ἀπῆν; ὧν οἱ μὲν ξυρόμενοι καὶ λεαινόμενοι διετέλουν ἄνδρες ὄντες, οἱ δʼ ἀλλήλοις ἐτόλμων ἐπανίστασθαι πώγωνας ἔχουσι. καὶ περιήγοντο μὲν δύο καὶ τρεῖς τοὺς ἑταιρευομένους, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς ἐκείνοις χρήσεις ἑτέροις παρείχοντο. ὅθεν καὶ δικαίως ἄν τις αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἑταίρους, ἀλλʼ ἑταίρας ὑπελάμβανεν [εἶναι] οὐδὲ στρατιώτας, ἀλλὰ χαμαιτύπους προσηγόρευσεν· ἀνδροφόνοι γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ὄντες ἀνδρόπορνοι τὸν τρόπον ἦσαν. ἁπλῶς δʼ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα παύσωμαι" φησί "μακρολογῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσούτων μοι πραγμάτων ἐπικεχυμένων, ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα θηρία γεγονέναι καὶ τοιούτους τὸν τρόπον τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους Φιλίππου προσαγορευθέντας οἵους οὔτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς τὸ Πήλιον κατασχόντας οὔτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας τοὺς τὸ Λεοντίνων πεδίον οἰκήσαντας οὔτʼ ἄλλους οὐδʼ ὁποίους."
10. Upon arriving in Messenia Philip began devasting the country, like an open enemy, with more passion than reason; for while pursuing this continuous course of injurious actions, he expected, it appears to me, that the sufferers would feel no anger or hatred towards him. I was induced to speak of these proceedings in somewhat full detail in the present as well as in the last book, not alone by the same motives as those which I have assigned for other parts of my work, but also by the fact that of our historians, some have entirely omitted this Messenian episode; while others from love or fear of kings have maintained that, so far from the outrages committed by Philip in defiance of religion and law upon the Messenians being a subject of blame, his actions were on the contrary matters for praise and gratulation. But it is not only in regard to the Messenians that we may notice the historians of Philip acting thus; they have done much the same in other cases also. And the result is that their compositions have the appearance of a panegyric rather than of a history. I however hold that an historian ought neither to blame or praise kings untruly, as has often been done; but to make what we say consistent with what has been written before, and tally with the characters of the several persons in question. But it may be urged perhaps that this is easy to say, but very difficult to carry out; because situations and circumstances are so many and various, to which men have to give way in the course of their life, and which prevent them from speaking out their real opinions. This may excuse some, but not others.
10. ταύτην δὲ τήν τε πικρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀθυρογλωττίαν τοῦ συγγραφέως τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοκιμάσειεν; οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅτι μαχόμενα λέγει πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν ἄξιός ἐστιν ἐπιτιμήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διότι κατέψευσται τοῦ τε βασιλέως καὶ τῶν φίλων, καὶ μάλιστα διότι τὸ ψεῦδος αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀπρεπῶς διατέθειται. εἰ γὰρ περὶ Σαρδαναπάλλου τις ἢ τῶν ἐκείνου συμβιωτῶν ἐποιεῖτο τοὺς λόγους, μόλις ἂν ἐθάρρησε τῇ κακορρημοσύνῃ ταύτῃ χρήσασθαι· οὗ τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν διὰ τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ τάφου τεκμαιρόμεθα. λέγει γὰρ ἡ [ἐπι]γραφή, ταῦτʼ ἔχω ὅσσʼ ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετʼ ἔρωτος τέρπνʼ ἔπαθον. περὶ δὲ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου φίλων εὐλαβηθείη τις ἂν οὐχ οἷον εἰς μαλακίαν καὶ ἀνανδρίαν, ἔτι δʼ ἀναισχυντίαν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον μήποτʼ ἐγκωμιάζειν ἐπιβαλλόμενος οὐ δυνηθῇ καταξίως εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ φιλοπονίας καὶ συλλήβδην τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν· οἵ γε προφανῶς ταῖς σφετέραις φιλοπονίαις καὶ τόλμαις ἐξ ἐλαχίστης μὲν βασιλείας ἐνδοξοτάτην καὶ μεγίστην τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀρχὴν κατεσκεύασαν· χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ Φιλίππου πράξεων αἱ μετὰ τὸν ἐκείνου θάνατον ἐπιτελεσθεῖσαι μετʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου πᾶσιν ὁμολογουμένην τὴν ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ φήμην παραδεδώκασι περὶ αὐτῶν. μεγάλην γὰρ ἴσως μερίδα θετέον τῷ προεστῶτι τῶν ὅλων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καίπερ ὄντι νέῳ παντελῶς, οὐκ ἐλάττω μέντοι γε τοῖς συνεργοῖς καὶ φίλοις, οἳ πολλαῖς μὲν καὶ παραδόξοις μάχαις ἐνίκησαν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ παραβόλους ὑπέμειναν πόνους καὶ κινδύνους καὶ ταλαιπωρίας, πλείστης δὲ περιουσίας κυριεύσαντες καὶ πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας πλείστης εὐπορήσαντες ἀπολαύσεως, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε διὰ ταῦτʼ ἠλαττώθησαν, οὔτε κατὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς ὁρμὰς οὐδὲν ἄδικον οὐδʼ ἀσελγὲς ἐπετήδευσαν, ἅπαντες δʼ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, βασιλικοὶ καὶ ταῖς μεγαλοψυχίαις καὶ ταῖς σωφροσύναις καὶ ταῖς τόλμαις ἀπέβησαν, Φιλίππῳ καὶ μετʼ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συμβιώσαντες. ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι μνημονεύειν ἐπʼ ὀνόματος. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου θάνατον οὕτω περὶ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀμφισβητήσαντες παραδόσιμον ἐποίησαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δόξαν ἐν πλείστοις ὑπομνήμασιν ὥστε τὴν μὲν Τιμαίου τοῦ συγγραφέως πικρίαν, ᾗ κέχρηται κατʼ Ἀγαθοκλέους τοῦ Σικελίας δυνάστου, καίπερ ἀνυπέρβλητον εἶναι δοκοῦσαν, ὅμως λόγον ἔχειν — ὡς γὰρ κατʼ ἐχθροῦ καὶ πονηροῦ καὶ τυράννου διατίθεται τὴν κατηγορίαν — τὴν δὲ Θεοπόμπου μηδʼ ὑπὸ λόγον πίπτειν.
11. I do not know any one who deserves more blame in this particular than Theopompus. In the beginning of his history of Philip he said that what chiefly induced him to undertake it was the fact that Europe had never produced such a man as Philip son of Amyntas; and then immediately afterwards, both in his preface and in the whole course of his history, he represents this king as so madly addicted to women, that he did all that in him lay to ruin his own family by this inordinate passion; as having behaved with the grossest unfairness and perfidy to his friends and allies; as having enslaved and treacherously seized a vast number of towns by force or fraud; and as having been besides so violently addicted to strong drink, that he was often seen by his friends drunk in open day. But if any one will take the trouble to read the opening passage of his forty-ninth book, he would be indeed astonished at this writer’s extravagance. Besides his other strange statements he has ventured to write as follows—for I here subjoin his actual words:—“If there was any one in all Greece, or among the Barbarians, whose character was lascivious and shameless, he was invariably attracted to Philip’s court in Macedonia and got the title of ‘the king’s companion.’ For it was Philip’s constant habit to reject those who lived respectably and were careful of their property; but to honour and promote those who were extravagant, and passed their lives in drinking and dicing. His influence accordingly tended not only to confirm them in these vices, but to make them proficients in every kind of rascality and lewdness. What vice or infamy did they not possess? What was there virtuous or of good report that they did not lack? Some of them, men as they were, were ever clean shaven and smooth-skinned; and even bearded men did not shrink from mutual defilement. They took about with them two or three slaves of their lust, while submitting to the same shameful service themselves. The men whom they called companions deserved a grosser name, and the title of soldier was but a cover to mercenary vice; for, though bloodthirsty by nature, they were lascivious by habit. In a word, to make a long story short, especially as I have such a mass of matter to deal with, I believe that the so-called ‘friends’ and ‘companions’ of Philip were more bestial in nature and character than the Centaurs who lived on Pelion, or the Laestrygones who inhabited the Leontine plain, or in fact any other monsters whatever.”
11. προθέμενος γὰρ ὡς περὶ βασιλέως εὐφυεστάτου πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονότος οὐκ ἔστι τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ δεινῶν ὃ παραλέλοιπε. λοιπὸν ἢ περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ προέκθεσιν τῆς πραγματείας ἀνάγκη ψεύστην καὶ κόλακα φαίνεσθαι τὸν ἱστοριογράφον, ἢ περὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀποφάσεις ἀνόητον καὶ μειρακιώδη τελείως, εἰ διὰ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ ἐπικλήτου λοιδορίας ὑπέλαβε πιστότερος μὲν αὐτὸς φανήσεσθαι, παραδοχῆς δὲ μᾶλλον ἀξιωθήσεσθαι τὰς ἐγκωμιαστικὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτοῦ περὶ Φιλίππου. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαλήψεις οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδοκήσειε τῷ προειρημένῳ συγγραφεῖ· ὅς γʼ ἐπιβαλόμενος γράφειν τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις ἀφʼ ὧν Θουκυδίδης ἀπέλιπε, καὶ συνεγγίσας τοῖς Λευκτρικοῖς καιροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἔργων, τὴν μὲν Ἑλλάδα μεταξὺ καὶ τὰς ταύτης ἐπιβολὰς ἀπέρριψε, μεταλαβὼν δὲ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὰς Φιλίππου πράξεις προύθετο γράφειν. καίτοι γε πολλῷ σεμνότερον ἦν καὶ δικαιότερον ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποθέσει τὰ πεπραγμένα Φιλίππῳ συμπεριλαβεῖν ἤπερ ἐν τῇ Φιλίππου τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. οὐδὲ γὰρ προκαταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ βασιλικῆς δυναστείας, καὶ τυχὼν ἐξουσίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπέσχε σὺν καιρῷ ποιήσασθαι μετάβασιν ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὄνομα καὶ πρόσωπον· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης ἀρξάμενος καὶ προβὰς ἐπὶ ποσὸν οὐδʼ ὅλως οὐδεὶς ἂν ἠλλάξατο μονάρχου πρόσχημα καὶ βίον, ἀκεραίῳ χρώμενος γνώμῃ. καὶ τί δήποτʼ ἦν τὸ τὰς τηλικαύτας ἐναντιώσεις βιασάμενον παριδεῖν Θεόπομπον; εἰ μὴ νὴ Δίʼ ὅτι ἐκείνης μὲν τῆς ὑποθέσεως τέλος ἦν τὸ καλόν, τῆς δὲ κατὰ Φίλιππον τὸ συμφέρον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, καθὸ μετέβαλε τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἴσως ἂν εἶχέ τι λέγειν, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο περὶ τούτων· πρὸς δὲ τὴν κατὰ τῶν φίλων αἰσχρολογίαν οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι δυνηθῆναι λόγον αὐτὸν ἀποδοῦναι, συγχωρῆσαι δὲ διότι πολύ τι παρέπεσε τοῦ καθήκοντος. [εχξ. πειρ. π. 18; 9, 6 — 9, 13 οὐδʼ ὁποίους ατηεν. ιϝ, 62 π. 167β; ϝι, 77 π. 260δ; 9, 9 τί γὰρ — οὐκ ἀπῆν ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 107 μαργο.]
12. Who would not disapprove of such bitterness and intemperance of language in an historian? It is not only because his words contradict his opening statement that he deserves stricture; but also because he has libelled the king and his friends; and still more because his falsehood is expressed in disgusting and unbecoming words. If he had been speaking of Sardanapalus, or one of his associates, he could hardly have ventured to use such foul language; and what that monarch’s principles and debauchery were in his lifetime we gather from the inscription on his tomb, which runs thus:“The joys I had from love or wine”“Or dainty meats—those now are mine.”But when speaking of Philip and his friends, a man ought to be on his guard, not so much of accusing them of effeminacy and want of courage, or still more of shameless immorality, but on the contrary lest he should prove unequal to express their praises in a manner worthy of their manliness, indefatigable energy, and the general virtue of their character. It is notorious that by their energy and boldness they raised the Macedonian Empire from a most insignificant monarchy to the first rank in reputation and extent. And, putting aside the achievements of Philip, what was accomplished by them after his death, under the rule of Alexander, has secured for them a reputation for valour with posterity universally acknowledged. For although a large share of the credit must perhaps be given to Alexander, as the presiding genius of the whole, though so young a man; yet no less is due to his coadjutors and friends, who won many wonderful victories over the enemy; endured numerous desperate labours, dangers and sufferings; and, though put into possession of the most ample wealth, and the most abundant means of gratifying all their desires, never lost their bodily vigour by these means, or contracted tastes for violence or debauchery. On the contrary, all those who were associated with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander, became truly royal in greatness of soul, temperance of life, and courage. Nor is it necessary to mention any names: but after Alexander’s death, in their mutual rivalries for the possession of various parts of nearly all the world, they filled a very large number of histories with the record of their glorious deeds. We may admit then that the bitter invective of the historian Timaeus against Agathocles, despot of Sicily, though it seems unmeasured, has yet some reason in it,—for it is directed against a personal enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant; but that of Theopompus is too scurrilous to be taken seriously.
12. Φίλιππος δὲ τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίους πολεμίους γεγονότας οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἠδυνήθη λόγου βλάψαι, καίπερ ἐπιβαλόμενος κακοποιεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους τῶν φίλων τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν ἐναπεδείξατο. τὸν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον Ἄρατον, δυσαρεστηθέντα τοῖς ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένοις ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, μετʼ οὐ πολὺ μετὰ Ταυρίωνος τοῦ χειρίζοντος αὐτῷ τὰ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον ἐπανείλατο φαρμάκῳ. παραυτίκα μὲν οὖν ἠγνοεῖτο παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς τὸ γεγονός· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἡ δύναμις οὐ τῶν παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἀπολλυουσῶν, ἀλλὰ χρόνον ἔχουσα καὶ διάθεσιν ἐργαζομένη· τόν γε μὴν Ἄρατον αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάνθανε τὸ κακόν. ἐγένετο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτων· ἅπαντας γὰρ ἐπικρυπτόμενος τοὺς ἄλλους, πρὸς ἕνα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν Κεφάλωνα διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν οὐκ ἔστεξε τὸν λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἐπιμελῶς αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀρρωστίαν τοῦ προειρημένου συμπαρόντος καί τι τῶν πρὸς τῷ τοίχῳ πτυσμάτων ἐπισημηναμένου δίαιμον ὑπάρχον, εἶπε "ταῦτα τἀπίχειρα τῆς φιλίας, ὦ Κεφάλων, κεκομίσμεθα τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον". οὕτως ἐστὶ μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν χρῆμα μετριότης, ὥστε μᾶλλον ὁ παθὼν τοῦ πράξαντος ᾐσχύνετο τὸ γεγονός, εἰ τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων κεκοινωνηκὼς ἔργων ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ Φιλίππου συμφέροντι τοιαῦτα τἀπίχειρα κεκόμισται τῆς εὐνοίας. οὗτος μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλάκις τῆς ἀρχῆς τετευχέναι παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν εἰς τὸ ἔθνος εὐεργεσιῶν, μεταλλάξας τὸν βίον ἔτυχε πρεπούσης τιμῆς καὶ παρὰ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ παρὰ τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν· καὶ γὰρ θυσίας αὐτῷ καὶ τιμὰς ἡρωικὰς ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσα πρὸς αἰώνιον ἀνήκει μνήμην, ὥστʼ εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀποιχομένους ἔστι τις αἴσθησις, εἰκὸς εὐδοκεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ τῇ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εὐχαριστίᾳ καὶ ταῖς ἐν τῷ ζῆν κακοπραγίαις καὶ κινδύνοις. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 106 εχτρ. εχξ. αντ. π. 198; Φίλιππος δὲ — 7 τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ηαβετ ξοδ. πειρ. αβ αντεξεδεντιβυς νον σειυνξτα.]
13. For, after premising that he is going to write about a king most richly endowed by nature with virtue, he has raked up against him every shameful and atrocious charge that he could find. There are therefore but two alternatives: either this writer in the preface to his work has shown himself a liar and a flatterer; or in the body of that history a fool and utter simpleton, if he imagined that by senseless and improper invective he would either increase his own credit, or gain great acceptance for his laudatory expressions about Philip. But the fact is that the general plan of this writer is one also which can meet with no one’s approval. For having undertaken to write a Greek History from the point at which Thucydides left off, when he got near the period of the battle of Leuctra, and the most splendid exploits of the Greeks, he threw aside Greece and its achievements in the middle of his story, and, changing his purpose, undertook to write the history of Philip. And yet it would have been far more telling and fair to have included the actions of Philip in the general history of Greece, than the history of Greece in that of Philip. For one cannot conceive any one, who had been preoccupied by the study of a royal government, hesitating, if he got the power and opportunity, to transfer his attention to the great name and splendid personality of a nation like Greece; but no one in his senses, after beginning with the latter, would have exchanged it for the showy biography of a tyrant. Now what could it have been that compelled Theopompus to overlook such inconsistencies? Nothing surely but this, that whereas the aim of his original history was honour, that of his history of Philip was expediency. As to this deviation from the right path however, which made him change the theme of his history, he might perhaps have had something to say, if any one had questioned him about it; but as to his abominable language about the king’s friends, I do not think that he could have said a word of defence, but must have owned to a serious breach of propriety....
13. πάλαι δὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὸν Λίσσον καὶ τὸν Ἀκρόλισσον ὤν, καὶ σπουδάζων ἐγκρατὴς γενέσθαι τῶν τόπων τούτων, ὥρμησε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· ποιησάμενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ δύʼ ἡμέρας, καὶ διελθὼν τὰ στενά, κατέζευξε παρὰ τὸν Ἀρδάξανον ποταμόν, οὐ μακρὰν τῆς πόλεως. θεωρῶν δὲ τόν τε τοῦ Λίσσου περίβολον καὶ τὰ πρὸς τῇ θαλάττῃ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν μεσόγαιον ἠσφαλισμένον διαφερόντως καὶ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ, τόν τε παρακείμενον Ἀκρόλισσον αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ τὴν εἰς ὕψος ἀνάτασιν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἐρυμνότητα τοιαύτην ἔχοντα φαντασίαν ὥστε μηδʼ ἂν ἐλπίσαι μηδένα κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν, τῆς μὲν περὶ τοῦτον ἐλπίδος ἀπέστη τελέως, τῆς δὲ πόλεως οὐ λίαν ἀπήλπισε. συνθεωρήσας δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα τοῦ Λίσσου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἀκρόλισσον πρόποδος σύμμετρον ὑπάρχον πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τὴν κατὰ τῆς πόλεως, κατὰ τοῦτο διενοήθη συστησάμενος ἀκροβολισμὸν χρήσασθαι στρατηγήματι πρὸς τὸ παρὸν οἰκείῳ. δοὺς δὲ μίαν ἡμέραν πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν τοῖς Μακεδόσι, καὶ παρακαλέσας ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ μέρος καὶ χρησιμώτατον τῶν εὐζώνων ἔτι νυκτὸς εἴς τινας φάραγγας ὑλώδεις ἔκρυψε κατὰ τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς μεσογαίου τόπον ὑπὲρ τὸ προειρημένον διάστημα, τοὺς δὲ πελταστὰς εἰς τὴν ἐπαύριον ἔχων καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τῶν εὐζώνων ἐπὶ θάτερα τῆς πόλεως κατὰ θάλατταν ἐχρῆτο τῇ πορείᾳ. περιελθὼν δὲ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ γενόμενος κατὰ τὸν προειρημένον τόπον, δῆλος ἦν ὡς ταύτῃ ποιησόμενος τὴν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνάβασιν. οὐκ ἀγνοουμένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Φιλίππου παρουσίας ἦν πλῆθος ἱκανὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς πέριξ Ἰλλυρίδος εἰς τὸν Λίσσον ἡθροισμένον· τῷ μὲν γὰρ Ἀκρολίσσῳ διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα πιστεύοντες μετρίαν τινὰ τελέως εἰς αὐτὸν ἀπένειμαν φυλακήν.